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Affectionately dedicated to my friends
Men have sought for aees to discover the science of govern-
ment; and lo l here it is, that men cease totally to
attempt to govern each other at allJ that they learn to
know the consequences of their OT-m acts, and that they
arrange their relations with each other upon such a
basis of science that the disagreeable consequences shall
be assumed by the agent himself.
Stephen Pearl Andrews
VPREFACE
The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine
anarchist thought from a new perspective. Anarchism and
anarchist thought are often portrayed in scholarly works
as moral protest against the modern trends of centralized
production, social injustice resulting from the abuses
of economic and state power, and bureaucratization.
This view of anarchism is a simplistic one that could be
challenged as one-dimensional
,
but it is not my major
concern to do so. Rather, I Intend to go beyond this
by looking at anarchism as a developing social scientific
paradigm that can be considered as "hard" an area of
social theory and critique as any other.
When I began to research this paper, I was
apprehensive that there might be a lack of material
concerning anarchist social science, for I knew of no
book or article written specifically on this subject.
Today, hov?ever, only one year later, I confess to being
humbled by my subject; rather than having to "stretch"
my topic, I have been forced to omit a huge amount of
pertinent material. This paper, therefore, is far more
limited in its scope than I had originally planned it to
be. In the first place, it examines the work of only a
relative few anarchist theorists, albeit the most widely
vl
known ones. Furthermore, it Is almost exclusively
concerned with communitarian anarchism, which is
certainly not the only form of anarchist and libertarian
socialist thought. Finally, a combination of l.anguage
barriers and the unavailability of some important
European sources has placed certain limits upon my
research. Chapter IV, which deals with contemporary
anarchist social science, is especially reflective of
this; the discussion is entirely in terms of contemporary
Anglo-American anarchism.
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that whatever
is stated in this work about areas of social thought
which are non-anarchist must be limited or even implied,
for they are peripheral to the scope of my subject.
This paper represents only one perspective upon one
aspect of a highly complex subject. A critique covering
anarchist, liberal, Marxist, and conservative social
sciences must be left undone for now. Such an attempt
to inter-relate so many facets of the "social science"
dilemma would be an undertaking of monumental proportions.
I am indebted to my family and all of my friends
for their unflagging toleration, understanding and
encouragement in the past year. However, I*d like to
thank Alex Shi shin in particular for his stimulating
comments and for many lively hours of discussion relating
Vll
to this paper. Special thanks, too. to Murray Bookchln
for helping me define this topic, and to Sam and Esther
Dolgoff for opening their personal library to me.
thereby giving me access to several rare books and
pamphlets. My greatest debt Is to Will Petry. whose
assistance and support at every stage of my research
and writing has been more valuable than I could ever
say.
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CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT 0? SOCIAL SCIENCE IN RELATION
TO NINETEENTH CENTURY ANARCHISM
The Development of Social Science as a Radical
Crltloue of Pre-Nineteenth Century i^ethods of
Studying; Society
The development of anarchist social science is a
fairly recent phenomenon, but its roots can be traced
beyond the existence of a distinctly self-aware anarchist
movement beginning in the nineteenth century. Because
its history is so closely related to that of early
social science, this chapter will begin with a brief
discussion of the rise of sociology and political
economy before we proceed to examine the early theories
of communitarian anarchism.
The actual origins of social sclence--that is, the
method developed for use in the natural sciences applied
to the study of individual life and society—are tied to
the scientific "revolution” directly set in motion
largely by Sir Isaac Newton, Nicolaus Copernicus, and
Galileo Galilei. However, it was Thomas Hobbes who
effectively developed a scientific consciousness that
embodied the mode of inquiry and explanation used in the
natural sciences in a social theory. Hoboes, in the
midst of the English Revolutionary period, attempted to
1
2use Ne;vton*s la^^^s of colliding matter and gravitational
restraint to create a theory of social order and law
with an explicitly mechanistic Newtonian flavor. He
transposed Newton’s thought into a social context, with
human and social movement conceived of as a result of
reaction. Pleasure and pain became physical functions,
while humans were held to be subject to the laws of
Inertia— i.e., people and societies were seen by Hobbes
as objects either animate or at rest that remained in
motion or at rest if external forces remained constant.
However, it must be remembered that Hobbes* break from
a religious vjay of knowing was not a total one, for he
seems to have been influenced as much by the traditional
Augustinian viev; of a divinely ordered worldly existence
as by Nevjton’s universal laws of matter.^
Later, in English and French Enlightenment thought
and in the American Revolution, emphasis began to be
placed upon knowing the world in terms of a rationally
determined and mechanistic law of motion. Jean-Jaccues
Rousseau, for example, looked for the origin of government
Isee especially Part III, ”0f a Christian
Coramonvjealth** and Part IV, ”0f the Kingdom of Darknesse"
of Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London; Pelican Books,
1972 ) .
3and property In his First and Second Discourses not by
looking to the Bible, but rather in using what he felt
was reason, for he was greatly Influenced by the
scientific spirit of the age. Enlightenment thought
considered ideas to be reflected in the natural laws of
the universe; a scientific construction of matter and
reason was consulted for explanations in both the
physical and social realms. Typical examples of this
attitude may be found in the works of writers in the
genre of Thomas Jefferson, Joseph Priestley, Benjamin
Rush, and Thomas Paine,
The scientific mode of thought and scientific
rationalism icere at first considered by Enlightenment
thinkers to be better conceptual frameworks than any
previous ones for studying individual, social, and
political realities. Eventually, the scientific
outlook became the only valid perspective for most. It
is impossible to pinpoint any one definite date, person,
or idea as the genesis of the scientific mythos as the
foundation of modern Western knowing and doing. The
scientific consciousness had been slowly developing in
Western thought during the Middle Ages and Renaissance,
and finally came forth in the Enlightenment in such a
way as to replace gradually the earlier religious rules
of natural order—that is, mystical modes of knowing
what is real and of living in the material world.
4A new way of knowing social reality has to be
coupled with a doing process if it is to have any
validity for social life. As has already been stated,
the rise of scientific social consciousness was tied to
the development of the natural sciences. The impact of
the latter upon both the educated strata and the masses
was tremendous. The increasing capabilities of science
to create new and visible "miracles , ” technological
Innovations, and rational explanations debunked many
traditional and mystical conceptions of the world. The
revolutionary upheavals of the same era--from the
peasant wars of the Reformation to the French Revolutlon--
seem to have been the starting impulse for the doing
belief in the social realm that made social science
possible. Admittedly, this sketch may be seen as all too
brief, but then, it is primarily the purpose here to
stress general trends rather than to delve into the
complexities and details of European history.
The French Revolution, which is often seen as the
crucial point in the development of social science, may
be better understood as an outstanding point in a
developing process reaching back into earlier Western
history. Furthermore, not only was the French Revolution
the culmination of a process creating social scientific
consciousness, but it also served as the impulse that
gave rise to the development of most of the modern
5political and social movements and theories of our oi-m
era. One lesson that the French Revolution demonstrated
to the more aware segments of the population was that
the social world was not only comprehensible, in a
manner similar to that employed in the study of the
world of matter, but that it xvas also changeable in
scientific fashion. Social change w^ould be effected
methodically in the sense that human reason could
consciously create a new social order.
With the French Revolution, the order of the Old
Regime, based upon superstition and mysticism, was
discredited so that it no longer represented the epitome
of wisdom and morality. In its place, nex^ social
conventions arose that were scientifically oriented,
eventually displacing most of the religious rules of
natural order. According to the belief of at least the
articulate elements, the truth of scientific reason,
after the temporary "reign of terror," would bring about
a "reign of virtue,” for with reason humans would not
only be able to knoxv the real but could also make the
possible a social reality. Order, no longer the realm
of the divine , was transformed into the realm of reason
by means of humanly-implemented social and political
structures. Thus, the French Revolution overturned not
only the Old Regime, but also the thourht of the Old
Regime, making a pla.ce for the nex\^ way of thinking and
6making possible a new ‘reasoned” life-style for everyone.
Early social scientific thinking is developed in
the works of Henri de Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, and
many others. Therefore, let us turn briefly to some of
the basic assumptions of these early nineteenth century
social theorists.
The early social scientists saw the social world as
both understandable and alterable according to their own
scientifically conceived plans of natural order.
Archtypical was Saint-Simon, who could be considered the
founder of both socialism and social science. He felt
that the Western world was in a state of disruption and
disharmony because society’s economic base was still
ensnared in feudal and mystical thought and customs. In
his view, the political reforms of the French Revolution
were only feeble steps in the right direction in the
process of rationalizing the economic order of existence.
The scientific plan of social life, for Saint-Simon,
was to be instituted by the bankers, industrialists,
and scientists, who would join forces in order to
rationally re-order society from a managerial position.
Once this was accomplished, everyone would benefit from
the rule of enlightened judgment. The old form of human
administration, politics, was an irrational and
inconsistent phenomenon that had to be replaced by a
system of scientific management that would control all
7aspects of the economy for the benefit of all.
Auguste Comte, who was a disciple of Saint-Simon*
s
for a time but who later broke with him, decided that he,
Comte, was the person who could undertake the task of
synthesizing the sciences and philosophy in order to
create a new schema V7hich would embrace all scientific
thought, both natural and social. He viewed his plan,
which he called positivism, as the key to a new age.
Fositivi sm consists essentially of a Philosophy and
a Polity. Tnese can never be dissevered, the
former -eing the basis, and the latter the end of one
comprehensive system, in which our intellectual
faculties and our social sympathies are brought
into close correlation with each other. For in the
first place, the science of Society, besides being
more Important than any other, supplies the only
logical and scientific link by which all our varied
observations of phenomena con be brought into one
consistent whole. Of this science it is even more
true than any of the preceding sciences, that its
real character carwiot be understood without explaining
its exact relation in all general features xv^ith the
art corresponding to it. Now here v:e find a
coincidence which is assuredly not fortuitious. At
the very time when the theory of society is being
laid down, an immense sphere is opened for the
application of that theory; the direction, namely, of
the social regeneration of Western Europe.
2
When this ” science of Society” became an important
concern for a growing minority of intellectuals and for a
limited number among the masses, as it did during the
third decade of the century, the problem arose as to how
**the application of that theory” to society—or to the
^Auguste Comte, A General View of Positivism ,
trans. by J.H. Bridges (New York: Robert Speller and
Sons, 1957 ), pp. 1-2.
8’’Polity,” in Comte’s ovm words—would be accomplished.
Comte, whose conceptions of human community were rooted
In the conservative medievalist thought of Louis G. A. de
Bonald and Joseph de Maistre,^ envisioned Positivism as
the functional replacement of the medieval Church during
and after society’s transition from its ’’metaphysical” to
its ”scientific" stage. A new priestly-scientific elite
would arise which would guide humanity in the tenets of
the ’’Religion of Humanity” --the dogma of science—which
in turn would radically reshape life according to society's
natural law. His system was basically a reformulation of
the Old Regime’s ideals in scientific terms. Thus, Comte
has the dubious distinction of being the first modern
scientific reactionary, but it is the method rather than
the content of the Science of Man that is the concem here.
Although today it is often regarded as quixotic,
messianic and even quite nonsensical (criticisms which are
not entirely unjustified), the thought of Comte,
Saint-Simon, and other of the post-Enlightenment
philosophers, especially Charles Fourier, presaged the
coming of the Age of Science and its tremendous influence
upon social life and thought. As one modern writer has
analyzed Fourier, elegance, pleasure, and comfort were
^Lewis A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought;,
Ideas in Historical and Social Context (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich , Inc, , 1971 ). 21 . Also see Leon
Bramson, The Political Context of Sociology (Princeton,
N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1970), Chapter I.
9cornerstones of his thought.
Every detail of life is clearly specified; the
number of inhabitants in each Phalanx (1,620), based
on Fourier’s notion of a ’complete scale of
characters’; the ratio of sexes; the division of
profits; the layout of rooms, dining-halls, libraries,
workshops, etc. Fourier, as a child of the Enlightenment
,
was in his own way a meticulous scientist, a veritable
social Newton, who formulated a complete cosmology to
replace the order of his era.^
One of the most Important effects of these thinkers’ work
and of the French Revolution, which had motivated them
and which continued to have a great Impact upon European
life for decades after it had occurred, was the scientific
consciousness vrhich developed and expanded so that it
became the sturdy "trunk" from which socialism and social
science diverged throughout the early and mid-nineteenth
century. As Peter Kropotkin stated in his study of the
French Revolution, "What we learn to-day from the study
of the Great Revolution is that it was the source and
origin of all the present communist, anarchist, and
socialist conceptions,
The Development of Socialism as an Integral
Part of the Rise of Social Science
Thus far, the text may seem only remotely connected,
if at all, to the question of anarchist social science. It
^Murray Bookchin, The Limits of the City (New York:
Harper and Rovj, 197^). ?• H3«
^Peter Kropotkin, The Great French Revolution , trans.
by N. F. Dryhurst (London and New York; William Heinemann and
G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909; reprint ed. , Ne'w York: Schocken
Books, 1971). P» 581 .
10
must be remembered, however, that anarchism did not nor
could it have arisen from a social and conceptual vacuum;
its development was within the context of advances in the
natural sciences and of the revolutionary conditions and
changes that characterized the years around the turn of
the nineteenth century in Europe and in the United States.
Two major factors leading to its conception have thus far
been briefly discussed: first, the development of the
natural sciences, both physical and biological, and their
impact upon religious realities and thought patterns;
and second, the English, American, and French Revolutions
and the tradition of the Enlightenment
,
all of vjhich
demonstrated that society was humanly ordered and was
therefore changeable. To this list must be added a third
element, which can be deduced from the preceding tvro—
that is, the rise of modern industrialism (technology)
and its impact and potential impact upon human life, both
individual and social. The Influence of these three
elements can be identified in the works of Saint-Simon,
Comte, and Fourier, as well as in the professed principles
of the rudimentary socialist movement which sprang "from
the head” of the French Revolution. The "common
denominator" these factors produced was the assumption
that society was not only within the grasp of human
reason, but that it was also malleable and could be made
very different in essence from what it was if certain
11
scientific prescripts were correctly applied to social
problems
.
With the rise of acceptable scientific interpretations
of social life, there also began the growth of the modern
socialist tradition, x^rlth Saint-Simon, Fourier, Robert
Owen, Louis Blanc, Etienne Cabet, Pierre -Joseph Proudhon,
Karl Marx, et. al. providing the theoretical inspiration
for the popular movement. However, politically speaking,
socialism was visible In nascent form in the French
Revolution in the activities of "Enrages” like Jacques
Roux and Jean Varlet and in Gracchus Babeuf’s "Conspiracy
of Equals." Later, Kropotkin, in The Great French
Revolution
,
and Marx and Friedrich Engels (as X'lell as many
others) traced the roots of socialism to the French
Revolution in the left insurgent trends which were
arrested by the development of bourgeois capitalism and
the Thermodorian and Napoleonic reaction following the
Revolution. Socialism, both libertarian and authoritarian,^
^"Most of these terms have a major disadvantage:
they fail to express the basic characteristics of the
doctrine they are supposed to describe. Anarchism is
really a synonym for socialism. The anarchist is
primarily a socialist whose aim is to abolish the
exploitation of man by man. Anarchism is only one of the
streams of socialist thought, that stream whose main
components are concern for liberty and haste to abolish
the State, Adolph Fischer, one of the Chicago martyrs,
claimed that 'every anarchist is a socialist, but every
socialist is not necessarily an anarchist.'" Daniel
Guerin, Anarchism , trans. Mary Klcpcer, with Introduction
by Noam Chomsky (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970),
p. 12,
12
as an outgrowth of social science, can be seen as a
result of the shortcomings of the French Revolution and
the general failure of the Enlightenment to translate
Itself into practice. For this reason, it is like one
of its ancestors, Comte*s positivism, a modernized
conservative hybrid bom of the same revolutionary
disappointment.
Because socialism, and thus anarchism, arose out
of the hopes raised by the French Revolution, it was
heir to the ideals--"Liberty
,
Equality and Fraternity”
—
7
of the unfinished revolution whose meaning, derived
from the core ethics of the Enlightenment, vfas distorted
with the rise of Industrial capitalism and of reactionary
o
politics. Yet the growth of industrialism Inspired a
dream which some felt could free humanity from its earthly
history and seeming destiny of drudgery under exploitative
tyrannies. Murray Bookchin points out that those hoping
*^See Pierre -Joseph Proudhon, General Idea of the
Revolution in the Nineteenth Century , trans. John B.
Robinson ( London : Freedom Press, 1923’. reprint ed. , New
York: Gordon Press, 1972), especially Chapter 1, for a
discussion of the idea that the unfulfilled ideals of
the French Revolution would bring about further
revolutions to fulfill them.
^Guerin feels that anarchism is the heir of the
Enlightenment tradition: se^ his Anarchism . For
further discussion of this, see Rudolf Rocker, "Anarchism
and Anarcho-Syndicalism" (London: Freedom Press, 1973)
and Noam Chomsky, "Notes on Anarchism," in For Reasons
of State (New York: Vintage Books, 1973)*
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to change society vlevred the new technologies of
industrialism—the fruits of science—as the potential
liberators of humanity, for those innovations,
both in their promise and their llraltations exercised
a profound influence on nineteenth century
revolutionary thought. The innovations in textile
and iron-making technology provided a new sense of
promise. Indeed a new stimulus, to socialist and
utopian thought. It seemed to the revolutionary
theorist that for the first time in history he could
anchor his dreams of a liberatory society in the
visible prospect of material abundance and increased
leisure for the mass of humanity. Socialism, the
theorist argued, could be based on self-interest
rather than on man’s dubious nobility of mind and
spirit. Technological innovation had transmitted
the socialist ideal from a vague humanitarian hope
into a practical program. 9
Socialism, as it developed, began to shed the ascetic
ethic characteristic of its earliest days, when it had
been comparable to early Christianity in its idealistic
and self-abnegating brotherhoods. For socialists
witnessing the adv^tnces in technology, communallty and
community suddenly became possible in the context of
material life, for the comprehensibility and changeability
of societal life and function took on a dramatic new
meaning. Socialist consciousness raised a hope for a
new world order and spawned various schools and ideals
of socialism, all of which hoped to give concrete form
to the Ideals of ’’Liberty, Equality and Fraternity." It
was generally believed within the socialist tradition
^Murray Bookchin, Post -Scarcity Anarchism (Berkeley:
Ramparts Press, 1971). pp. 88-89.
l4
that once the true basis of life was comprehended
accurately, a new and better society built upon scientific
principles could be founded. Instead of humanity being
acted upon blindly by nature or Its being exploited by
a small minority, the new sciences and their technology
would make socialism a practical proposal and Its social
science understandable to all; Industrialism’s potential
meant that people would not have to wait for the churches*
absolution from the curse of Adam, nor would they have to
toil endlessly until the liberation from material life,
death. To the early socialists, it was their social
science that provided the glimpse of an alternative to
the bourgeois organization of society. For them,
socialism and social science became almost synonymous,
for knowing how society functioned seemed to entail a
demand for reform in accordance with the "rules of
natural order" that scientific study discovered.
Socialism viewed Itself as social science carried to its
logical conclusion--that economic and social reorganization
be carried out and this in a rational manner with a
commitment to the institution of a classless social
structure which would use technology by or for all.^^
lOiiBy or for all" depended upon what kind of
socialism was in question. "For all" applied largely to
authoritarian socialism and "by all" to libertarian
socialism, but then, there were varying degrees in between
these concepts which resulted in the advocacy of mixed
forms of control over technology and people within the
socialist movement.
15
Here we must turn to the work of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon,
the first conscious anarchist, who formulated anarchism
—
libertarian socialism—as a new type of societal
ors;anization arising directly as a result of the
application of the principles of the socialist social
science of his day.
The Emergence of Anarchism as an Outgrowth
of Socialism and of Social Science
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
It is in the i^ork of "the father of us all," as
Michael Bakunin called Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, in which
can be seen the development of an actualized self-conscious
anarchism within socialism. Although anarchist ideas
predate Proudhon (and have had great impact, both direct
and indirect, upon the development of anarchism;
especially Important has been the work of William Godwin)
,
it was he who first used the term "anarchist" in its
present sense, and it is because of his work that the
anarchist movement became conscious of itself and
deliberately bercan to help shape its own history in order
to construct anarchism as a positive reality for some
persons, if not as an actuality for many at this time.^^
llNew modes of social thought are often considered
extremely "utopian," far from concrete reality. However,
this is an inaccurate generalization , as ideas usually do
not arise in a vacuum. The so-called "utopias," if one
examines them critically, as did Marie -ijouise Berneri in
Journey Through Utopia (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
16
To start to study Proudhon’s thought in relation to the
socialist notion of science as a socially beneficial
process is to be.o:in to see the motivating force for
anarchist social science-— i .
e
.
,
the impulse to design
a social community.
Proudhon’s philosophy is a difficult topic to
breach. Admittedly, it is nearly impossible to do
Justice to such a copious body of thought, even when
dealing with Just one limited aspect of his thought—in
this case, his influence upon the definition of anarchism
as a distinct school of socialist thought and his
reinterpretation of and selective integration from the
social sciences of his era to serve as the basis of an
anarchist social science.
I 95O; reprint ed . , New York: Schocken Books, 19?l), look
strangely similar to their times and are in fact anchored
firmly in the social milieus of their creators.
12it must be remembered that this discussion is
highly selective and in no way gives the full flavor or
meaning of the multi-faceted thought of Proudhon, who v:as
most concerned with Justice, morality, and labor. For one
of the better discussions of Proudhon, see Guerin’s
Anarchism .
Another difficulty in the study of Proudhon is that
his work is almost inaccessible on this side of the
Atlantic and little of it is in English. Those books that
are in English are mostly his early works. What Is
Property? (l840) and The System of Economic Contradictions
( l8'i-6) were translated and publisned by Benjamin Tucker,
the individualist anarchist, in the l880’s. The General
Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century {T851 ) was
translated by John 3e‘'?’erley Robinson and published in 1923
by Freedom Press. War and Peace was transl.ated by
Bartholomeo Vanzetti while he was in Dedham Prison but
17
Proudhon drew heavily from the socialist tradition
and movement and from the social sciences of his time,
both of which were becoming more acceptable (if not
primary) ways of explaining the social world. He
attempted to actualize v^hat he felt was a "true" social
science, using the existing sources in political economy
to explain how the industrial -market system functioned
and drawing upon certain stated socialist Ideals to
create a vision of a society based upon a rational and
social use of technology for the use and benefit of all.
Although Proudhon, introduced to socialism by Moses Hess
(the noted German radical of the previous generation who
also "converted" Engels)
,
drew quite heavily from Comte
and his Positive science of reality and Saint-Simon's
and Fourier's socialist conceptions of an ideal rational
material society, he himself admitted only three definite
influences on his thought: Adam Smith, Georg Friedrich
Hegel, and the Bible. Nevertheless, the impression made
by others, especially by the previous generation of
seems never to have been published. There are two books
of selections from Proudhon in English: Proudhon's
Solution to the Social Problem , compiled in 192? by Henry
Cohen, containing selections on mutual ban’-'lng and
published by Vanguard Press; and the -ore recent (1969)
anthology. The Selected VJriting-s of Pierre-Josenh ?roudho_n ,
compiled by Stewart Edwards and published by Doubleday.
As welcome as they are, these works nevertheless
overemphasize Proudhon's economic works and underrepresent
his overtly Dolitical 77riting, especially from
( 1858 ) and The Political Capacity of the V/orking Class (lbb5;
18
**utopiau socialists” and political economists, is
apparent. Dravfing from Smith and the other political
economists and from Saint-Simon' s industrial
-managerial
socialism and Fourier's phalanstry social life (which
pictured whole individuals engaged in agriculture and
manual labor in stark contrast to the prevailing system
of alienating labor that served only to enrich the
capitalist and the state at the expense of community and
individuals* physical and psychic well-being), he
concluded that the economic structures were the base of
human society and therefore that the understanding of
these structures was a most critical intellectual
endeavor. Such knowledge could be gained in the study
of political economy. He wrote,
Political economy is, therefore, the natural history
of the most apparent and most universally accredited
customs, traditions, practices and methods of
humanity in all that concerns itself in fact and in
right : in fact, because the phenomena which it
studies are constant, spontaneous, and universal; in
right because these phenomena rest on the authority
of the human race, the strongest authority possible.
Consequently
,
political economy called itself a
science; that is a rational and systematic knowledge
of regular and necessary facts. 13
Because the subject of political economy dealt
Indirectly with basic human needs--food, clothing, and
l3pierre-Joseph ProU'ihon, 'The System of Economic
Contradictions, trans. Benjamin R. Tucker, The Evolution
of Capitalism Series (Boston; Benjamin R. Tucker, l888;
reprint ed. , New York: Arno Press, 1972), pp. 45-46.
19
shelter—in relation to the market
-system, for Proudhon,
as for Marx and Engels and other early socialists, the
political economists Smith, J.B. Say and David Ricardo
were precursors of true economic social science;
ironically, then, the latter writers were indirectly
founders of socialism. In contrast to Comte's Positivist
"Religion of Humanity," political economy was more
comprehensible. It was more suited to detailed explanation
of the operations of bourgeois economy. Furthermore,
it could be modified for use as a critique of bourgeois
society and as a conceptual tool for the theoretical
construction of a socialist alternative, despite the
bourgeois sympathies and biases of its founders, theorists
and most adherents.
Unlike Smith, Say, and the other bourgeois political
economists, Proudhon saw nothing scientific—"rational
and systematic"—about the way in which the capitalist
economy functioned in his time, viewing the idea that
it was scientific as based upon an acute fallacy. He
criticized Say specifically and bourgeois political
economy in general.
, . . Say says, and repeats, that value being based
on utility, and utility depending entirely on our
needs, whims, customs, etc., value is as variable as
opinion. Now political economy being the science of
values, of their production, distribution, exchange,
and consumption , --if exchangeable value cannot be
absolutely determined, how is political economy
possible? How can it be a science? How can two
economists look each other in the face without
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laughing? How dare they Insult metaphysicians and
psychologists? ... And the Hermes of economy,
Trismegistus Say, devoting half a volume to the
amplification of the solemn text, political economy
is a science
,
has the courage to affirm immediately
afterwards that this science cannot determine its
object, —which is equivalent to saying that it is
without a principle or foundation! He does not know,
then, ... the nature of a science; or rather, he
knows nothing of the subject which he discusses.
Say*s example has borne its fruits. Political
economy, as it exists at present, resembles ontology:
discussing effects and causes, it knovrs nothing,
decides nothing. The ideas honored with the name of
economic laws are nothing more than a few trifling
generalities, to which the economists thought to
give an appearance of depth by clothing them in high
sounding words. As for the attempts that have been
made by the economists to solve social problems, all
that can be said of them is that if a glimmer of sense
occasionally appears in their lubrications, they
Immediately fall b^ck into absurdity.
Yet these forerunners of socialism in political economy
had actually begun the process of abstraction and theory
construction which made the economic functions of society
intelligible, making possible the socialist reformulation
of economic thought so as to be congruent with the Ideals
of science and of new conceptions of social justice.
Political economy explained bourgeois society in terms of
economic realities of the market—e.g. , supply and demand--
and of individual economic Interests. It was left to
socialist social science to explicate the human realities
of the market system and to find ways to actualize the
l^Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, VJhat Is Property? (n.p. :
Humboldt Publishing Co., ca. I89O; reprint ed.
,
New York:
Dover Books, 1970 ), pp. 136 -137 *
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potential for freedom within society by reconstructing
society around the economic interests of all. Since all
humanity faced the same economic needs—"the laws of
necessity itself"^5—the economic base of society was a
basic fact of the structure of all human societies and
was the unifying principle of life. "Necessity," said
Proudhon
,
. . . is inevitably the same throughout the world
fancOdoes not depend upon the fancies of men or nations:
it yields to the caprice of none. There is not a
Russian. English, Austrian, Tartar, or Hindoo
political economy, anymore than there is a Hungarian,
German or American physics or geometry. Truth alone
is equal everywhere: science is the unity of mankind.^°
It was exactly here, in the universality of necessity
—
the basic physical requirements of life—that Proudhon
saw his socialist critique of pd*litlcal economy becoming
scientific. That is, the "unity" of humankind in necessity
demanded a new form of social life which the bourgeois
society and its political economy denied, grounded as
they were in competition and the advancement of existing
structures. Bourgeois political economy, for Proudhon,
denied the basic reality of social life in its paradigmatic
inability to accept the laws of necessity as the
determinants of labor and value.
To eliminate the dilemma of value and labor in
^
-^Proudhon, The General Idea of the Revolution , p. 29^
•
l^Ibid .
,
p. 283.
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political economy, which, as a socialist he considered
its most severe error, Proudhon stressed need as the
central concern and criterion of value rather than
artificial market standards.
Has every creation of industry a venal, absolute,
unchangeable
,
and consequently legitimate and true
value? —Yes.
Can every product of man be exchanged for some
other product of man? —Yes again.
Hovr many nails is a pair of shoes worth?
If we can solve this appalling problem, we shall
have the key of the social system for x^rhich humanity
has been searching for six thousand years. In the
presence of this problem the economist recoils
confused; the peasant who can neither read nor write
replies without hesitation: *As many as can be made
in the same time, and x^ith the same expense. '17
For Proudhon, then, the solution of the social problem was
in allowing the universal laws of necessity to reconstruct
the economy so that a unity of humanity in a new social
life (not that unlike Comte's "Religion of Humanity")
would be made possible by a new social order based upon
the exchange of need. This solution, as an offensive
position, necessarily generated political activism (as
did all of the socialist sects) in contrast to bourgeois
political economy, which as an integral part of the
capitalist establishment, had the more passive role of
reinforcing the status quo. It is interesting to note
in passing that although the characters and particulars
of the situation have changed, its structure remains
17proudhon, What Is Property? , p. 137 *
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basically unchanged to this day.
Since only work (labor) could fulfill human needs
equitably, the world of work had to be constructed. Under
Proudhon’s new order, force, necessary to hold together
a society based upon the maintenance of private property--
"theft”—and remnants of feudal privilege would no longer
be necessary for cohesiveness; Indeed, physical coercion
would be antithetical to the promotion of true unity.
Instead, if labor was evenly exchanged, harmony would be
achieved spontaneously. Although the process of economic
reconstruction in Proudhon’s system was modeled after the
scheme of the philosopher Fourier, .in the hands of Proudhon,
a puritanical moralist, Fourier’s social program, which
the latter posited as a necessary adjunct of his economic
plan, was transformed from a conception of community based
on harmony of the (passionate) senses into a community in
which harmony would arise only from the "sensual”
gratification of hard work and moral prudence. Regarding
harmony, Proudhon wrote:
It is an inv^ard pleasure, to be found as much in
solitary meditative reflection as in the bustle of
the workshop. It results from the worker’s sense
that he is making full use of his faculties--the
strength of his body, the skill of his hands and the
agility of his mind; it comes from his sense of
pride at overcoming difficulties, at taming nature,
at acquiring knowledge and at guaranteeing his
independence. It is a sense of communion with the
rest of the human race through the memory of past
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strucrgles, through Identity of purpose and the
equal sharing of well-being.
The unity of life and reason—the comprehensibility and
order of utility and function demanded by economic
necessity—would be attained spontaneously once society
was unburdened of the crass monopolies and superstitions
of privilege which deny the true value of each person's
labor and the value of collective labor^^ and which
prohibit the operation of society according to the laws
of necessity.
Proudhon summed up his economic theory thus:
Utility equals utility.
Function equals function.
Service pays for service.
One day's work equals another day's work.
All products will be paid for by the products that
have cost the same in effort and expense.^®
The new order would be a world of justice and rational
^^Plerre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings of
P.J. Proudhon
,
edited by Steviart Edwards, trans.
Elizabeth Fraser (Garden City, N.X. : Doubleday & Company,
Inc., 1969). pp. 81-82.
^^The concept of collective labor, or "collective
force" as Proudhon called it, was an original concept of
his meaning ba.sically that cumulative action is worth
more in terms of productivity than the labor of separate
individuals. Thus the achievement of ten workers doing
one task for one hour is greater than that of one worker
doing that task for ten hours. The concept is closely
tied to the idea of the division of labor, which Proudhon
regarded as a "correlative facet of the same law" --the
division of labor becnmes a collective force. See
Proudhon, Selected V/ri tings
,
p. 45 .
^Qlbid.
,
p. 64 .
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equity in all things—mutualism—and of the rational
realm of science In which the exchange of necessity for
kind would be actualized for all people by the natural
social process.
In order to put things right the proletariat Is
called upon to provide a pattern for order, that Is
to say to create the very science of Economics. 21
This "pattern for order," shaped by the needs of the
existing society's productive segments ("proletariat"
had a wider meaning for Proudhon than it did for Marx)
,
would materialize as societies of mutual work with a
people's mutual bank as a "broker" for these groups
exchange labor and value on a scientifically determined
basis of equity.
According to Proudhon, when society becomes aware
that universal labor is the functional basis of life,
the society of true scientific socialism will begin to
come into being. The process will commence vjhereby the
functional and pragmatic working class will replace the
medieval and industrial lords of the irrational past as
the determining influence upon economic, social and
political activity. Property, which Proudhon defined as
theft because its basis is in privilege rather than in
the recognition of labor as value, will cease to exist.
Furthermore, the new economic order will spawn a new
^^Proudhon, Selected Writings, pp, 46-4-7
.
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moral order as the values of the working class become
the basis of a new morality of labor. The working
class, once aware of itself as a functional class, will
become a political class. It then will redraw society
according to its own values and the scientific guidelines
of the new political economy, mutualism.
Strongly influenced by Hegelian thought, Proudhon
looked at the history of social life as the development
of a social consciousness by which humanity became aware
of Itself throughout successive stages of evolutionary
development. He saw a dialectic of progress in society,
moving from instinct unconscious of Itself in the
beginning toward self-aware reason at some time in future
history.
In human society instinct and reason, which are
present there in parallel to each other, are both
raised to their highest level. Humanity and Divinity
are, in the Social Body, combined, but first of all
they are antagonistic
. The manifestations of instinct
constitute Divine or Providential rule, while the
manifestations of philosophy constitute the rule of
liberty. Religions, empires, the poetry, and
monuments of the past are created by social
spontaneity, which reason ceaselessly revises and
rejuvenates
.
But in society as well as in the individual,
reason and reflection always triumph over instinct
and spontaneity. This is the characteristic feature
of our species and it accounts for the fact that we
progress. It follows that Nature in us seems to
retreat while Reason comes to the fore, or, in other
words, God retires and Mankind advances.
^^Proudhon, Selected Writings, pp. 242-2'4'3.
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Dialectical development, then. Is the process by which
rationality overcomes unconscious Instinct, and in so
doing creates true scientific method. This, in turn,
ultimately transcends and transforms all prior forms of
knowing and doing. It is Interesting to note that there
are strong August! nlan overtones in this view of human
nature as he saw it evidenced in past history.
The closer man is to the beasts, the more deeply he
is sunk into that miserable condition the philosophers
of the last century termed a state of nature
,
the
more he is forced to rely on the use of his oT^m limbs
and, as a result, the less he fulfills his potential
and the less he works. Social progress is assessed in
terms of the development of industry and the
sophistication of tools. A man who cannot or does
not know how to work with tools is an anomaly or a
freak. He cannot be called a man.^3
As for Saint-Simon, Comte ,- Fourier
,
Marx, et al.
,
the ultimate goal of humanity was for Proudhon the
progressive development of reason as the scientific basis
of society. The quote belovj illustrates the fact that
Proudhon was thinking in terms highly similar to
Saint-Simon and Comte when he dealt with what he felt was
the epistemology of science.
. . .
there have been three great stages in the
development of human knowledge: the Religious, the
Philosophic, and the Scientific. . . .
3y Progress I mean the mind's upward movement,
through the three successive stages of Religion,
Philosophy and Metaphysics, toxvard Science.
^^Proudhon, Selected Writings , pp. 239"240.
^
^Ibid.
,
p. 239 .
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As human reason matured In successive stages of comprehending
the world, so too would the means for doing—creating a
society in harmony with the laws of economic necessity.
In Proudhon’s work, as in the tradition of social science,
society was not only knowable but actually changeable
’’the science of society” and positivism were alike in
this respect—
—and with a reasoned economic base, humanity
would enter a stage of development in which a higher
level of ordered life would be the result of a harmony
with natural laws. It is apparent that within this
conceptual framework, socialism becomes scientific only
if it constitutes more than criticism.
... so long as it restricts itself to criticizing
existing politics and economics and puts forward its
hypothesis for criticism
,
[socialism^ is a form of
protest. Insofar as it formulates practical positive
ideas, it is the same as social science. 25
Consequently
,
Proudhon favored a realistic and constructive
type of socialism and insisted that it synthesize two
vital characteristics:
Socialism is right to protest against politics!
economy and say that it is simply an unthinking
mechanism, and political economy is right to say
that socialism is merely an unrealistic utopia which
cannot possibly come into being. But since each in
turn is denying something, socialism humanity's past
experience and political economy humanity's reason,
both are inadequate statements about the truth of
human life.
Social science is the marriage of reason and social
practices. While our former teachers had only rare
glimpses of this science, it v;ill be given to us in
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this century to contemplate it in all its splendor
and sublime harmony,
Thus social science and anarchism are functional
equivalents in that they both can create an equitable
social order wnich is the ultimate goal of humanity.
Proudhon posited anarchism as his eoulvalent of
the Kantian categorical imperative for the just, happy
and harmonious adoption of humans to the business of
meeting necessity. The new order would find its own
meaning and function in the practical and rational
economy (mutualism) and its adjunctive social system
(anarchism). Organized coercion, the state, incompatible
with rational systems, would disappear and a new sort of
"government" would take its place.
By the word [Anarch,^ I wanted to indicate the extreme
limit of political progress. Anarchy is, if I may be
permitted to put it this way, a form of government
or constitution in which public and private
consciousness, formed through the development of
service and lav:, is alone sufficient to maintain
order and guarantee all liberties.
The order that vrould prevail is anarchy, the social order
of social science and the practical and functional form
of socialism,
Proudhon’s contribution to later anarchist thought
concerning social science and socialism must be viewed
^^Proudhon, Selected Writings , p. 5^*
27lbld.
. pp. 91-92.
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as an Immense one, even from a critical perspective.
It was he who took the first step towards formulating
a coherent theory of anarchism that could serve as both
a critique and an ideal, although it is true that his
work appeared at an opportune moment in history; in
contrast to other anarchistic thinkers (especially
Godwin)
,
it w'^ s not necessary for the anarchist movement
to ^rediscover” Proudhon. Nevertheless, he was truly
"the father of us all”; he was to be followed by a
school of successors who would build upon his work,
reformulate it, and in many ways change it. He was
able to amalgamate elements of the* socialism, political
economy, and philosophy of his era—the positivism of
Comte, the dialectical mode of inquiry of Hegel and
Kant, the economic content of Smith et al.
,
and even
some traditional elements, as well as many of the
beliefs of his predecessors and contemporaries within
the socialist raovement--to comprise his unique theory,
which is the forerunner of modern anarchism. He should
certainly be considered part of the socialist tradition
(he is sometimes "read out” by socialists who are
unsympathetic to anarchist thought)
,
for like all of his
contemporaries within the socialist movement(s), he
viewed the comprehensibility and changeability of life
due to the promises of technology as both possible and
imminent. And, like his fellow socialists, he saw a
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formal social science as entirely compatible with and
in fact auxiliary to socialism in practice. Furthermore,
that social science, if it was to apply to social
reconstruction, had to be clearly defined in terms of
a universally applicable social order.
It is our first business, then, to ascertain
what a science of society must be.
Science in general is the logically arranged
and systematic knowledge of that which is. Applying
this idea to society, we will say; Social science
is the logically arranged and systematic knowledge,
not of that which society has been
, nor of that which
it will be, but of that which it is in its whole
life; that is, in the sum total of its successive
manifestations ; for there alone can it have reason
and system. Social science must include human order,
not alone in such or such a period of duration, nor
in a few of its elements; but in all its principles
and in the totality of its existence; as if social-
science, spread throughout time, should find Itself
suddenly gathered and fixed in a picture which,
exhibiting the series of the ages and the sequence
of phenomena, revealed their connection and unity.
Such must be the science of every living and progressive
reality; such social science indisputably is. 28
This statement' might have been written by any of the
socialists active during the first half of the nineteenth
century
.
Proudhon was not the rural Idyllist he is often
portrayed as by many of his critics and commentators.
He should be viewed as a bona fide socialist, despite
certain Idealist and ruralist tendencies that were
present, for he was an activist and a thinker whose
^^Proudhon, System of Economic Contradictions , pp« 52~53
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sympathies were with the advancement of Justice In the
industrial future rather than in a return to the bucolic
past.
Others draw back In alarm before the developments
of economics and look back in anguish to the days
when industry was simple and spinning was done in
the home, to the days of the communal bakehouse.
Thus they retreat into the past, 29
Unless one desires to oversimplify Proudhon, one
must ask why he wrote for the developing working class
and why his following was so numerous if he was Indeed
an anachronistic anomaly. It is true that he did believe
30that agriculture was "the hub of all industry. . . but
it pro'^uced the first priority of necessity, food. Also,
consistent with Proudhon’s socialist sympathies was
"from each according to his ability, to each according
to his needs," which he stated in similar terms at
several points in his What Is Property? . Thus, his
"credentials" as a modern socialist are virtually
incontestable.
Anarchists who followed him may not have agreed
entirely with Proudhon’s thought or actions, especially
in regard to his low opinion of women, his racism, his
puritanical morality, his glorification of hard work for
^^Proudhon, Selected Writings , p. 50.
^^Ibid.
, p. 84.
^^Proudhon, V/hat Is Property? , p. 132.
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Its own s'^.ke, and dis zealous praise of war; but then,
they could not have ignored his work, for he constructed
the theory of what he believed was a functional and
self
-actualizing creative order in which rule would be
replaced by a self -regulating social process. He
especially influenced Bakunin, and his quarrel with
Marx helped shape the directions of modern socialism,
as the following chapters will Illustrate. Contemporary
communitarian anarchist social science, although its
vision and methodology are Quite different from Proudhon's,
nevertheless remains quite Indebted to his contributions.
This chapter has been a brief sketch of Proudhon's
legacy to anarchist social science. He had conceived
and formulated a rational and systematic knowledge of
what he posited to be social facts and using it, hoped
to be able to demonstrate the urgency of the need to
change instinctual reaction to reasoned action so that
necessity could completely meet its own needs. From
here, we must pass on to later anarchists' perceptions
of Proudhon's anarchist social science, their use of it,
the changes that they made in it, and the critique they
formulated of both their various socialist "competitors”
and of themselves as anarchism developed.
CHAPTER II
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AN AJJARCHIST PHILOSOPHY
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
Chapter I covered the development of a consciousness
embodying ”what is, is real" and the concommitant
confidence to understand and even attempt to change the
material world. Now we are faced with the task of
delineating the practical implications and consequences
of the social scientific thought that emerged early in
the nineteenth century; in light of the present
predominant forms of Western social science, it is indeed
Ironic that little more than a century ago, the idea of
a social science was strongly grounded in materialist
philosophy and entwined both conceptually and as a
movement of Intellectuals with socialist ideals.
We have seen that socialism began its development
as a conceptual polyglot within which several distinct
movements and schools of thought eventually emerged.
Initially there existed an apparent harmony within the
socialist movement, but it was more a harmony of
conceptual innocence than one of philosophical and
practical purpose. The conflicts a.rose as personalities
and thought diverged within the nascent movement,, and
with these conflicts came varying definitions of socialist
34
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thought and organization. All socialist factions sought
to introduce unity to a humanity divided by market
relations and the division of labor and society, with
the common end of meeting the material needs of all.
However, a major dilemma, implicit in their basic
assumptions, confronted the socialists, most of whom
were strongly influenced by the scientific mythos ; As
there could only be one unity of humanity and as there
was only one science--one law of **social gravity”--the
belief arose that there had to be one social science with
one true socialism as its end. This aggravated differences
of opinion and brought about the fragmentation of socialism
as a popular movement. Within this situation, however,
some personalities and factions were more tolerant of
divergences and varieties of thought than were others,
for they recognized that a "perfect** social science was
still undeveloped. Just as a perfect society—socialism
—
had yet to be built. Thus, **correct*' social science
would arise spontaneously over time, shaped not by
human argument and cerebration, but by necessity. Social
science, when it emerged from material circumstances,
would then provide clear and sufficient knowledge for
the construction of socialist society. For these people,
no single theory yet in existence could regulate every
detail of living without destroying free spontaneous
action, v:hich was required to fulfill material necessity
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(see Proudhon, Chapter I). Others within the socialist
movement perceived their method and thought as being
fully developed, and demanded adherence to their "correct"
and elaborate schemes of socialism, some of which were
drawn to the minutest detail, including descriptions of
the clothing that would be worn in their socialist
utopias.
In considering the divergences and development of
socialism, one must be careful not to regard every
action or thought solely in terms of conflict of
personalities, neuroses, vindictiveness, and so forth.
It must be emphasized that the differences among the
early socialists were substantive, even if personallstic
considerations were a factor. Yet the latter must not
be ignored, as must not the racism, chauvinism, sexism,
megalomania, etc, that existed to differing extents
within the various schools and in many individuals in
the socialist movement, for such elements did contribute
to the shaping of each particular strain. Thus, due to
contrasts in thought and temperament, distinct conceptions
of socialist consciousness were formed whose development
was not only a reaction to the capitalist realities, but
also to those of a changing socialism as well. Early
anarchist thought concerning social science, then, like
anarchism in general, should not be seen only as a
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response to the use (or abuse) of humans by capitalist
technology and society, but it should also be viewed
in terms of a development in sympathy and/or antipathy
with other schools of socialism, such as Blanqulsm,
Fourierism, Bland sm, to name but a fev:. Marxian thought
especially must be examined in this vein, for to see the
development of anarchist social science in relation to
socialism and social science in general, it is necessary
to look at Marxian thought, which has been closely
associated with anarchism for so long a time.
Proudhon* s Criticue of Marx and Marxism
As fascinating as it Is, the relation to anarchism
of Karl Marx and his followers is a topic too broad to
be covered here.l Therefore, our discussion of Marxism
will be peripheral to anarchism (for once, Marxism is
anarchism's footnote). To the serious scnolar of
socialism, however, much of what is said about anarchism
will naturally imply a great deal about Marxism. It
must be admitted even by those anarchists most critical
of Marx that Marx's thought was the "field of conflict"
in which anarchism developed at least as much as it
grew in relation to the hostile environment of bourgeois
^One good treatment of this subject is Richard
Adamiak's "The *V/ithering Av:ay* of the State: A
Reconsideration," The Journal of Politics 32 (February 1970)
3-l8.
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society and bourgeois conceptions of political economy;
It was from the clashes of (socialist) doctrine that took
place In the mid-nineteenth century that anarchist social
science emerged with a clear vision of its own nature
and purpose. It was not until the l840*s that the
contradictory conceptions of socialism ruptured the
apparent unity of the socialist movement to spilt into
distinctly libertarian and authoritarian state socialist
strains. Hovjever, this Is not to Imply that the differing
wings of the socialist movement were Ideal types In the
Weberian sense, for they were admixtures and variations
of all sorts. For purposes of this discussion, "libertarian
socialism" will be used to refer to the nineteenth century
anarchist movement, while "state socialism" will refer
to those groups who were inclined to regard the state
as an instrument of post-revolutionary transformation and
to advocate adherence to guidelines and programs set
forth by the revolutionary "vanguards" who would run
the vjorkers* state, with the understanding that the
division between the two types is somewhat arbitrary and
is not categorically exclusive.
With the anarchist Proudhon, socialist thought took
a qualitative leap from pre-l846 socialist conceptions of
improving capitalist modes of social life and production
to formally envisioning a new social order which would
bear little resemblance to the world that gave birth to
It. As Martin Buber, a twentieth century thinker, would
later observe,
• • . advancing from the idea of social reconstruction
to the idea of structural renewal, Proudhon took thedecisive step. The ‘industrial constitution* of
Saint-Simon does not signify a new structure, but
•federalism* does.^
Proudhon *s crltioue of the disharmony and callousness
inherent in capitalism was much more than solely an
attack on non-ratlonallzed function within capitalism;
in his system (unlike in Saint-Simon* s , for example), a
new social framework was proposed in which there would
be no room for giant industry and the banker captains of
capital. As Proudhon saw it, capitalism* s fault was not
primarily in irrational distribution and production.
Rather, it v;as by its nature irrational, for it denied
life its true quality—humanity *s right to labor freely
to meet necessity in its own way. The new socialist
order meant an order of work, but work through which
people could restore necessity to its true central
function of regulating life, in place of the prevailing
tyranny of privilege. All would produce, manage, and
exchange their products by means of free federations of
productive units. There would be no need for a managerial
elite/state, as necessity under these conditions would
fulfill itself (anarchy)
.
^Martin Buber, Paths in Utopia (Boston: Beacon
Press
, 1958) , p. 32
.
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As they themselves conceded, Marx and Engels were
affected by these ideas of Proudhon's. Because of Marx's
feud with Proudhon, the former later denied any
conceptual link with the latter, but it must be admitted
that Marx and Engels owe at least as much in a positive
sense to Proudhon's early anarchism as anarchism owes to
them.
In l844 Marx and Engels (in their book The Holy
Family ) had found in Proudhon's book on Property a
scientific adv'^nce which 'revolutionizes political
economy, and makes a science of political economy
possible for the first time'; they had further
declared that not only did he write in the Interests
of the proletariat but that he was a proletarian
himself and his work 'a scientific manifesto of the
French proletariat' of historic significance. And
as late as May l846, in an anonymous essay, Marx
had dubbed him 'a communist,' in a context, moreover,
which made it obvious that Proudhon v^as still a
representative communist in his eyes at the time,
some six months before the Polemic fThe Poverty of
Philo so phy^ was written.^
Thus began anarchism's love -hate affair with Karl Marx,
who influenced early anarchism as both a brilliant
thinker and an unusually vindictive and feuding relative
in the socialist ’•family." There was finally a bitter
rupture where there had originally been an apparent
harmony of Interests. Following the break, Marx and
Engels' enmity for Proudhon became almost unrestrained,
and they renounced him as a socialist and tried to read
^Buber, Paths in Utopia, p. 4.
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him out of the movement.
True in the Manifesto he had been named as an
example of the 'conservative or bourgeois socialists*
and in the Polemic Marx had declared that Proudhon
was far inferior to the socialists, 'because he has
neither the sufficient courage nor sufficient
Insight to raise himself, if only speculatively,
above the bourgeois horizon*; and after Proudhon's
death he asserted in a public obituary that even
today he would have to confirm every vrord of this
judgement, and a year later he explained in a letter
that Proudhon had done 'immense harm* and, by his
'sham-criticism and sham-opposition to the Utopians*
had corrupted the younger generation and the workers.
But another year later, nine years before v/riting
the anti -Difhring book, Engels states in one of the
seven reviews which he published anonymously on the
first volume of Marx's Capital
,
that Marx w\anted to
'provide socialist strivings with the scientific
foundation which neither Fourier nor Proudhon nor
even Lassalle had been able to give. 4
Later, Engels, in his version of socialism's history
( Socialism: From Utopia to Science , part of Anti-Duhring )
,
refused to mention Proudhon, even amongst those who were
labelled "utopian socialists," well-intentioned but
misguided individuals (e.g. Fourier and Saint-Simon)
.
However, this treatment of Proudhon by Engels, as well as
by Marx, was quite unfair. Despite the basic conservatism
of his character, Proudhon never denied that the concept
of surplus value vias basic to the structure of capitalism;
indeed, it can be stated viithout reservation that he
4 I
Buber, Paths in Utoria . p. 4.
utopian socialist, for Engels, was one who vjould
or could not quite grasp the tenets of "scientific
socialism" in the Marxian sense because of the survival
of the old attitudes that had been internalizeci in the
historical condition existing immediately prior to the
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hslped develop the concept In his What Is Property? In
1840. He never agreed vrlth Saint-Simon that bankers and
capitalists would or could manage socialism as a
rechartered megacorporation. Neither did he deny the
reality of class antagonism within capitalist society,
for he believed that by precluding free labor, capitalism
automatically generated Internal conflict. He^ differed
with Marx and Engels as to the role, composition, and
revolutionary function of the working class, but he
never doubted that there was the need for a Qualitative
change in the modes of production. Finally, he was
certainly not so naive as to think that nationalization
of industry automatically entailed a new form of social'
life and liberated everyone to be creative producers.
Nevertheless, after he and Marx parted company, Proudhon
was not mentioned by the latter except as a petty-bourgeois
philosopher, a class traitor and an enemy of socialism.
development of a comprehensive reality of scientific
socialism. He perceived the common denominator of
utopian socialism to be the belief that socialism could
be introduced by the peaceful emancipation of humanity
through the reasoned action of all classes. According
to Engels, the Utopians' attempt to undo capitalism
was inherently impossible due to the internal antagonisms
Capitalism generated; the reorganization of society by
class struggle was the only possible solution. In
brief, these thinkers glossed over the central reality
of socialism, the struggle between v/orkers and the
bourgeois strata.
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Admittedly, the split between Marx and Proudhon
was quite a personal one, but here we must deal with it
on its conceptual level: Valid scholarship demands more
than a "psychologized” explanation. Much of the
vituperation was a manifestation of Marx*s deep concern
over conflicting forms of social thought within the
socialist movement. The times added significantly to
the controversy since the widely held belief within the
socialist ranks in the l840»s v:as that revolution was
imminent
.
There x^ras much in common between Proudhon and
Marx. Both men v;ere writers and actors within the
»
'
socialist tradition and believed that economic necessity
was central to the development of a society that could
tap the full creative potential of individuals. Work
and technology x-^ere prominent concerns of both and they
both believed that capitalism was incompatible with
socialism. They agreed on the fact that workers were
robbed of their surplus value and that an economic social
science was possible. Yet their many common assumptions
about the desirability of a scientifically rationalized
society and the exploitative order that they lived under
notwithstanding, they nevertheless sharply diverged over
many matters. On May 17, 1846, Proudhon replied to a
letter Marx had x^rltten to him regarding establishing
a socialist communications network:
44
. . . although my Ideas on matters of organization
and realization are at the moment quite settled, at
least as far as principles are concerned, I believe
that it is my duty, and that it is the duty of all
socialists, to maintain for some time yet an
attitude of criticism and doubt. In short, I profess
with the public an almost total anti -dogmatism in
economics
.
By all means let us work together to discover
the laws of society, the ways in which these laws
are realized and the process by which we are able
to discover them. But, for God*s sake, when v:e
have demolished all a rriori dogmas, do not let us
think of indoctrinating the people in our turn. . . .
I wholeheartedly applaud your idea of bringing all
shades of opinion to light. Let us have a good and
honest polemic. Let us set the world an example of
wise and farsighted tolerance, but simply because
Vie are leaders of a movement let us not instigate
a. new intolerance. Let us not set ourselves up as
apostles of a new religion, even if it be the
religion of logic or reason. Let us welcome and
encourage all protests, let us get rid of all
exclusiveness and all mysticism. Let us never
consider any question exhausted, and when vie have
used our very last argument, let us begin again, if
necessary, with eloquence and irony. On this
condition I will join,your association with pleasure,
otherwise I will not.°
Yet the question of defining socialism and its social
science was Indeed exhausted between Marx and Proudhon;
their conflicting conceptions ended all communication
between them, and with this, closed off the chances of
their respective schools working “together to discover
the laws of society.” Marx's dogmatic tendencies have
been briefly noted; Proudhon, too, had set ideas as to
the true nature of good socialist social science, and
while he called for tolerance, his own ideas were
^Proudhon, Selected Writings, p. 150«
nevertheless firnly established in his nind as objectively
correct. In the same letter, he stated:
I must also make some observations about the
phrase in your letter *at the time for action.*
Perhaps you still hold the opinion taat no reform
is possible without a helcins: coun o e main
,
without
what used to be called a revolution cut which is
quite simcly a Jolt. I confess that most recent
studies have led me to abandon this vie-:. ... I
do not think this is what we need in order to
succeed, and consequently we must net suggest
revolutionary action as the means of social reform
because this supposed means 'would simply be an
appeal to force and arbitrariness. In brief, it
would be a contradiction. I put the problem in this
way : How can 'we rut beck into socieev, throunh some
system of economics, the we=^Itn w^ici r.as seen raken
out of societ"^ by another system of eco^^omics? In
other 'words, through Political .economy, we must turn
the theory of Property against Property in such a
way as to create 'what you German socialists call
community and which for the moment I will only go
so far as calling liberty or ecualit" . No'W I think
I knoxv' the X'lay in which this problem may be very
quickly solved. Therefore, I 'would rather burn
Property little by little than give it renewed
strength by making a Saint Bartholomew’s Day of
property owners.
^
Proudhon was confident that he had found the x^ay to
socialism "through some system of economics," mutualism--
The Mutual Bank of (labor) Exchange and workers*
associations. The function of these organizations v;as
to be the exchange of labor for labor and value for
value to meet the demands of necessity. These structures
could be initiated within the capitalist system and in
time, they would develop so that a nex-7 society would
7proudhon, Selected VJritinnrs, p. 151«
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emerge fron the new economic base.® Proudhon. In the
above quote, answered >Tarx*s letter by addressing himself
to what he felt was a tendency of certain schools of
socialism prior to the revolutions of 1848 to view the
political reorganization of capitalism as a coup de maln--
a seizure of pov;er. Schemes based upon this assumption,
he was confident, were doomed to failure, for they would
neglect to change the structure of the economic system
and could succeed only In grafting a new managerial
group onto the old regime, in the fashion of Saint-Simon.
Furthermore, the coup de main theories ignored the
organic reality of Political Economy--that is, that
change cannot be forced from above --and were therefore •
totally impractical.
Marx ansivered Proudhon’s letter and his book with
his polemical The Poverty of Philosophy
. He rejected
Proudhon’s vision of social science and its order,
anarchy, refusing to consider it even as a socialist
alternative. Sven if they were able to agree on the
nature of capitalism, Marx’s and Proudhon’s concepts of
socialism negated one another so that they were conceptually
deadlocked. Then, when Marx and Engels, in their l848
Manifesto, expounded the practical tenets of their
scientific socialism and their model of proletarian
®Thls is detailed in System of Economic Contradictions ,
to which Proudhon alluded in the above letter to Marx.
4revolution, they effectively ensured a perzianent split,
for Proudhon’s science of society then stood in sharp
contrast to their ovrn. By positing a positive function
for the state and coercive authority in the creation of
socialism, Marx’s and Engels’ scientific socialism based
Itself on assumptions entirely unacceptable to the
Proudhonian rules of natural order. Thus, the similarities
between Marxian socialism and anarchist socialism
(anarchism) after lS48 were not great enough to enable
their adherents to create a common matrix of scientific
aspirations, a unity of vision of an ideal social order,
or even a basis for any long-range cooperation. Instead
of a tolerance and a diversity, there began to develop
the absoluteness of two hostile camps within socialism.
The failure of the schemes of the state socialists in
France of 1843 reinforced the schism. Animosity became
the prevailing feeling, a result of the belief that there
could be only one true solution to a given social problem.
From February to June l848, the attempts of the
socialist Republic in France to implement the
idealistic schemes of Blanc, Saint-Simon, Fourier
and others had all ended as abyssmal failures.
State socialism had been discredited in the eyes of
both the Right and of some elements of the Left.
One bourgeois writer, Reybaud, wrote in lS52: ’To
speak of socialism nov:adays is to deliver a funeral
oration. . . . Should the human mind in its vertigo
ever take it up again it will be in a different form
or under the Influence of other illusions.' But
far more significant, Proudhon epitomized the new
negative attitude of a growing segment of the Left
toward ’that fictitious being, without intelligence.
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without morality, that we call the State.* Thus by
1851 the polarization of nineteenth century European
radicalism was already under way. 9
It was this situation that existed when, in the l86o»s,
Michael Bakunin continued the formulation of an anarchist
social science by expanding and refining Proudhon’s
earlier critique from a uniquely anarchist perspective.
Bakunin’s Critioue of Socialism and Social Science
Michael Bakunin’s conceptions of anarchism, socialism,
and good social science synthesized elements of various
schools of the socialist tradition, but he owed the most
to Proudhon. He himself acknowledged Proudhon’s
contributions to his intellectual development in relation
to the lessons he, Bakunin, had learned from Marx. The
following excerpt from a French manuscript of 187O shows
not only his debt to the two great socialists, but also
illustrates Bakunin's position, which was in a sense
between them, although his ties to Proudhon were closer
and more visible.
As I told him a few months before his death,
Proudhon, in spite of all his efforts to shake off
the tradition of classical idealism, remained all
his life an incorrigible idealist, immersed in the
Bible, in Roman law and metaphysics. Kls great
misfortune was that "he never studied the natural
sciences or appropriated their method. [Bakunin
probably meant by this that Proudhon had not adopted
the inductive method, but it is nevertheless Ironic
that he criticized Proudhon concerning this when he
himself was untrained in the natural sciences!! He
^Adaraiak, "The * 'Withering Away’ of the State," p. 10 .
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had the Instincts of a genius and he glimpsed the
right road, but hindered by his idealistic thinking
patterns, he fell always into the old errors.
Proudhon was a perpetual contradiction ; a vigorous
genius, a revolutionary thinker arguing against
idealistic phantoms, and yet never able to surmount
them himself.
. . , Marx as a thinker is on the
right path. He has established the principle that
juridical evolution in history is not the cause but
the effect of economic development, and this is a
great and fruitful concept. Though he did not
originate lt--lt was to a greater or lesser extent
formulated before him by m.any others--to Marx belongs
the credit for solidly establishing it as the basis
for an economic system. On the other hand, Proudhon,
when not obsessed with metaphysical doctrine, was
revolutionary by instinct; he adorned Satan and
proclaimed Anarchy. Quite possibly Marx could
construct a still more rational system of liberty,
but he lacks the instinct of liberty--he remains
from head to foot an authoritarian.
In such critical terms, Bakunin assessed two of his most
important "tutors.** Much of what both men wrote favorably
impressed Bakunin, although there were other influences.
For example, Georg Freidrich Hegel, Ludwig Feuerbach,
Alexander Herzen, and Giusseppe Mazzinl also had important
effects upon his thinking.
Bakunin became an anarchist quite late in his life;
it was after witnessing the crushing of the Polish
Insurrection that he became receptive to the principles
of Proudhon and the nascent anarchist movement. By the
end of his life, he had redirected Proudhon's theories
toward a more militant, activist, materialist, and
practical anarchism, especially in relation to the
l^Michael Bakunin, Bakunin on Anarchy , trans. , ed.
and Introduction by Sam Dolgoff (New York: Vintage
Books, 1971). P. 26.
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working class militance of the late l860*s and the early
1870* s.^^ He greatly expanded on Proudhon's basis of
an anarchist social science so that he left a full-blown
anarchist philosophy of social science with substantial
content and fashioned a biting critique of the hierarchical
social relations epitomized within the State. His work,
however, has been largely disregarded by "mainstream”
scholars and his impact on anarchist theory has been
underestimated because the assessment of his thought
suffers from the scholarly bias of a barricade stereotype
to which scholars unfortunately seem to attach the
greatest significance. This Impression must be dispelled;
Bakunin's revolutionary activities in no way diminish
the importance of his writings, which were essential to
the creation of a critique of the use and role of science
and scientific social inquiry in both libertarian and
authoritarian societies. His critical commentaries
covered the Comtean positivists of his time, the bourgeois
political economists, the philosophical Idealists, and
especially the "scientific socialist" followers of Marx
and Engels.
As was true with Proudhon, a good part of Bakunin's
thought vjas developed in relation to the socialist
movement as much as in opposition to the capitalist order.
Hit is interesting that Proudhon's last book,
written on his deathbed in I865 ( The Political Capaci ty
of the Working Class) , was in this vein.
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He had seen state socialism in action in France In 1848,
and from its failure, he later realized the necessity
of anarchism, although his obituary of state socialism.
In retrospect, was premature, since the "corpse" Is
very much alive today. Bakunin wrote:
What succumbed In June l848 was not socialism In
general. It was only state socialist
,
authoritarian
and regimented socialism, the kind that had believed
and hoped that the State would fully satisfy the
needs and the legitimate aspirations of the working
classes, and that the State, armed with its
omnipotence, would and could inaugurate a new social
order. Hence it was not socialism that died In
June; it v:as rather the State which declared its
bankruptcy toward socialism and, proclaiming itself
Incapable of paying its debt to socialism, sought
the Quickest way out by killing its creditor. It
did not succeed In killing socialism but it did kill
the faith that socialism had placed in it. 12
Thus, what is usually viewed as some form of promethean
and romantic impulsiveness on the part of Proudhon,
Bakunin, and other nineteenth century rebels was actually
an acceptance of anarchism on the rather sound empirical
grounds of having witnessed authoritarian socialism
In action "against" the established state. Later,
Bakunin developed his Ideas of socialism and of anarchist
social science in relation to the conflict V7ith Marx
and with certain authoritarian elements (e.g. the
Blanquists) In the First Workingmen's International.
At first, the libertarians (including Bakunin) and the
state-socialists (including Harx) cooperated, or at
12^11 chael Bakunin, "Federalism, Socialism and
Antl-Theologlsm, " Bakunin on Anarchy , p. 121.
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least tolerated one another In the socialist movements
of the l860»s. In many ways, the conflict that developed
was an extremely personal one, but again, the personality
clashes revolved around the much deeper Issue of defining
the nature of socialism and how it could be attained.
Bakunin summed up his personal relationship with Marx
during the conflict in the International by recalling
his meeting with Marx the emigre in Paris in the late
l840*s.
As far as learning vras concerned, Marx was, and
still is, incomparably more advanced than I. I
knew nothing at the time of political economy. I
had not yet rid myself of my metaphysical aberrations,
and my socialism was only instinctive. Although
younger than I, he was already an atheist, a conscious
materialist and an informed socialist. It was
precisely at this time that he was elaborating the
foundations of his system as it stands today. We
saw each other often. I greatly respected him for
his learning and for his passionate devotlon--though
it was alvjays mingled with vanity—to the cause of
the proletariat. I equally sought his conversation,
which was always instructive and witty v:hen it was
not inspired by petty hate, which alas! was only too
often the case. There v;as never any frank intimacy
between us—our temperaments did not permit it. He
called me a sentimental idealist, and he was right;
I called him vain, perfidious, and cunning, and I
also was right. 13
Though the conflict between Marx and Bakunin can be
explained partially by divergences of character, the
personal tensions between the two did not prevent Bakunin
from recognizing the value of Marx's contributions to
the socialist cause. Even in his most critical remarks
I33akunin, quoted in
Sketch by James Guillaume,
p , 25
•
"Michael Bakunin: A Biographical
i844-19i 6," Bakunin on Anarchy ,
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concerning Marx*s personal actions (such as those written
at the time of the First International)
,
Bakunin
acknowledged Marx*s Important Intellectual achievements.
Karl Marx, the undisputed chief of the Socialist Party
in Germany--a great intellect armed v;ith a profound
knowledge, whose entire life, one can say it without
flattering, has been devoted exclusively to the
greatest cause vihlch exists today, the emancipation
of labor and of the tollers—Karl Marx who is
Indisputably also, 'if not the only, at least one of
the principal founders of the International
Workingmen's Association, made the development of
the communist idea the object of a serious work. . . .
His work on Capital, though unfortunately bristling
with formulas and metaphysical subtleties, which
render it unapproachable for the great mass of readers,
is in the highest degree a scientific or realist
work: in the sense that it absolutely excludes any
other than that of the facts.
. .
.^^
What split Marx and Bakunin certainly was not a result
of the belief in the applicability of an economic and
materialist critique of capitalist society. Rather,
the crux of the disagreement between them V7as the debate
concerning the complexion of a scientifically planned
society--that is, how social science would be applied.
Where Marx and Engels saw those who rejected the tenets
of scientific socialism (as stated in the Communist
Manifesto
.
such ideas as class struggle, inevitable
revolution, and the reorganization of society through a
dictatorship of the proletariat in a workers* state) as
impractical Utopians, Bakunin, like Proudhon, having
^^Bakunin, "Marx, the Bismarck of Socialism,"
Patterns of Anarchy, ed. Leonard I. Krlmmerman nnd Lewis
Perry (Garden City, W.Y.
:
Doubleday, 1966), p. 83 .
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seen the effects of the state-socialist ideals in
practice, saw the attempt to create socialism x*ilthin a
statist framework as impractical—the state-socialists
were, in his view, the real "Utopians"—and more
Important, as unethical because of the severe limitations
that would be placed upon individuals* freedom. Bakunin
viewed the early socialist movement with one major
exception as largely unconcerned with what he held to be
the most essential characteristic of socialism, free
action. He wrote.
In general, regulation was the common passion
of all the socialists of the pre-l848 era, with one
exception only. Cabet, Louis Blanc, the Fourlerists,
the Saint -Slraonians
,
all were inspired by a passion
for indoctrinating and organizing the future; they
all were more or less authoritarians. The exception
is Proudhon.
. , . Proudhon armed himself with a critique as
profound and penetrating as it was merciless, in
order to destroy their systems. Resisting authority
with liberty, against these state socialists,
he boldly proclaimed himself an anarchist; defying
their deism or their pantheism, he had the courage to
call himself simply an atheist, or rather, with
Auguste Comte, a positivi st .
His socialism was based upon liberty, both
individual and collective, and on the spontaneous
action of free associations obeying no laws other
than general lavrs of social economy, already kno^'m
and yet to be discovered by social science, free from
governmental regulation and state protection. This
socialism subordinated politics to the economic,
intellectual, and moral interests of society. It
subsequently, by its own logic, culminated in
federalism.
. t-
Such was the state of social science prior to l848. ^
^^Bakunin, "Federalism, Socialism and Antl-Theologlsm,
"
Bakunin on Anarchy , pp. II6-II7.
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What split Bakunin from the Marxian conception of
socialism were basically the same differences that
separated Proudhon and Marx, Where Marx and Engels
felt that the uprisings and subsequent failure of l848
justified their conception of soclalism-r-specifically
,
the use of state power to create socialism—Proudhon and
Bakunin felt that state socialism had revealed its
bankruptcy. Later, when in I 871 the Paris Commune arose,
the socialist factions v;ere primarily under the inspiration
of the federalist ideas of Proudhon’s follovjers
,
and when
the Commune was crushed, many of the victims of the
repression were members of the anarchist wing of the
International. However, Marx and Engels, thinking
revolution imminent, republished their l848 Manifesto at
that time as if to prove their point about the necessity
of stricter hierarchical organization—although they
allowed that their work was outdated in a few respects
—
as opposed to voluntary federalism. But at the same
time they bitterly denounced the utopian "anti -authoritarians”
in the International, they vrere forced to praise the
Commune’s generally anarchistic nature in order not to
be totally disregarded,^^ It is one of history’s ironies
that anarchism, labelled by many in the nineteenth
^^Nicholas Walter, "Biographical and Bibliographical
Note,” Michael Bakunin, "The Paris Commune^and the Idea
of State” (Lausanne, Switzerland: Centre Internationale
de Recherche d’Anarchisme , 1971). P. 7.
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century and today as a romantic and quixotic phenomenon,
was actually the ”practical" socialism at this crucial
time in French history.
Influenced by the failure of l848*s rebellions,
the conflicts In the International, and the heroic
resistance of the Commune, Bakunin extended Proudhon’s
critique of authoritarian state-socialism, began to add
additional dimensions to the foundations of social
science, and commenced the formulation of an anarchist
social science. He began his critique by describing
what he called ”the cult of the state,” which was the
criterion of division within the socialist, movement as
the major ingredient of certain kinds of socialism and
as the impediment to socialism for others. In Bakunin’s
eyes, both forms of socialism were equally supporters
of science, but one, the state school, had lost contact
with science’s proper function in the task of creating
a Just social order.
The communists \j>larxlsts) are supporters of the
principle and practice of aut'^^ority; the revolutionary
socialists (anarchists^ have no faith except in freedom.
Both the one and the other, equally supporters of
science which is to destroy superstition and replace
belief, differ in the former wishing to impose it,
and the latter striving to propagate it; so that human
groups, convinced of its truth, may organize and
federate spontaneously , freely, from the bottom up,
by their own momentum according to their real
instincts, but never accordin.g to any plan laid down
in advance and imposed upon the ignorant masses by some
superior intellects
.
l^Bakunln, "The Paris Commune and the Idea of State,”
p. 2,
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In Bakunin’s view, the reconstruction of society to meet
the scientific demands of a socialist society meant that
necessity must determine the forms of life, rather than
some central principle and human authority
—
people would
join together naturally In order to best meet their
needs, Bakunla, like Proudhon, felt that the creation
of socialism was too monumental an undertaking to be
handled by any one group or formula—even science—other
than by the whole people.
. . .
equality must be established In the world by
the spontaneous organization of work and of the
collective oxmership of producers* associations,
freely organized and federated in communes, by the
equally spontaneous federation of these communes,
but not by the overriding and enslaving activity of
the state.
As Proudhon put it, “The lax'^s of necessity" would create
their own order. Bakunin’s socialism entailed free-forming,
self-regulating communities of labor in X'^hich necessity
would be met collectively. His conception of socialism
was quite similar to Proudhon’s and his critique of Marx’s
socialism starts from the same point as the latter's,
viewing such socialism as being based on a narrow fiction--
that of the beneficial potential of the state structure.
Scientific socialism meant more to him than the rule of
science or of a class: The rationalization of an
economy by any technical elite--revolutionary vanguard--
l^Bakunin, "The Paris Commune," p. 1.
be It the scientist-priests of the positivist "Religion
of Humanity" or the politico-scientists of a "temporary
dictatorship"—would not automatically liberate
individuals. For socialism to be realized, science
—
"the laws of necessity Itself"—had to be Inherent in
the productive process and never separate from it. For
Bakunin, as for Proudhon, necessity refined its own
function, eliminating the need for a Salnt-Simonlan
Directorate fashioned into a "Dictatorship of the
Proletariat" to construct socialism. Socialism was not
a plan that once correctly expounded and properly
directed would automatically be ensured of success. It
had to be protected not from the "Instinctive" action
of the masses of people --Bakunin believed that necessity
would generate both an organic order and the means of
protecting the socia'^ist revolution--but from the
efforts of elites to impose "re-education" on them, since
such action would be antithetical to the spirit and
meaning of socialism, equality and freedom. Here,
l^The question is sometimes raised by anarchists
and non -anarchists alike concerning Bakunin's own
conception of a revolutionary vanguard and its function.
Realizing that the people are susceptible to manipulation
during any revolution, he advocated the pre-revolutionary
establishment of a secret network of activists whose
task would be to prepare the masses for revolution and to
fight with them. They would seek no power for themselves
and would alvjays work towards returning all power to the
grass-roots organizations spont'^neously created by the
revolution itself. Despite Bakunin's insistence that the
efforts of these revolutionaries would never be imposed ,
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Balamin came Into conflict with Marxian socialism's
conception of a revolutionary state. Prophetically, he
wrote
:
But in the People's state of Marx there will be
we are told, no privileged class at all. All vjill
be equal, not only from the juridical and political
point of view, but from the economic point* of view.
At least that is what is promised, ticough I doubt
very much, considering the manner in V7hich it is
being tackled anh the course it is desired to
follow, whether that promise coul'i ever be kept.
There vjill therefore be no longer any privileged
class, but there will be a government, and, note this
well, an extremely complex government, which will
not content itself with governing and administering
the masses politically, as all governments do today,
but which 'will also administer them economically,
concentrating in its own hands the production and
the just division of wealth, the cultivation of
land, the establishment and development of factories,
the organization and direction of commerce, finally
the application of capital to production by the only
banker, the State, All that will demand an immense
knowledge and many 'heads overflo'wing 'A’-ith brains*
in this government. It will be a sign of scientific
this concept does pose some difficult problems concerning
elitism, the nature of "true" consciousness , the destruction
of spontaneity, infiltration by opportunist authoritarian
groups, etc. These things are still debated 'within the
anarchist movement. Yet, as Sam Dolgoff shows in his
excellent discussion of this Question, it is also true
that this particular part of Bakunin's program has been
overemphasized by some historians. Says _polgoff , "It is
true that the internal Brotherhood rules pphe code Baloinin
wrote in 1865 for one of his abortive "secret networks'^
constituted a violation of Bakunin's ot'Ti anarchist
principles, but to stress this contradiction as the essence
of Bakunin's doctrine is a gross distortion." Furthermore,
it is too often forgotten that in his time, all revolutionary
groups had to operate secretly, so that such rules of conduct
for their members 'were seen as a safeguard for their
survival, and that in the early l 860 's, V7hen he was most
enthusiastic in his advocacy of the secret organization of
revolutionaries, he was only beginning to develop his
anarchist ideas. See Sam Dolgoff's Introduction, Balcunin
on Anarchy , pp. 8-13.
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Intelligence
,
the most aristocratic, despotic,
arrogant and contemptuous of all regimes. There will
be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and pretended
scientists and scholars, and the world will be
divided into a minority ruling in the name of
knowledge and an immense ignorant majority. And
then, woe betide the mass of Ignorant ones. 20
In Bakunin’s opinion, the authoritarian socialists had
lost sight of the socialist function of science because
they were willing to see it used as a force ruling over
life Instead of as a liberating part of life. Revolutionary
reconstruction had to mean qualitatively more than a new
oppression labelled ’’socialism.” Such socialism would
be no more than a fixed abstraction, an arbitrary social
physics prescribing individual and collective diversity.
Bakunin reacted to this conception with a critique
similar to that which he made concerning the mystical
conceptions of religious and capitalist privilege and
property: Projecting the best human qualities into an
abstraction, be it a god or some supra-human construction,
leaves humanity in a subservient position--”God being
everything, the real world and man are nothing.”^^
Science separated from common social realities v^ould
have to be tyrannical. It is here that Bakunin began to
build his philosophy of social science, with the first
^^Kichael Bakunin, ’’Marx, the Bismarck of Socialism,”
Patterns of Anarchy
,
ed. Krimmerman and Perry, p. 87 .
^^Michael Bakunin, God and the State , Introduction
by Paul Avrich (New York: Dover Books, 1970), p. 24.
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requirement of good social science being the universal
propagation of scientific knowledge and Its integration
Into everyday life. At the time, there were those who
were attempting to use science In a social fashion
(notably the Comteans and the Malthusians) but who,
according to Bakunin, were neglecting the fact that
science is by Its natune quite limited and that recognition
of this social fact Is critical to the effective
reorganization of society. The philosophy of science
motivating this critique stems from Bakunin's theory of
human consciousness, which, like Proudhon's, saw humans
as becoming more aware of the potential within themselves
as humanity evolves--! . e
. ,
become conscious of their own
actions. According to Bakunin,
Man, a wild beast, cousin of the gorilla, has emerged
from the profound darkness of animal instinct into
the light of the mind, which explains in a wholly
natural way all his past mistakes and consoles us
for his present errors. 22
However, science, by its very nature a reflection of human
consciousness, has within it an intrinsic flaw: Science
can never grasp the particular. It can work only with
generalities. Science, in Bakunin's view,
. . .
is as incapable of grasping the individuality
of a man as that of a rabbit, being equally indifferent
to both. Not that it is ignorant of the principle of
^^Mlchael Bakunin, Bakunin , ed. G.P. Maximoff
(Glencoe, Illinois; The Free Press, 1964), p. 173*
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individuality: it conceives it perfectly as principle,
but not as fact. 23
That is, it cannot distinguish between individuals, for
if it attempted this, it would destroy its very nature,
which is necessarily abstraction and generalization.
What does it (scienc^ care for the particular
conditions \Df individual^ . . , ? It would make
Itself ridiculous, it would abdicate, it would
annihilate itself, if it wished to concern itself
with them otherwise than as examples in support of
its eternal theories. And it would be ridiculous
to wish it to do so, for its missions lie not there.
It cannot graso the concrete; it can move only in
abstractions . \Ttalics mine^'l Its mission is to busy
itself V7ith the situation and the general conditions
of the existence and development, either of the
human species in general, or of such a race, such
a people, such a class or category of individuals;
the general causes of their prosperity, their decline,
and the best preneral methods of securing their
progress in all w-^ys. Provided it accomplishes this
task broadly and rationally, it will do its whole
duty and it would be really unjust to expect more of
Science, by its nature limited in function, therefore
must be limited in its application to social life.
The mission of science is, by observation of the
general relations of passing and real facts, to
establish the general laws inherent in the development
of the phenomena of the physical and social world;
it fixes, so to speak, the unchangeable landmarks
of humanity's progressive march by indicating the
general conditions which it is necessary to
rigorously observe and always fatal to Ignore or
forget. In a word, science is the compass of life,
but it is not life. . . . Science creates nothing,
it establishes and recognizes only the creations of
life . 25
233akunln, God and the State , p. 57* , p, 58 .
25lbid.
, p. 55 .
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Thus, In agreement with Karx and Comte, Bakunin
recognized science as a progressive and invaluable tool,
but cautioned that it was only an abstraction of the
real life itself. Science, being external to life, has
to be limited to its proper concerns if violence and
other disasters are to be avoided. Unlike Marx and
Comte, Bakunin did not believe that life could be enhanced
by immutable laws of social physics, since humans could
not benefit by considering themselves abstract qualities.
Thus, any social science seeking fixed formulations of
the way to govern and build socialist society would
necessarily destroy the essential content of socialism,
the free and unique individual member of the community.
The result of excessive scientization would be that
humans made to conform to externally created "laws of
scientific socialism" would constitute what would be
called in modern terms a conditioned socialist society,
a low-grade social system resembling an ant-colony more
than a conscious human community.
The socialist revolution could not be a plan for
abstract freedom, however scientifically conceived.
Bakunin viewed it instead as simply the culmination of
the creative acts and impulses of many persons, "knovm"
and "unknovm," joining together to consciously shape
their own history, and social reconstruction after the
revolution would have to proceed from the same assumption.
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”
. . . History Is made, not by abstract Individuals,
but by acting, living and passing individuals. Abstractions
advance only when borne forward by real men.”^^ Ideals
are thus humanly realized. The problem, however. Is how
this should be accomplished. The favored proposed
solution of the educated strata of Bakunin’s time, a
government in the name of science, would become a tyranny
of abstraction In practice, for it would command and
restrict human action by means of the finite formulae of
science’s •’interpreters.” The latter would inevitably
constitute an elite by virtue of their claim to superior
knowledge and the power to enforce their wisdom. For
Bakunin, any group in such a privileged position.
regardless of its function, woul'd become hierarchically
structured and motivated towards a tyranny even if it
held humanistic goals and proclaimed noble purposes
.
Science (as any other ideal) imposed by an elite would
tend toward domination in practice
... in the first place, because, constituted
outside of life, it is represented by a privileged
body; and in the second place, because thus far it
has posited itself as an abolute and final object
of all human development . 2?
Science itself is not inherently dysfunctional in
Bakunin’s vlev;. Rather, humans make science v/hat it is:
^^Bakunin, God and the State , p. 58.
27ibid
.
.
p. 60.
6If it becomes tyrannical, then it is a human fault since
the natural limits of science are transgressed by what
he called ’’the cult of authority'*—that is, those who
look to leaders, de facto elites, and/or power to impose
solutions upon the "unenlightened masses." This "cult,"
which tends to propagate a belief in one universally
valid methodology for solving social problems, is
consequently inclined to focus upon a given abstraction
as a panacea. Referring specifically to the authoritarian
socialists, whom he regarded as exemplary of this
phenomenon, Bakunin pointed out that at that historical
moment, they had established the concept of science as
the absolute cure-all, making it a fetish simulating in
substance and function the religious Ideal of the
non-revolutionary past. An underlying fallacy, though,
is that humans are not abstractions by virtue of their
physical existence, the highly diverse demands of which
do not necessarily conform to precepts formulated as
rigid laws of conduct.^® Furthermore, Bakunin asserted
that there was an outstanding contradiction in the
authoritarian socialists* scientific vision, which would
negate free human action—the essence of any socialist
revolution--in order to provide economic security.
Bakunin’s own concept of socialism allowed for no
^^Bakunin included in this criticism not only the
state socialists, but also all who would "decree" the
good society's construction.
66
compromise with liberty, even by a fully developed science
of society; paternalism, coercion, or any kind of
hierarchical socialism was wholly unacceptable to him.
. , , the State, representing as It does the public
welfare or common interest of all, curtails part of
the liberty of each for the sake of assuring to him
all the remainder. But this remainder may be a
form of security; it Is never liberty. Liberty Is
Indivisible; one cannot curtail a part of It without
killing all of It. ' This little part you are curtailing
is the very essence of my liberty; it is all of it. 29
Thus Bakunin's analysis of the social repercussions of
the use of science In the creation of socialism interlocks
with his critique of authoritarian socialism.
We must remember that Bakunin's philosophy of
science and social science did not imply a rejection of
science within the structures of libertarian socialism.
Science, he insisted, was essential to any society aiming
to satisfy all of its members' needs. The crucial
problem for him was to recognize and respect science's
limits. In Bakunin's ovm vrords;
On the one hand, science is indispensable to the
rational organization of society; on the other,
being incapable of interesting itself in that which
is real and living, it must not interfere with the
real or practical organization of society.
Here, we must go beyond the critique of science in
authoritarian socialism and examine more closely the
^^Mlchael Bakunin, "Federalism, Socialism and
Anti-Theologlsra," Bakunin on Anarchy , p. 129.
30Bakunln, God and the State, p. 62.
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more '‘positive” aspects of anarchist social science as
developed by Bakunin,
We have seen that as "scientific” as he wished
socialism to be, Bakunin steadfastly refused to recognize
science as the proper governing force In society. He
had complete faith In the ability of human adults to
regulate their own lives and to live together harmoniously
and productively In the absence of Imposed force and
abstraction. The vital element required for this was
for him the freedom of the Individual, which
instead of stopping far from the freedom of others
as before a frontier, sees on the contrary the
cementing and expansion into the infinity of its
own free will, the unlimited freedom of all--freedora
through solidarity, freedom which triumphs over
brute force and over the principle of authoritarianism,
the Ideal expression of that force which after the
destruction of all terrestial and heavenly idols
will find and organize a new world of Individual
mankind upon the ruins of all churches and states."^
Thus the primary value and characteristic of Bakunin’s
system was its pervasive libertarian spirit, which
Bakunin held was the sole force capable of creating (Just)
order and liberating humans to achieve their creative
potential. As he put it,
. . • Life, not science, creates life; the
spontaneous action of the people themselves alone
can create liberty. Undoubtedly, it would be a very
fortunate thing if science could, from this day
forth. Illuminate the spontaneous march of the people
^^Mlchael Bakunin, ”V/here I Stand,” Bakunin* s
Writings, ed. Guy Aldred (New York: Kraus Reprints,
1972) ,p. vlil.
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tovrards their emancipation. But better an absence
of-lig:ht than a false and feeble liprht, kindled
only to mislead those who follow it
. After all,
the people will not lack light. Not in vain have
they traversed a long historic career, and paid for
their errors by centuries of misery. The practical
summary of their rainful experiences constitutes a
sort of traditional science, which in certain
respects Is worth as much as theoretical science
.
tjtalics mine]
This passage indicates that Bakunin’s conception of
science encompassed an extremely broad range of human
experience, focused upon the material and popular aspects
of science, disavowed elitism, and subordinated all
science to the propagation of liberty. Science had to
be part of the everyday human efforts to meet necessity.
The socialism that would emerge from the libertarian
’’science of society,” rather than being a new order
regulated by a revolutionary vanguard, would be a
conscious creation of all rational beings. This libertarian
anarchist—social science would help bring about the
development of socialist society, which in turn vrould
further transform natural and social science so as to
ground them firmly in the material world. The dialectical
process of ”materializing” science, Bakunin held, was a
crucially important one, for
The world of scientific abstraction is not
revealed; it is Inherent in the real world, of which
it is only the general or abstract expression and
^^Bakunin, God and the Sta.te, pp. 63 “64.
69
representation. As long as it forms a separate
region, specifically represented by the savants as
a body, this ideal world threatens to take the
place of a good God to the real world, reserving for
its licensed representatives the office of priests.
That is the reason why it is necessary to dissolve
the special social organization of the savants by
general instruction, equal for all in all things in
order that the masses, ceasing to be flocks led and
shorn by privileged priests, may take into their
hands the direction of their own destinies. 33
A socialist society true to its liberatory rhetoric must
demand that science be of the people and for the people
In the most literal sense. Bakunin saw it as the
function of an anarchist social science to propagate
natural and social facts so that each individual may
be adequately prepared to meet necessity in a rational
«
fashion by creating a self -actualizing community.
Science in general would flower only when it ceased to
serve the interests of an elite class and assumed a role
beneficial to everyone. 3^ Once freed from class interests,
science.
. . , the patrimony of everybody, will wed itself in
a certain sense to the immediate and real life of
each. It will gain in utility and grace what it
loses in pride, ambitions, and doctrinaire pedantry.
This, however, will not prevent men of genius, better
organized for scientific speculation than the majority
of their fellows, from devoting themselves exclusively
to the cultivation of the sciences, and rendering
33sakunin, God and the State , p, 62,
^^Not only scientific knowledge, but also such
attributes as artistic and poetic sentiment, poise,
literacy, etc. would become common among the people,
instead of being "monopolized'* as privileges of the elite
segment(s), Bakunin saw the latter situation as existing
in his own time.
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great services to humanity. Only, they will be
ambitious for no other social influence than the
natural influence exercised upon its surroundings
by every superior intelligence, and for no other
reward than the high delight which a noble mind
always finds in the satisfaction of a noble passion.
Through what Bakunin felt vzas the "fraternal" instruction
of the people in the ways of science, science "would find
itself in the milieu of human equality, solidarity, and
sociability. Science would become the means for the
achievement of a much higher goal than had ever before
been set—that is, the complete humanization of "the
real individuals who are born, who live, and who die, on
earth, He viewed science as becoming a bond between
all persons and common to all functions of socialist
society that embodies a reasoned consciousness of
physical existence. As such, science in a (libertarian)
socialist society makes possible a unity of function and
purpose in all aspects of living and for every individual.
Proudhon had insinuated and Bakunin said that
anarchist forms of science have to rest on a new form
of authority. The latter, defining authority as "the
inevitable power of natural laws which manifest themselves
in the necessary concatenation and succession of phenomena
in the physical and social world"^*^ against which it is
^^Bakunin, God and the State
,
p. 63. , p. 60
.
37ibid,
.
p, 28,
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impossible to revolt, advocated the acceptance of this
"natural authority" as the sole type compatible with
anarchist society. In practice, it would constitute a
functional and non-coerclve authority. As Bakunin put
it.
I bow before the authority of special men because it
is imposed upon me by my ovm reason. I am conscious
of my inability to grasp, in all its details and
positive developments, any very large portion of human
knowledge. The greatest Intelligence would not be
equal to a comprehension of the whole. Thence results,
for science as well as for Industry, the necessity
of the division and association of labor. I receive
and I give—such is human life. Each directs and
is directed in his turn. Therefore there is no fixed
and constant authority, but a continual exchange of
mutual, temporary, and above all, voluntary authority
and subordination . 38
We accept all natural authorities and all
influences of fact, but none of right; for every
authority or every influence of right, officially
Imposed as such . . . would Inevitably Impose on
us . . . slavery and absurdity. 39
In Bakunin’s conception of socialism, then, the authority
of function is the only permissible social limit on
science and social science, as this authority is the only
38sakunin, God and the State , p. 28 . "Yes, we are
absolutely the slaves of these laws. But in such slavery
there is no humiliation, or rather, it is not slavery at
all. For slavery supposes an external master, a legislator
outside of him whom he commands, while these laws are not
outside of us; they are inherent in us; they constitute
our being, our whole being, physically, intellectually,
and morally; V7e live, x-7e breathe, we act, we think, we
wish only through these laws. Without them we are nothing,
we are not." Ibid
.
39lbid.
.
p. 35 .
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type in accordance vxith the demands of the material world.
He attempted to explicate the concept of legitimate
authority as being inherent in the knowledge garnered
from the people's experiences in meeting necessity (in
Aristotelian terms, a type of "common wisdom"). Such
authority, the basis of any libertarian socialist order,
also constitutes the foundation of the new form of
science
.
Science, being called upon to henceforth represent
society's collective consciousness
,
must really
become the property of everybody. Thereby, without
losing anything of its universal character
. . . and
while continuing to concern itself exclusively with
general causes, the conditions and fixed relations
of individuals and things, it will become one in
fact with the immediate and real life of all
individuals.^®
It is clear now that the goals of the social science
rooted in the above assumptions are necessarily oriented
to praxis. Social science must investlage
. . .
the general causes of individual suffering—
among these causes it will not forget the immolation
and subordination (still too frequent alas!) of
living individuals to abstract general! ties--at the
same time showing us the general conditions necessary
to the real emancipation of the individuals living in
society . That is its mission, those are its limits,
beyond which the action of social science can only
be impotent and fatal.
It is here that the explication of Bakunin's
thought must stop and the relation of his thought to
anarchist social science in general and the anarchist
^®Bakunln, God and the State, p. 62. ^^Ibid. , p. 6l.
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movement must be explored. His work, unfortunately, was
not seriously enough regarded nor was It built upon and
expanded by his immediate historical successors in the
anarchist movement. During the l8?0*s and l880's, the
anarchist critique of science and its social uses
degenerated to the point where there was a strong
implication that anarchists had science on their side
and that the authoritarian socialists did not simply
because they were not anarchists. Anarchism was all too
often posited as being equivalent to science.
Bakunin, who had an overly Newtonian conception of
pure science, viewed the true science of society as an
unchangeable perspective entailing a body of universal,
eternal, and objective natural laws. Accepting a social
science thus defined Implied an acceptance of certain
wisdom and its authority beyond the limits of anarchism.
Thus, Tve find an irresolvable contradiction in Bakunin’s
scientific thought. Oddly enough, however, Bakunin’s
rather conventional philosophy of science in this aspect
did not significantly hamper his developing an incisive
anarchist critique of the role and function of science
in building socialist society. Despite his Newtonian bias,
he was able to see the authoritarian tendencies latent in
a universal! sti c approach to science and to caution against
the rule of laws of social matter. Just as the law of
gravity does not make rocks fall--lt is only an abstraction
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of real instance
— , the laws of scientific social
knowledge can only abstract the meaning of freedom.
Bakunin realized well in advance of other socialists
and his fellow anarchists in the nineteenth century (who
somehov; felt that science was '*theirs'* and that it would
be automatically libertarian) that to believe excessively
in the liberatory capabilities of science at the expense
of other human ways of freedom was both unrealistic and
dangerous. As he stated in a rather prophetic passage
in relation to the legacy of tarnished promise of both
natural and social science in our era.
Though we may be well nigh certain that a sav^mt
would not dare to treat a man to-day as he treats a
rabbit, it remains always to be feared that the
savants as a body, if not interfered vjith, may
submit living men to scientific experiments,
undoubtedly less cruel but nonetheless disagreeable
to their victims. If they cannot perform experiments
upon the bodies of individuals, they will ask nothing
better than to perform, them on the social body, and
that is what must be absolutely prevented. 42
Unfortunately, all too often this is just what has not
been prevented. His words have gone unheeded in our age
of Skinnerian condi tioned-response , behavioral! sir. * s
value -neu tral i ty , scientific socialism technocratism,
etc. It is now easier to understand Bakunin's fears of
the social use of science than it was in the nineteenth
century, when the rule of science was largely a theoretical
^^Bakunin, God and the State, p. 56 .
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matter
.
The development of anarchist social science was
greatly advanced by Bakunin. Not only did he augment the
body of ”written" theory and develop anarchist thought
in relation to the idea of science, but it was his
influence that drew many persons—including a relatively
large number of scientifically oriented individuals^3—
towards anarchism as a means of healing the social wounds
Inflicted by the Industrial Revolution and capitalism.
Furthermore, he initiated the healing of the mlnd/body,
reason/passions dichotomy within anarchist thought; this
acceptance of humans* natural being has increased in
significance in the anarchist paradigm since he wrote,
as will be shoim in the next two chapters. Finally,
anarchism owes a substantial debt to Bakunin for his
^3Bakunln himself was the last of the nineteenth
century anarchist movement's dialectical theorists; after
him (and partially as a result of his work’s rather
scientific orientation)
,
we see the rise of the anarchist
theorist trained in the natural sciences. For example,
Errico Malatesta and Carlo Caifero, both medical students,
were "recruited" by him. Elie Reclus, an anthropologist
,
and Elisee Reclus, a geographer, were personal friends of
Bakunin's and presumably became active in the anarchist
movement under his influence. Giusseppe Fanelli, an
engineer, became interested and active in anarchism during
his acquaintance with Bakunin in 1865. Later, other
anarchist "luminaries" such as Peter Kropotkin and Emma
Goldman were favorably impressed by Bakunin's insistence
upon the "practical" scientist, and utilized their
respective scientific training (Kropotkin as a geographer,
agronomist, anthropologist
,
etc., and Goldman as nurse
and midwife) to support their anarchist ideas, which, at
least in Kropotkin's case, had been formulated to a
considerable degree by the scientific theory and experiments
he had studied.
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contributions to social scientific knowledge itself,
many of which are reflected in his observation that
.
Liberty without socialism is privilege, injustice;
socialism without liberty is slavery and brutality
.
^^Bakunin, "Federalism, Socialism and Anti-Theologism,
"
Bakunin on Anarchy
,
p. 127.
CHAPTER III
CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL DARWINISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AN ANARCHIST VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE
The Shift from Political Economy to Natural
Science as the Model for Social Science:
The Rise of Evolutionary Thought
We have tried to show how Proudhon and Bakunin
modified bourgeois political economy and other trends
of the social science of their era into a new philosophy
In order to give a "scientific** support to their political
and moral views of anarchism. Marx and the authoritarian
socialists were, at least in this area of thought, rather
similar to the anarchists: Economics was radical in the
sense that it tried to explain the world in its own terms
of natural reality and (thanks to the influence of the
natural sciences^) universal law; as such, the developing
socialist movement was able to adapt economic theory to
its own construction of critical theory. Yet simultaneously ,
a new body of thought was developing which was to have the
^Bookchin points out that in almost every period
since the Renaissance, the growth of revolutionary thought
has been strongly influenced by the natural sciences,
often in connection with particular schools of philosophy.
For example, astronomy had a huge impact during the
Renaissance in that it helped dispel many of the
superstitious ideas and heavily mystical worldviews of the
medieval period. The result was the development of
critical rationalism and modern humanism; this was reinforced
by advances in mathematics during the Enlightenment . See
Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Berkeley, California:
Ramparts Press, 1971)* P* 37*
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profoundest inpact on all social and hence anarchist
thought during the latter part of the nineteenth century,
and that trend was the rise of the concept of evolution.
Thus far, we have been tracing primarily the development
of social science largely in terms of a Newtonian
conception of an external universal generalized law
which, once discovered," could be used as a tool to
either reorganize or reconstruct society for the benefit
of all. The political economist--bourgeois
,
Marxist,
anarchist, or whatever—looked for the economic laws
that governed the economic movement of society. In
economics and materialist philosophy, the early socialists
sought to understand what they felt were the irrational
functions of a capitalist system so that they could
construct a new and more rational social order. The
rise of evolutionary thought, however, was to have great
repercussions on radical thought, for it made possible
a qualitatively different paradigm for socialists and
forced them to grapple with the philosophical problems
it raised. Again, as we have tried to show with the
origin of socialism and social science, no one person,
or date can be isolated in relation to the origin of the
concept of evolution. There was certainly quite a bit
of evolutionary thought apparent in Europe before Darwin
wrote his book on the origin of the species, Kropotkin,
the noted anarchist who was also a renovzned natural
79
scientist, in one of his more Intriguing statements,
wrote in his Ethics that the origin of social science as
started by Smith and Comte arose from an evolutionist
perspective of sorts.
Already in the thirties the positivist philosopher
Auguste Comte, and the founders of socialism
Saint-Simon and Fourier (especially his follovjers in
France and Robert Owen in England)
, endeavored to
apply to the life of human societies the theory of
gradual development of plant and animal life,
promulgated by Buffon and Lanarck and partly by the
Elncyclopaedl s t s . In the second half of the nineteenth
century the study of the development of the social
institutions of man made possible for the first time
the full realization of the importance of the
development in mankind of this fundamental conception
of all social life --equity .^
An evolutionary consciousness had certainly been
developing prior to 1859 (the publishing date of The
Origin of Soecies ) in many areas of Western thought other
than natural biology; if one looks closely at the history
of European thought, one can see that it has been pregnant
with evolutionary conceptions in such matters as the
progressive development of human societies, the human
condition, and reasoned thought, especially from the
Enlightenment onward. In Hegel's Idealist philosophy and
in Comte's positivist philosophy, societies developed
from a less perfected form to a more perfect and complex
stage of existence, as did human thought, which made this
^Peter Kropotkin, Ethics; Origin and Development ,
trans. Louis S. Friedland and Joseph H. Piroshnikoff
(New York; Benjamin Blum, I968) , p. 265.
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progressive change In society possible. This Impulse of
thought within the evolution of society to reach complex
reasoned Ideals (ends) was not lost on anarchist thinkers,
as has already been shown with Proudhon, who accepted the
Comtean stages of progressive development of humanity and
the Hegelian belief In a transcendence of Instinct by
conscious reason. Proudhon, although more Newtonian than
Bakunin In his search for an Immutable law of justice,
nevertheless utilized the work of Georges Cuvier, the
pre -Darwinian French naturalist v7ho had greatly affected
Comte as well. Cuvier held that the Instinctual was the
governing drive of all animal life; Proudhon was able to
accept this, for Cuvier also felt that animals Instlnctually
followed a leader, but as reason ascends In human
development, the chief’s Importance fades and rationality
becomes the significant ruling force. Cuvier’s Influence
Is apparent In Proudhon’s thought concerning the development
of society.
Thus, In a given society, the authority of a man over
man Is Inversely proportional to the stage of Intellectual
development which that society has reached; and the
probable duration of that authority can be calculated
from the more or less general desire for a true
government—that is, for a scientific government.
And just as the right of force and the right of
artifice retreat before the steady advance of justice,
and must finally be extinguished in equality, so the
sovereignty of the will yields to the sovereignty of
the reason, and rust at last be lost in scientific
socialism. Property and royalty have been crumbling
8l
to pieces ever since the world began. As man seeks
Justice in equality, so society seeks order in
anarchy .
3
Thus, Proudhon used evolutionary thought (along with
political economy) in his explication of the development
of reason to advocate the creation of a sclentif ically
based society without a -state order.
Bakunin noted the contributions of Comte and Hegel
to the Integration of evolutionary thinking into socialist
thought
.
It is curious to note that the order of sciences
established by Auguste Comte is almost the same as
the one in the Encyclopedia
[
of Science^ by Hegel,
the greatest metaphysician oT past or present times,
X'/hose glory x^:as that he brought the development of
speculative philosophy to its culminating point,
from which, impelled by its ovm peculiar dialectics,
it had to follow the dox-mward path of self-destruction.
Between Auguste Comte and Hegel there was an enormous
difference. The latter, true m.etaphyslcian that he
was, spiritualized matter and Nature, deducing them
from logic; that is, from spirit. Auguste Comte, on
the contrary, materialized the spirit, grounding it
solely in matter. And therein lies his greatest
glory
The notion that human societies progressed and evolved
from simpler to more complex and finally more human forms
was thus prior to the development of explicit evolutionary
theory in the natural sciences, but then, evolution, like
any theory, arose from a definite conceptual matrix.
3proudhon, What Is Property? , p. 277 •
^Michael Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of
Bakunin; Scientific Anarchism , ed. G. P. Naxinoff
,
Preface by Bert F. Hoselitz, Introduction by Rudolf
Rocker (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 196^), p. 7^.
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It Is an historical irony that ComteVs positivist
philosophy and Hegel’s dialectical philosophy probably
made the acceptance and understanding of natural evolution
and its application easier for radicals to accept, for
the concept of evolution was unacceptable vjithin the
inductivist-mechanistic-predictivist model, adopted from
physics, the science considered most advanced at that
time, which was the common framework of most students of
society. This paradigm, still in existence in “mainstream"
social science, equates explanations with forecasts;
therefore, theories which produce no predictions are
assumed to be lacking in explanatory value and hardly
qualify as "scientific." However, many important theories
have offered no forecasts: Darwin’s theory is an
outstanding example. The latter, as Stephen Toulmin has
shown, explains the origins of species by mutations and
natural selection, yet makes no predictions. No scientist
would use this theory to predict the evolution of new
species; yet Darwin's theory is widely regarded as having
a great deal of validity as an explanatory device.^
Darwin's theories did not fit the Newtonian
conceptions of the philosophers of science or social
science of the early nineteenth century (or for that
^Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding
(New York: Harper and Row', 19^1 ) , pp« 24-25*
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natter, those of most social scientists today)
,
but
as science, it had value beyond its explanatory capabilities,
which assured it an Important place in Western thought.
If Darwin’s theory could not predict future species
arising, it nevertheless was able to give credence to
both status quo conceptions of social thought grounded
in natural selection and tending toward the survival of
elites, and revolutionary thought, grounded in a belief
in the evolutionary capacity of humans and society toward
a more perfect social organization and tending toward
the survival of all the species. Evolution was already
in the air, and in many ways, if a scientific theory of
evolution hadn’t existed in rudimentary form, it
probably would have been developed anyway in an age that
was so very much under the influence of science as both
a means to and the equivalent of progress in human life,
a belief which arose from the Enlightenment tradition
of reason and science as the repository of ethical
progress. Bakunin stated concerning Comte’s evolutionary
conception on the development of science, formulated in the
lingering hope of the Enlightenment:
The co-ordination of sciences established by
positive philosophy is not just simple juxtaposition:
it is a sort of organic concatenation which begins
with the abstract science—mathematics, which has for
its subject matter facts of the simple order, and
gradually ascends toward comparatively more concrete
sciences which have for their subject matter facts
ever growing in complexity. And thus from pure
mathematics one passes to mechanics, to astronomy,
and then to physics, chemistry, geology, and biology.
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including here the classification, comparative
anatomy, and physiology of plants, and then of
animals, and finally reaches sociology, which
embraces all human history, such as the development
of the collective and Individual existence in
political, economic, social, religious, artistic
and scientific life.®
The evolutionary "progressive” development even of the
sciences, then, was not quite so alien to the nineteenth
century thinker, even if it could not be acceptable within
the bounds of the existing philosophy of science.
Despite his belief that science did transcend
pure abstraction as it became Increasingly grounded in
the realities of daily life, Bakunin nevertheless
perceived science as a universal and unchanging reality.
Where he could grasp the Newtonian content of science and
could critique it, he was never able to question its
form; His criticism was directed not at its external-
universalistlc Newtonian formulation, but at its present
and potential application by the powerful segments of
society. Bakunin, however, was one of the most critical
socialist thinkers of his day with respect to the question
of the social uses of science, for there is very little
nineteenth century anarchist thought questioning the
inherent good of science. Rather, it was generally
agreed that the development of science was an entirely
beneficial phenomenon that would inevitably lead to the
^Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin ,
pp. 73-74.
85
anarchist social revolution.
By the time Darwin published his Origin of Snecies .
the socialist movement was already receptive to evolution
and somewhat oriented to Its perspective. Marx*s
A Contribution to the Crltlcue of Political Economy ,
which appeared in the same year, 1859, is more or less
his outline of thought concerning the evolution of
capitalism (this work was later expanded by him to become
Capital)
. According to John Hewetson, a modern writer,
Karl Marx
. . , when he published his Crltioue
of Political Economy in 1859, considered it an
extremely lucky chance that The Origin of Snecies
should have appeared in the same year. 'This
wonderful work,* he wrote, *makes my o^m absolutely
impregnable. Darwin .may not know it, but he belongs
to the Social Revolution . *7
Marx wanted to dedicate Capital to Darwin for this reason.
• • • and as Engels made clear in his speech at Marx's
graveside, the comparison expresses a much deeper
connection than this. In one of those profound and
exquisite though often seemingly digressive footnotes
with which Ka,rx overloads Car.1 tal
,
he relates how
Darwin first drew his attention to the 'history of
natural technology,* that is, to the formation of
plant and animal life. And he poses the question,
'Does not the history of the productive organs of
social man, of organs that are the material basis of
all social organization
,
deserve equal attention?
And would not such a history be easier to compile,
since, as Vico says, human history differs from
natural history in that we have made the former
but not the latter?°
7john Hewetson, "Mutual Aid and Social Evolution,"
Anarchy 5 (September 1965) t P* 258.
®Karl Korsch
,
"Introduction to Capital , " Three
Essays on Marxism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972 ),
pp. 41 -42 .
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Marx, En,5els, and other early socialists (as well
as liberals and some conservatives—e.g. , Herbert Spencer,
Comte, Thomas Henry Huxley) felt that they were involved
in scientific construction of the social realm. Marx
viewed himself, and Proudhon did likewise, as founding
a socialist science of political inquiry. In doing this,
discoveries in science or in other schools of social
science were often used by them to support the scientific
contentions of socialist thought, an endeavor which was
reciprocal, for the various bourgeois schools of thought
did the same thing (Max Weber, Emile Durkhelm and John
M, Keynes drew on Marx, for example).
Bakunin was no exception to the phenomenon of the
scientific mystique, even if he was critical of the
authoritarian application of science to human society,
for his thought, as well as that of the other anarchists
of his time, shows the impact of evolutionary thought
as it was presented in Darwin’s vrork. In his God and
the State , in which he had done so much to debunk the
myth of formula-ridden, universalistic and manipulative
social science, Bakunin stated on the origin of human
life:
Yes, our ancestors, our Adams and our Eves, were if
not gorillas, omnivorous, intelligent and ferocious
beasts, endowed in a higher degree than the animals
of any other species with two precious faculties
—
the power to think and the desire to rebel . These
faculties, combining their progressive action in
history, represent the essential factor, the
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negative power In the positive development of human
animality, and create consequently all that
constitutes humanity in man.
9
It was through reason (the Influence of Hegel and Proudhon
is quite obvious here) that Bakunin believed that humans
would transcend animalistic Instinct and become rational
social creatures—humans in a more perfect sense.
Darwin's "struggle for existence" fit as well into the
economic parameter of Bakunin's anarchism as into bourgeois
thought as a means of scientifically determining the
true basis of human social life.
Whoever has studied history even a little cannot fail
to notice that, underlying all the religions and
theological strunrgles, however abstract, sublime, and
ideal they may have been, there was always some
outstanding material interest. All the racial,
national. State, and class wars had only one object,
and that was domination, which is the necessary
condition of the guarantee for the possession and
enjoyment of Tvealth. Human history, considered from
this point of view, is simply the continuation of the
great struggle for life, which according to Dar*win,
constitutes the basic law of the organic world,
H
Considered from this point of view, the natural
x^orld presents to us a deadly and bloody picture of
a fierce and perpetual struggle, a 5tru-:-;:le for li'^e .
Man is not the only one to wage this stru'::gle: all
animals, all living beings--nay, what is more, all
existing things---carry within themselves, although
in a less apparent manner than man, the germs of
their own destruction, and so to speak are their own
enemies. The same natural inevitability begets.
^Bakunin, God and the State , pp. 9-10.
^^Bakunin was never the chastity-ani-‘*sins of the
flesh" -socialist that Proudhon was. Bakunin wanted an
"informed" instiactuality . the passions liberated from
blind and ignorant superstition. Being human ultimately
meant both reason and body participating in social life.
^^Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Baloinin, p. 169.
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preserves, and destroys them. Every class of things,
every plant and animal species, lives only at the
expense of other; one devours the other, so that the
natural world can be regarded as a bloody hecatomb,
as a grim tragedy incited by hunger
. The natural
world is the arena of a ceaseless struggle which
knows no mercy nor respite.
Is it possible that this inevitable law also
exists in the human and social world?12
These statements of **fact** could have been postulated by
a Social Darwinist or a Marxist of the era whose belief
was that the struggle for economic necessity was based
on the need to preserve llfe--the basic law of the
organic world. For Bakunin, through the use of human
reason and the technology of science, a new social order
could evolve which would wrest the means of life from
the environment so that the minimal physical requirements
adequate food, clothing and shelter—would be universally
met.
In short, Bakunin’s solution to the inevitable
•’biological” problem was the solution of the social
problem through the use of human reason and material
transformation. Through the economic reordering' of
voluntary and communal cooperation and collective
ownership of the land, the struggle for necessity could
be vitiated and the twin struggles of natural history
and of social history could be ended in an order of
material plenty created by the labor of all. Marx and
^
^Bakunin, The Political Philosophy of Bakunin ,
pp. 169-170.
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Engels held a similar progressive evolutionary view but
believed that state socialism could better determine
the solution of the economic and social problem of
necessity than could voluntary cooperation, for it was
not only necessary to create material plenty but also
to restrain the anti -social instincts in a humanity
tainted by capitalist social relations to create
communism. Engels stated it this way:
The anarchists put the thing upside down. They
declare that the proletarian revolution must begin
by doing away with the political organization of the
State. But after its victory the sole organization
which the proletariat finds already in existence is
precisely the state. 13
For Bakunin, then, in humans evolution was becoming
aware of itself, for of all the animal species, the
human was the only one able to abstract hlm/herself in
his/her oim mind. Humans could separate their reason
from the natural environment and thus could endeavor to
create a society whose social life would transcend
nature’s adversity. Human history was the development
of reason as the triumph over nature. In this matter,
Bakunin was no different than Proudhon and was also
similar to most other socialist and liberal theorists,
differing only in his rejection of the assumption that
the state and/or private property were needed as checks
on anti-social instincts and the egotistical struggle
^^Friedrlch Engels, Letter to Von Patten, Marx and
Engels: Selected Corresrondence 1846-1895 (New York:
International Publishers, 19^2 Ft P^ ^1?
•
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for survival.
It is here that It is necessary to begin to examine
Peter Kropotkin’s legacy to anarchism in developing an
anarchist conception of social evolution which would be
quite unlike previous views and which would no longer
be a matter of a merely different interpretation of
the same viewpoint of evolutionary theory. With Kropotkin,
anarchism became more than a "rational” critique of the
present and an anticipated future order resting on the
rational faculties or even on Bakunin’s "reasoned passions,”
It became anchored instead in progressive animal evolution
and in animal life Itself, which included instinctual
and rational behavior. With Kropotkin, a great step
forward was taken to heal the wound created by the Western
mlnd/body dichotomy. No longer would it be necessary to
transcend the animal nature in humanity in order to attain
socialism. Where Bakunin believed that reason was part
of the material realm and that the solution of the
struggle for existence lay in the realm of reason,
Kropotkin showed that both instinct and reason were
eminently human and social, existing together of their
own necessity, and that they were the natural basis of
socialism. No longer would only the progressive
development of reason be on humans’ side, but so too
would be the animal impulse of survival. Anarchism was to
rest on a more naturalistic basis, and its social science
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beg:an to develop a new paradigm reflecting this change.
Kropotkin's Conception of Social
Evolution and Mutual Aid
The work of Peter Kropotkin is outstanding in the
history of anarchist thought, especially in the regard
that he successfully integrated and reinterpreted
evolutionary thought in such a way as to expurgate the
Malthusian elements within it and to develop a completely
anarchistic conception of social evolution and social
life. Yet his perspective, of course, did not appear
suddenly; its direct origins considerably predate it.
Although Proudhon initiated the development of a conscious
anarchist movement, it is necessary to find the roots
of an anarchist perspective on evolution within the
"depths" of the anarchist consciousness. Thus we must
briefly move back in time to the late eighteenth century
to William Godwin, the first thinker to expound a
multi-faceted libertarian philosophy resting on secular
premises
.
Reacting against Hobbes* view of human nature
and the less extreme guarded optimism of the liberal
contract theorists, Godwin believed that society should
be ruled solely by reason and, like the anarchists who
were to succeed him, viewed education as the most
important means of bringing about meaningful and self-
actualizing change. For Godwin, the rule of political
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force would become unnecessary In a society of reason,
and a new economic structure would come Into being
naturally and harmoniously In such a society. In contrast
to the liberals of the late seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, Godwin held that reason alone would be
sufficient to modify or restrain passionate and unreasoned
action. Thus he saw no need to limit hum.an impulses by
state action; reason could more than adequately create
a good social life without the encumbrance of set laws
and the coercive structures that always are required to
enforce them. Godwin’s philosophy of law—the focal
point of his anarchism—is encapsulated in this statement
from An Snquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its
Influence on General Virtue anfi Happiness (1793).
Law is merely relative to the exercise of political
force and must perish when the necessity for that
force ceases, if the influence of truth do not still
sooner extirpate it from the practice of mankind.
As clearly as his ideas were developed, they had
no direct impact on anarchist thought and the development
of the anarchist movement. It was not until his work
was "discovered** in the late nineteenth century by
English anarchists (as also happened with the work of
Max Stirner) that he was linked to the anarchist
tradition. However, Godwin’s thought directly influenced
^\illiam Godwin, "On Law" (excerpts from An Enquiry
Concerning: Political Justice and Its Influence on General
Virtue and Kart^lness) (London: Freedom Press, n.d.), p. 14.
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the shaping of the English radicalism of the early
nineteenth century, especially in the cases of Percy
Shelley and Robert Owen. Yet his major effect was not
to be recognized in anarchism until almost a century
Political Justice was written: It was Godwin who
moved Reverend Thomas Maithus to write from a neo-Kobbesian
perspective within the liberal philosophic fold in an
attempt to refute Godwin’s vision of rational anarchy,
and in turn, Kalthus* theories became basic to the Social
Darwinist paradigm that Kropotkin’s work challenged.
Thomas Kalthus, creator of political economy’s
s^nmia anolcgia for the inequities of early industrial
capitalism, believed that what he saw in his own society
was the reflection of the ’’scientif Ic'* reality of all
human existence. Viewing the capitalist order as based
on natural and scientific principle, Kalthus posited the
law of just retribution to be discoverable in operation.
It follows that the so-called "injustices” of the
prevailing system were due not to humanly-created
structures, but were rather brought about by the natural
misfortune of the human condition. Humans v;ere seen as
reproducing geometrically, like the proverbial offspring
of Adam, while the food supply could only be forced to
yield arithmetically. The strong, the intelllgent--these
survived and became the prosperous; the poor, the weak
and the lame existed for the time, but due to a lack of
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mental acuity and moral sobriety, had to bear the burdens
of a hostile natural environment—l.e., hunger and
deprivation, Mai thus* theories quickly found favor
among the circles of the upper bourgeoisie, for his was
a morally assuaging message for these people, a resolution
of the contradiction between some of their proclaimed
Ideals (e.g., the dignity of the human being, the right
to life and liberty) and the realities of the order they
supported. Eventually, Maithus* work had a profound
Impact on a vjhole generation of bourgeois political
economists, philosophers and naturalists. Hewetson
discusses this phenomenon:
By a remarkable coincidence, both Darwin and
Alfred Russell V/allace, who reached the idea of
evolution taking place through natural selection
almost simultaneously, started on this train of
thought from the same initial stimulus. In his
Natural! st*s Voyage Round the World
,
Darwin relates
how the ideas of Malthus set him on the track of
Natural Selection,
*
, . , In October I838, that Is, fifteen months
after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened
to read for amusement ’’Malthus on Population,” and
being well prepared to appreciate the struggle for
existence which everyv;here goes on, from long
continued observation of the habits of plants and
animals, it at once struck me that under these
circumstances favourable variations vjould tend to
be preserved, and unfavourable ones destroyed. The
result of this v7ould be the formation of new
species .
*
Similarly, Wallace describes how, vrhen he was
lying ill with fever in February 1858, twenty years
later than Darwin, he was thinking about the
*positlve checks* —war, famine, disease—described
by Malthus in his Essay on Population , Wallace felt
that these * positive checks' must act even more
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powerfully on animals than upon men because of their
greater rate of multiplication. Thus both men began
to speculate about selection after reading Maithus*
book . 15
Malthus* theory on population, then, lay within
an evolutionary perspective in that society tended
towards hunger and then a progressive equilibrium of
the strong in its development. This belief had a profound
Impact on both the political economy and the evolutionary
theory of the nineteenth century, as the ’’mainstreams*' of
both proceeded from the assumption that poverty, hunger,
and disease were manifestations of an inevitable tendency
for the population to be greater than the available
food supply—the poor were simply those upon vrhom the
"positive checks" were acting. 1 ^
Proudhon was one of the first socialists to
criticize the "iron" theories of the Malthusian school
of political economy which were widely accepted in
France as well as in Malthus* native England. Proudhon’s
criticism was directed at the isolation of the individual
in Malthusian thought, which he saw as aimed at destroying
the solidarity of labor and at preserving the system of
private property, as well as at placing the "blame" for
poverty upon single persons rather than upon social
l^Hewetson, "Mutual Aid and Social Evolution,"
pp. 258-259.
l^Ibid.
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Institutions; at the assertion that class division was
eternal and inevitable; and at what he characterized as
the erroneous idea that population and production cannot
attain equilibrium.^*^ At least as far as anarchists
were concerned, Proudhon thus refuted the "scientific”
pretensions of Malthusian theories of political economy
and had showed that any. society restructured with reason
as Its means of meeting the laws of necessity would
render the Malthusian "laws” of class division obsolete.
The various Malthusian arguments defending the
status quo with which anarchism vjould have to grapple
were later garbed in the language of natural science.
The social philosophy inspired by Darwin’s work, because
of the x^ay it was stated, was almost universally
considered scientific and could be accepted to some
degree by widely differing schools of thought. For
example, even vrlth its Malthusian elements, we have seen
that Bakunin v;as able to accept certain aspects of Social
Darxfinist theory as the truth of natural history and
human development. His solution to the problem of
restraining the voracious and anti -social instincts In
humans was the progressive realization of community
through an Informed and corporeal reason. The human
ability to abstract oneself and finally to become
l?See especially Proudhon, System of Economic
Contradictions
,
pp. 66-67.
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^ social creature was required to overcome
the brutal ” struggle for existence." Therefore,
Balcunin s anarchism, although revolutionary in every
sense of the word, nevertheless was blind to the Infusion
of Malthusianism into Darwin's work, which Bakunin
accepted as completely scientific. It was Kropotkin
who finally reassessed
-evolution's social biases in
light of his findings in biology and ethnology and applied
evolution in revised form to anarchist thought and the
conception of an anarchist social science.
The Impact of Darwin's work upon Kropotkin's
developing anarchism both before and after he considered
himself an anarchist v^as of great magnitude In both a
negative and a positive sense, as can be seen in this
statement from Mutual Aid ;
Two aspects of animal life Impressed me most
during the journeys I made in my youth in Eastern
Siberia and Northern Manchuria. One of them vras
the extrem.e severity of the struggle which most
species of animals have to carry on against an
inclement Nature; the enormous destruction of life
which periodically results from natural agencies;
aind the consequent paucity of life over the vast
territory vjhich fell under my observation. And the
other was that even those few spots where animal
life teemed in abundance, I failed to find--al though
I was eagerly looking for it--that bitter struggle
for means of existence, among animals belonging to
the same species
,
which was considered by most
Darwinists (though not always by Darvjin himself) as
the dominant characteristic of struggle for life,
and the main factor of evolution.
l^Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid (Boston: Extending
Horizon Books, 1970), p. vii.
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Although his perspective was definitely, evolutionary
and although he was Indebted to Darwin In many ways,
Kropotkin nevertheless felt th.at Darwin often overstressed
certain factors of evolution—especially that of
struggle for existence within the same species——
at the expense of other important factors. Darwin, he
thought, never really sketched out all of the major
implications within his theory. Furthermore, Kropotkin
saw Darwin as never quite able to overcome the contradictory
elements within his theory resulting from his acceptance
of Malthusian philosophy. The problem, said Kropotkin.
was that much of Darwin's natural history was in actuality
a projection of the realities and anxieties of the
existing social order into the natural world and the
past. Concerning Darwin's last great work. The Descent
of Man
.
Kropotkin wrote:
He Ijparwlr^ pointed out how, in numberless animal
societies the strur^gle between separate individuals
for the means of existence disappears, hovj struggle
is replaced by co-operation, and how that substitution
results in the development of intellectual and moral
faculties vjhich secure to the species the best
conditions for survival. He intimated that in such
cases the fittest are not the physically strongest,
nor the cunningest, but those who learn to combine
so as mutually to support each other, strong and
weak alike, for the welfare of the community. . . .
The term [struggle for existenc^ which originated
from the narrow Malthusian conception of competition
between each and all, thus lost Its narrowness in the
mind of one vjho knew Nature.
Unhappily, these remarks, which might have become
the basis of most fruitful researches, vrere overshadowed
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by the masses of facts gathered for the purpose of
Illustrating the_ conseouences of a real coniDetitlon
for life.
. . . never wrote the work he procosed
to write upon the natural checks to over-multiplication
that would have been the crucial test for appreciating
the real purport of individual struggle. Nay, on the
very pages just mentioned, amidst data disproving
the narrow Malthusian conception of struggle, the
old Malthusian leaven reappeared—namely, in Darwin’s
remarks as to the alleged inconveniences of maintaining
the ’I'jeak in mind and body* in our civilized societies
(ch. V).l9
Darwin, in Kropotkin's assessment, was guilty of scientific
oversight in allowing the Malthusian content in his
theory to overcome the positive elements therein. His
followers, however, x*jere guilty of the more serious
Intellectual offense of using the content of Darwin's
science as an apology for prevailing social conditions.
Many Darxvinists disregarded the scientific implications
in Dar'win's work so that instead of expanding upon it by
further exploring various related hypotheses of natural
development, they reduced the meaning of Darwin's theory,
narrowing it down to eno-Hobbeslanlsm, with Individuals
pitted against one another in the struggle for survival,
"with the war-cry of x-:oe to the vanquished, as if it were
the last word of modern biology."^® Kropotkin believed
that this misconception of the evolutionary process was
the result of biases embedded in the bourgeois view of
social life which colored many Darwinists* scientific
20l^Kropotkin, Mutual Aid , p. 3* Ibid. , p. 4.
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vision and carried fallacious proposition? into their
scientific work.
With Kropotkin, anarchist social science extended
its concern from the economic question to the even
larger sphere of "the nature of nature," and the conflicts
with both the schools of socialism and the schools of
bourgeois political economy consequently took on new
dimensions, Kropotkin endeavored to align anarchism
with science, as Proudhon and Bakunin before him had
attempted to do with the "science" of political economy.
Kropotkin, hovrever, with the abundance of new evidence
available in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
was able to provide a scientific base for anarchism
far more effectively than were his predecessors. That
he did this was fortunate for anarchism, for if it was
to survive in the age of science, it had either to
accept science as it was—i.e., accept Malthusian
evolution and the Newtonian mechanistic view of society,
and therefore undermine the most basic assumptions of
anarchism—or to ground Itself in a new epistemology.
Kropotkin and other scientifically oriented anarchists
of his era (notably Elie and Eli see Reclus) went beyond
Bakunin*s conception of science by questioning not only
the uses of science, but also the content of what was
labelled science. Although they continued to regerd
science as a "universal" ideal and to view it as the
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force that would liberate humanity, they were able to
recognize the ideological biases of the biological
sciences of their time. This awareness led them to an
acute consciousness of paradigm which ultimately resulted
in the rejection of bourgeois interpretations of natural
selection and human nature,
Kropotkin’s research in biology provided him with
the ability to formulate a new scientific base for
2ianarchist thought. Let us now examine more closely
the context in v;hich Kropotkin came to develop the
concept of mutual aid as a significant factor in
zoological evolution and consequently as a firm basis
for the construction of an anarchist society.
What prompted Kropotkin's open conflict with the
Malthusian evolutionary theory of his era was the
appearance in February l888 in Nineteenth Century
(magazine) ofan article on the social implications of
2lThis is not to imply that Kropotkin's theory was
entirely new in the historical sense. Scientific
revolutions, like any thought, do not sud'^enly occur.
Rather, they develop more-or-less slowly until one
scientist, or a group of scientists, recognize anomalies
as inherent in the assumptions of the '*01(3." paradigm and
thus must go beyond the existing framework to develop a
nevj perspective on scientific problems. See Thomas Kuhn,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicapro Press, 19o2 y . In the case of
Kropotkin, we find elements of his theory of mutual aid
directly foreshadowed in the writing of Proudhon, Bakunin,
Joseph Dejacoue, the utopian socialists, and others of
the early nineteenth century. However, it was Kropotkin
who made the actual "breakthrough."
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evolutionary theory. It was written for a popular
audience by Thomas Henry Huxley, a leading biologist aind
a friend of Darwin’s, as well as a great popularizer of
the theory of evolution. The article, entitled ’’The
Struggle for Existence in Human Society,” provoked
Kropotkin’s ire both as an anarchist and a scientist,
as it attempted to fit evolution into the "laissez-faire"
political philosophy and economic assumptions of the
time and to characterize the result as science. Kropotkin
replied to Huxley in Nineteenth Century with a series
of articles which vjould later become the book Mutual Aid:
A Factor of Evolution and which constituted the basis of
his last v:ork. Ethics; Origins and Development .
Huxley’s position, in brief, was of an extreme
neo-Hobbesian and Malthusian bent, garnished with a
pessimistic assertion of the superiority of the English
people in their ability to triumph in the global struggle
for existence. He defined the conditions of existence
in terms such as these;
From the point of view of the moralist the animal
world is on about the same level as a gladiator's
show. The creatures are fairly well treated, and
set to. fight—whereby the strongest, the swiftest,
and the cunningest live to fight another day. The
spectator has no need to turn thumbs down, as no
quarter is given. He must admit that the skill
and training displayed are wonderful. But he m.ust
shut his eyes if he would not see that more or less
enduring suffering is the meed of ooth vanquished and
victor . 22
22Thomas Henry Huxley, "The Struggle for Existence
in Human Society," appendix B to Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, p. 330.
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It is clear that the view of natural life .had deteriorated
from the one that was prevalent in the written works and
hopes of the Enlightenment * s humanist tradition. The
vision of nature one hundred years after Rousseau, Paine,
Jefferson, et al. was one of carnage, bloodthirst,
unbridled destructive instinct. A "solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish, and short"^3 life was seen by Huxley as the
basic fact of all animal existence. Gone were Rousseau’s
over-idealized noble savage and Diderot’s Tahitians,
replaced by a "natural man" of evil inclination and cruel
action. Until the advent of civilization, said Huxley,
, . , among primitive men, the weakest and stupidest
went to the wall, while the toughest and shrewdest,
those who were best fitted to cope with their
circumstances, but not the best in any other sense,
survived. Life was a continual free fight, and
beyond the limited and temponry relations of the
family, the Hobbesian war of each against all was
the normal state of existence. The human species,
like others, splashed and floundered amid the
general stream of evolution, keeping its head above
water as it best micght, and thinking neither whence
nor whither. 2^
In Huxley’s Social Darwinist system, humans were
by nature violent and anti -social beasts of prey who
had to be restrained so that life could rise above the
level of constant terror and misery. In true Hobbesian
fashion, and not entirely Inconsistent with the liberal
belief of reason restraining the passionate senses as a
23Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , p. 107
•
2^Huxley, "The Struggle for Existence in Human
Society," p. 332.
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way of gainirif? ordered liberty, Huxley believed that
civilization had to rest upon restraint of these natural
**anlmal" impulses so that "survival of the fittest"
could depend upon more rational and important qualities
such as capitalist acumen. Because Inherent in the
animal nature of humanity there lurked a primal "heart
of darkness," civilization had to mean the continuous
renunciation of the beast in each person or at least
the restraint of the openly animalistic behavior of
those unwilling or unable to overcome their true nature.
Accordingly, Huxley viewed human history as no more than
a record of humans* efforts to escape their own
biological being. Emerging from this analysis is a
covert defense of Manchester! te (laissez-faire) liberalism.
The first men who substituted the state of
mutual peace for that of mutual war, whatever the
motive which impelled them to take that step,
created society. But, in establishing peace, they
obviously put a limit upon the struggle for existence.
Between the members of that society, at any rate,
it was not to be pursued \ outrance . And of all the
successive shapes which society has taken, that most
nearly approaches perfection in which the war of
individual against individual is most strictly
limited. The primitive savage . . . appropriated
whatever took his fancy, if he could. On the contrary,
the ideal of the ethical man is to limit his freedom
of action to a sphere in which he does not interfere
with the freedom of others; he seeks the commonweal as
much as his own, and indeed, as an essential part of
his own welfare . 25
25Huxley ."The Struggle for Existence," p. 332 .
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The vision of Individuals divided and embattled against
each other until the Institution of societal restraint
seems to have been the subconscious attempt of an
apologist for the capitalist status quo to come to grips
with the conflict between the ideals of liberty,
equality and fraternity—the heritage of the Enlightenment—
and the problems industrial society had created. The
tension created between the professed belief in the more
or less spontaneous creation of society for the benefit
of all as it had been put forth In the ” social contract”
theories and the realities of enforced subsistence for
many within bourgeois society demanded a conceptual
resolution: That which developed, as has been mentioned,
was a neo-Hobbesianlsm, Where most of the contract
theorists posited society as having originated In the
willingness of equal and rational beings to come together
for their Increased mutual benefit, Hobbes had viewed
any equality that existed In humanity as derived from
the equal ability of individuals to kill one another
and had seen society as held together by bonds of mutual
antagonism. Civilization—any civilization—had to be
better than the state of nature.
Social Darwinism revived and transported
Hobbesianism into natural biology and from there
reinfused European society with Hobbeslan pessimism.
With the latter nineteenth century’s complex industrialism
giving rise to vast industrial armies of proletarians
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and conflicts and disruptions on a vast scale in the
social
-life of all, it was generally conceded that
progress and civilization could only result from
restraining natural impulses. Clearly, Hobbes* theory
of stifling innate tendencies to create order served
the requirements of an elaborate justification of the
status quo. Darwinian thought turned to Hobbes via
Malthusianism for praxis in the political and social
realm. Theory adjusted itself to the existing reality
in its advocacy of a strong governmental structure to
restrain the anti -social Impulses of humanity and to
socialize it, since the natural forces of famine,
pestilence, and war alone would not suffice to insure a
stable economic and social order. (Besides, continual
struggle would seem to lead to chaos rather than order
—
an interesting contradiction in the Social Darwinist
theory.) Yet even in this limited struggle for survival,
the weak still had to die if the species were to
survive—hence the "positive” Malthusian checks on human
life. For example, the discoveries of science could
yield modern sanitation methods, thereby limiting
disease, but the overpopulation resulting from the
lowered death rate would cause an Increase in famine and
war. There is little humanistic content in this, the
message of Huxley, Darwin’s friend and popularizer of
Darwinian evolution.
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Peter Kropotkin realized that such thought
disguised as objective science, if it remained unchallenged,
would reduce anarchism to impractical and anti-scientific
romanticism. This view of natural biological reality,
If It were true, would imply that anarchism was impossible,
for once external restraint and coercion were lifted.
Individuals* natural ravenous impulses would surface.
Kropotkin respected much of Huxley’s work, but he
realized how limited it was by its social roots and
Implicit aims. Huxley’s elitist view conflicted with
Kropotkin’s personal scientific experience—Kropotkin,
too, was "one who knew Nature'*—which had to a large
degree shaped his moralistic concerns. Like Bakunin, he
wished to universalize science, making it part of
everyone’s existence.
He who has once in his life experienced this
joy of scientific creation will never forget it;
he will be longing to renew it; and he cannot but
feel vjith pain that this sort of happiness is the
lot of so few of us, while so many could also live
through it, --on a small or on a grand scale,—if
scientific methods and leisure were not limited to
a handful of men. 26
The earlier anarchists’ vision of the evolution
of natural society differed little from contemporaneous
bourgeois theorists’ vision, as has been indicated
2^Peter Kropotkin, Nemoirs of a Revolu tlonist ,
Introductions by Paul Goodman, Barnett Newman, and
Georg Brandes (New York: Grove Press, 1970), p. 22?.
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earlier. Proudhon believed that early natural society
was governed by Instinct and that with human consciousness
progressing towards reasoned self-awareness, no longer
would external restraints on Instinct be necessary.
For Bakunin, natural society was not so much a product
of reason as of an Informed materially grounded
consciousness encompassing both reason and the senses.
Such a consciousness would free humanity from superstition,
violence, and other Instinctual ''phantoms . Once
unfettered by the abstractions of Ignorance, the
Individual struggle for existence could be transcended,
allowing a fully natural order to come Into being.
This would enable people to collectively create products
to fully meet necessity and to thus control their own
lives. In this way would freedom and social harmony
be achieved.
Coming from the anarchist tradition, Kropotkin
found It hardly acceptable for anarchists to adopt any
degree or part of the Malthusian paradigm, v/hlch
envisioned society as necessarily bound by hostility
and suffering. Where Bakunin accepted the Social
Darwinist view with a "Yes, but . . . "—the "but"
being that a society congruent with reason and science
would eliminate the causes of the rampage and plundering
Inherent In "the struggle for existence"— , Kropotkin,
in contrast, was pushed by his studies of nature beyond
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the bourgeois conception of evolution into an almost
entirely unexplored area of evolution.
Early in his career, Kropotkln^’^ began to doubt
that Individual struggle was truly inherent in nature
as universal reality, as the Darwinists postulated,
and that it was a universal reality before the advent
of socialism, as many socialists believed. What, then,
were the lessons to be learned from Nature? It might
be claimed that Kropotkin’s anarchist beliefs compelled
him to look for a social Instead of a tooth -and -claw
basis of evolutionary theory. However, while Kropotkin’s
anarchism may have inclined him to do further research,
it did not lead him to his conclusions: Bakunin, for
example, had avoided a confrontation with the Malthusian
content within evolutionary theory by accepting it as
true of the ’’state of nature” and to a lesser degree
as also applicable to the pre-socialist era. As we have
seen earlier, Kropotkin was involved in studying the
^^In this section, primarily Kropotkin’s work will
be examined, but he was hardly the only anarchist who
approached anarchism through natural science. Ells^e
Reclus, a prominent geographer and winner of the Paris
Geographical Society’s gold medal for his ((La Nouvelle
Geographic Unlverselle )) and his nineteen volume The
Earth and Its Inhabitants
,
became an anarchist as a
result of his research. Similarly, Elie Reclus, an
anthropologist, found himself receptive to anarchist
ideas while scientifically studying various societies.
They and several of their contemporaries made important
advances in scientific anarchist theory, but unfortunately
,
their works are not easily accessible in North America and
in English, nor have these works been recently published.
110
social aspects of evolution long before
. he- was an
avowed anarchist. The work of the Russian zoologist
Kessler helped give form to Kropotkin's nascent Ideas
on the social drives In natural animal life he saw In
Siberia.
Kessler's idea was that besides the law of Mutual
Struggle there is in Nature the law of Mutual Aid
,
which for the success of the struggle for life, and
especially for the progressive evolution of the
species, is far more important than the law of
mutual contest. This suggestion—which was, in
reality, nothing but a further development of the
ideas expressed by Darwin himself in The Descent
of Man—seemed to me so correct and so great an
importance, that since I became acquainted X'fith it
(in 1883) I began to collect materials for further
developing the idea, vihich Kessler had only
cursorily sketched in his lecture and had not lived
to develop . 28
Anarchism was not the sole factor motivating Kropotkin
to disprove Social Darwinist contentions, for a truly
scientific curiosity played an important role in the
endeavor. As a young officer in Siberia, he had seen
none of the violent intra-species conflict that had
been proclaimed the condition of nature, and he came
to realize that the question "Who are the fittest?"
was actually an inquiry of great social and political
import. Mutual Aid is his detailed answer to this
question. Kropotkin's basis thesis is stated in the
following passage from the latter work. He states that
28Kropotkin, Mutual Aid , p. x.
1^1
if we ask the question,
* i . . Who are the fittest: those who are continually
at war with each other, or those who support one
another?* we at once see that those animals which
acquire habits of mutual aid. are undoubtedly the
fittest. They have more chances to survive, and
to attain in their respective classes the highest
development of Intelligence and bodily organization.
If the numberless facts which can be brought forvrard
to support this viev; are taken into account, we may
safely say that mutual aid is as much sa law of
animal life as mutual struggle, but tha^t as a factor
of evolution, it most probably has a riiir* greater
importance, inasmuch as it favours the development
of such habits and characters as insure the
maintenance and further development of the species,
together with the greatest amount of welfare and
enjoyment of life for the individual, with the least
waste of energy. 29
Without positing the idyllic fallacies of some Enlightenment
thinkers who exalted the ”noble savage,” Kropotkin began
to pierce the ideological contradictions in Darv7inist
thought that were masked by the veil of science.
It was obvious to Kropotkin that sociability is
as much a law of nature as is mutual struggle.^® Why,
then, did Social Darwinists place so much emphasis upon
struggle within and outside of species, to the exclusion
of the associational characteristic in nature? He saw
both forces at work in nature at all times, their
effects varying with the species, environmental conditions,
and particular functions with which they work. Clearly,
the "survival of the fittest" theory was inadequate as
a general explanation of species evolution.
29Kropotkin, Mutual Aid , p. 6 . ^^Ibid. , p. 5 ^
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• • • If the evolution of the animal world were based
exclusively, or even chiefly, upon the survival of
the fittest during periods of calamities; If natural
selection were limited in its action to periods of
calamities,
. . . drought, or sudden changes in
temperatures, or inundations, retrogression would be
the rule of the animal world. Those who survive a
famine, or a severe epidemic of cholera, or smallpox
or dlptheria, such as we see them in uncivilized
countries, are neither the strongest, nor the
healthiest, nor the most intelligent. No progress
could be based on those survivals—the less so as
all survivors usually come out of the ordeal with an
impaired health, like
. , . the garrison of a fortress
which has been compelled to live for a few months
on half rations, and subsequently shows a quite
abnormal mortality. All that natural selection can
do in times of calamities is to spare the individuals
endowed with the greatest endurance for privations of
all kinds.
. . , *Evil cannot be productive of good,*
as Tchernyshevsky wrote in a remarkable essay on
Darwinism. 3l
Thus, Kropotkin held that the Malthusian claim that
hunger goads humanity on towards a development of strength,
intelligence, agility, etc. rests on rather precarious
grounds. Continuous crisis spells doom rather than the
rise of “uber-species . ” Those species whose members
combine among themselves to secure food, ward off their
enemies and/or protect their young are more likely to
survive than are those in which individuals compete
against one another for their needs. Kropotkin posited
that nature i tself demands association and cooperation--
mutual aid --for survival in the face of scarcity . Only
when an animal society ignores this is it doomed to
3lKropotkin, Mutual Aid , pp. 73“7^*
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suffer a "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish aind short"
existence. The predominance of social animals in nature,
rather than of the rapacious species (whose numbers are
far less) is empirical proof of this point, which the
Social Darwinists were nevertheless paradigmatically
unable to recognize. After citing many specific examples
of the social species which abound throughout the globe,
he wrote:
. . . how false, therefore, is the view of those who
speak of the animal world as if nothing were to be
seen in it but lions and hyenas plunging their
bleeding teeth into the flesh of their victimsi
One might as well imagine that the X'lhole of human
life is nothing but a succession of war and massacres. 33
If the most successful animals associate naturally
for the sake of survival, Kropotkin vjondered wny
"civilized" humans should prove to be the major exception
to this; the cause of this, it seemed to him, was that
their "social" system as it existed violated this "law"
of nature. Rather than being intrinsically anti-social
in the absence of external force or external stimuli,
life is almost universally sociable to some degree, from
the smallest unicellular creatures and plants, whose
physiological structures demand at least anatomical
association, to the highest mammals, whose sociability
is highly developed.
32Kropotkin, Mutual Aid , p. 38. 33ibid. . pp. 39-^0
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Association is found in the animal world at all
degrees of evolution; ... In proportion as we ascend
the scale of evolution, we see association growing
more and more conscious. It loses Its purely physical
character, it ceases to be simply instinctive, it
becomes reasoned. With the higher vertebrates it is
periodical, or is resorted to for the satisfaction
of a given want
—
propagation of the species, migration,
hunting, or mutual defence. It even becomes occasional,
when birds associate against a robber, or mammals
combine, under the pressure of exceptional circumstances,
to emigrate. In this last case, it becomes a voluntary
deviation from habitual moods of life. The combination
sometimes appears in tv:o or more de.Qcrees—the family
first, the group, and finally the association of
groups, habitually scattered, but uniting in case of
need, as we saw it with the blsons and other ruminants.
It also takes higher forms, guaranteeing more
independence to the individual without depriving it
of the benefits of social life. With most rodents the
individual has its own dwelling, which it can retire
to when it prefers being left alone; but the dwellings
are laid out in villages and cities, so as to guarantee
to all inhabitants the benefits and Joys of social life.
And finally, in several species . . . sociable life'
Is maintained notwithstanding the quarrelsome or
otherwise egotistic inclinations of the isolated
individuals. Thus it is not imposed, as is the case
with ants and bees, by the very physiological structure
of the individuals; it is cultivated for the benefits
of mutual aid, or for the sake of its pleasures. And
this of course, appears with all possible gradations
and with the greatest variety of aspects taken by
social ‘ ence, and for us a further
Association for social purposes, then, appears in nature
with much greater frequency than the Darwinists of this
era were willing to admit or even to consider. Yet if
the benefits of association and mutual aid were so
commonplace in the animal world, why then were they so
lacking in the human world? The Social Darwinist position
proof
,
^^Kropotkln, Mutual Aid , pp. 53 -54 .
held a limited food supply to be the determininf; factor,
and insisted that all creatures, in the face of scarcity,
fight to the end for individual survival. This view,
for Kropotkin, vastly oversimplified the operation of
the natural selection process. Scarcity being a poor
determinant of the best of characteristics and individuals
within a species, animals have developed biologic
responses other than starve-or-f ight to avert extinction.
Animals do not eagerly initiate internecine struggle
in a difficult environment, as it is usually easier to
move or to change their food source, or their method of
gathering food; an anti -social drive is not rooted in
the basic order of most of the animal world. Kropotkin
added that not only do animals tend to avoid competition
for food, but they also tend toward eliminating struggle
within the species for any of their needs so that the
species may survive and even increase in number.
If the physical and the biological conditions
of a given area, the extension of the area occupied
by a given, species, and the habits of all the members
of the latter remained unchanged--then the sudden
appearance of a new variety might mean the starving
out and the extermination of ail the individuals
which xvere not endovred in a sufficient de.gree with
the new feature by which the new variety is
characterized. But such a combination of conditions
Is precisely what we do not see in Nature. Each
species is continually tending to enlar.ve its abode;
. .
.
physical changes are continually going on in
every given area; and new varieties among animals
consist in an immense number of cases--perhaps in the
ma jori ty--not in the grox^th of new weapons for
snatching the food from the mouth of its congeners
—
food is only one out of a hundred of various conditions
of existence--but ... in forming new habits, moving
Il6
to new abodes, and taklnr^ to new sorts of food.
In all such cases there will be, after a time, an
absence of intermediate links in consequence of a
mere survival of those which are best fitted for the
new conditions. ... It hardly need be added that
If we admit, with Spencer, all the Lanarcklans andDarwin himself, the modifying influence of the
surroundin.qs upon the species, there remains stillless necessity for the extermination of intermediateforms.
Survival of a species is thus dependent on a greater
complexity of factors than a ’’gladiator contest,” even
when Nature is harsh.
His research led Kropotkin to conclude that there
are strong indications that humans, who are not the
swiftest, strongest, sharpest-fanged
,
or longest-taloned
of creatures, must have evolved as other than Hobbesian
ignoble savages. The reasons for humans* survival and
their progress, according to the anarchist paradigm,
will be revealed as we examine Kropotkin *s conception
of evolution as he related it to humanity.
Let us return briefly to anarchist thought prior
to Kropotkin in order to clarify the earlier concept of
human social evolution and relate it to Kropotkin’s
revised explanation. Picking up on Proudhon's work,
Bakunin had held that before the rise of conscious
reason, humans lack the reasoned consciousness necessary
to sate the inquisitiveness concerning the hows of their
existence. Thus, these mysteries could only be explained
^^Kropotkin, Mutual Aid
, pp. 64-65.
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by chimerical ’’abstractions" which were, at best, only
haphazard guesses about the nature of concrete reality.
Humanity unconscious of itself is yet unaware of its
nature and potential. In Bakunin’s conception.
The example a-^forded us by children and younn: people,
and even by many men long: past the age of majority
shovis us that man may use his mentel faculties for
a long time before .accounting to himself for the way
in which he uses them, before becoming conscious of
it. During this vforking of the mind unconscious of
itself, during this action of innocent or believing
Intelligence, man obsessed by the external ^^^orld
,
pushed on by that internal goal called life and its
manifold necessities, creates a quantity of
Imagination, concepts, and ideas necessarily very
Imperfect at first and conforming but slightly to
the reality of the things and facts which they
endeavor to express. Not having yet the consciousness
of his own intelligent action, not knowing yet that
fee himself has produced and continues to produce these
Imaginations, these concepts, these ideas, ignoring
their wholly subjective --that is, human--origin, he
iiust naturally consider them as objective beings, as
real beings, wholly independent of him, existing by
themselves and in themselves. 3?
It is with this incomplete--alienated--consciousness that
humans had created both their earthly and heavenly gods.
A system founded in abstraction gives rise to hierarchies
of privilege, which are commands based on imperfect
reason. Privilege based on ignorance has to be endured
by humanity until the proper consciousness of self
develops and is diffused amongst the masses so as to bring
about a social revolution.
Bakunin, God and the State, pp. 66-6?.
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Bakunin’s historical analysis held that
Until now all human history has been only a perpetual
and bloody immolation of millions of poor human
beings in honor of some pitiless abstraction—God,
country, power of State, national honor, historical
rights, juridical rights, political liberty, public
welfare. Such has been
. , , the natural, spontaneous,
and inevitable movement of all human societies. As
we cannot undo it; we must submit to all natural
fatalities. We must believe that that was the only
possible way to educate the human race. For we must
not deceive ourselves: even in attributing the
larger part to the Machiavellian wiles of the governing
classes, we have to recognize that no minority would
have been powerful enough to impose all these horrible
sacrifices upon the masses if there had not been in
the masses themselves a dizzy spontaneous movement
which pushed them on to continual self-sacrifice, now
to one, now to another of these devouring abstractions,
the vampires of history, ever nourished upon human
blood.
3°
We have seen in Chapter II that Bakunin regarded socialism
as the liberation of rational humans from direction and
manipulation by external forces whose rule is sustained
by significant remnants of the past--the Ignorant
thought and acts of uncultivated human nature. For
Kropotkin and his anarchist contemporaries, their
predecessors* conception of human history had to be
modified to conform to advances in natural science.
Including the biological basis of sociality. Kropotkin
apparently considered Bakunin’s conception of the past
as relying too heavily upon both the liberatory potential
of socialist reason and the bourgeois evolutionists’
383akunin, God and the State, p. 59.
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paradigm of natural science. Armed with the data of
ethnological research, the humanist thought of the
?I^^6nmen t (**noble savage'*) tradition was revived on
a higher level by the late nineteenth century anarchist
scientists seeking to discredit the image of the
aggressive, possessive, atomistic "natural man" that
most social scientists accepted at that time. Elie
Reclus, who was a well kno\m and respected anthropologist
and an anarchist as well, stated that the study of past
human life forms and of surviving primitives allows a
new and realistic scientific "mind’s eye" glimpse of
the history of human evolution, which could yield much
information about the present condition of humanity.
He wrote:
Our institutions
. , , are not the product of
spontaneous generation. They are derived from the
human soul, which never ceases to fashion and modify
them after its own image. Each one of us toils at
this work during his day and generation until his
breath ceases. The dust that we have quickened
retains memory as long as the stream retains the
reflection of its banks. Our whole being seems
swallowed in forgetfulness. And yet we ourselves
survive in all that subsists of the influence,
oftenest the unconscious influence, we have exercised
in the preservation and transformation of our
surroundings. The passions that have thrilled us
—
our hopes and fears, our struggles, our victories,
our defeats, all have left their faint and shadowy
traces, indefinitely repeated by multitudes of our
fellow-man from age to age, constituting laws and
codes, religion and dogma, arts and sciences, and
finally, the infursoria, whose remains harden into
concreted rocks and are piled up in mountainous
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masses. From this point of view, ethnology has its
resemblance with palaeontology
.
The social or anti—social roots of human animal nature,
then, could be discovered by studying the ’’descent” of
humanity from a social viewpoint as well as from that
of physical anthropology. With this methodological
advance, the anarchist conception of a social science
at this time assumed a qualitatively new character.
The origin of human social forms, as well as of social
forms in other animal species, was to become an integral
concern of anarchist social thought in its challenge to
both bourgeois and authoritarian socialist contentions
concerning human nature. The work of Alfred Victor
Espinas (who also affected Engels, Lewis Henry Morgan,
and others)
,
proved especially useful to Kropotkin and
Reclus in their studies of sociability in nature.
Furthermore, the research of Henry Maine on the ancient
law of the village (folk) communities in the Middle Ages
and Morgan's ethnological work had great Impact on the
developing conception of social evolution in anarchist
social science.
The ethnological work of the anarchists themselves
for example, Kropotkin's Mutual Aid and The State: Its
Historic Role and Reclus' Primitive Folk--and the v/orks
39Elie Reclus, Primitive Folk , Studies in
Comparative Ethnology (London: *Valter Scott, l89l)t
p. ix.
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of certain non-anarchists (Maine was a political
conservative and Morgan was a liberal) showed that
humans lived in clans before they lived in nuclear
families. In contrast, the nuclear family was the
starting point of civilized association in the neo-Hobbesian
interpretations of Darwin, which pointed to the civilizing
influences of the child-bearing female as the only
check on the primitive passions. In Huxley's words,
"Life was a continual free fight, and beyond the limited
and temporary relations of the family, and Hobbesian war
of each against all was the normal state of exi stence
.
In opposition to this view, ethnology showed early human
life in quite a different light. Kropotkin wrote,
Man did not create society; society existed
before Kan.
We now also know--and it has been convincingly
demonstrated by anthropology--that the point of
departure for mankind was not the family but the
clan, the tribe. ^+1
Anthropological evidence indicated that humans lived
socially before they were divided by dif ferentiation
within social structures. The first human association,
then, was a biological social fact rather than an anomaly.
The social structure of these "primitive communists" was
built upon
Hunting and food gathering (whicl:^ were engaged in by
the whole tribe in common, and once their hunger was
^%uxley, "The Struggle for Existence," p. 332.
^Ipeter Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role
(London: Freedom Press, 1969) . P^ .
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satisfied, they gave themselves up with passion to
their dramatised dances.
Unlike both Hobbes* ignoble savage and Rousseau’s solitary
noble primitive, early humans had to be (and still are
where they exist) quite social in order to survive. ^3
Primitive people, submerged in nature as they were, took
their cues from the environment.
The first thing which primitive savages must have
learned about nature was that it represents a vast
agglomeration of animal clans and tribes; the ape
tribe so nearly related to man, the ever prowling
wolf tribe, the knowing chattering bird tribe, the
ever-busy ant tribe, and so on. For them the animals
were an extension of their ovm kind only so much wiser
than themselves. And the first vague generalization
which men must have had about nature --so vap-ue as to be
almost a mere Impression—was that the
^
living being
and 1
1
s clan or tribe are i n s eoarabl
e
.
~
Living in the industrial age, vrith its system of nation-
states, its highly competitive economic structures, its
philosophy of atomistic individualism, and its Inherent
separation of humans from nature, it v?as possible for the
Social Darwinists and those with similar conceptions to
maintain that humans have evolved as basically isolated
^^Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Role , p. 13.
^3a fascinating anthropological account that provides
evidence supportive of this idea is Colin Turnbull’s
The Mountain People (New York; Simon and Schuster, 1972).
It details the tragic consequences of the breakdown of
mutual aid am.ongst the Ik, a hunting and gathering tribe
of Uganda.
^^Kropotkin, Ethics , p. 51.
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beings. Kropotkin pointed out that
For our Stone-Age ancestors, sociality and mutual aid
within th^ tribe must have been a fact in nature
so habitual that they certainly could not imagine
life under another aspect. ...
The conception of Xan as an isolated being is a
later product of civilization—the product of Eastern
legends about men who withdrew from society. To a
primitive man, isolated life seems so strange, so much
out of the usual course of nature, that when he sees
a tiger, badger, a shrew-mouse leading a solitary
existence, or even when he notices a tree that stands
alone, far from the forest, he creates a legend to
explain this strange occurrence. He makes no legends
to explain life in societies, but he has one for
every case of solitude.
. . .
Social life—that is, we
,
not I—is the norrr.3.1
form of life. It is life itself . Therefore, 'He*
must have been the habitual trend of thought >;ith
primitive man, a 'category* of his mind, as Kant
might have said. ^5
The question might be raised, said Kropotkin, that
granting the sociability of "natural man," might not it
still be true that there is present, as Huxley held, a
ravenous nature, the "nature of non-civilized people,
who tutored by I star [Naturej . . . killed whomever opposed
him, if he could"?^^ On the contrary, Kropotkin replied.
Far from expressing contempt for human life,
those primitive people hated murder and blood. To
spill blood was considered such a grave matter, that
every drop spilled--not only human blood but also
that of some animals--required that the aggreg_^or
should lose an eoual amount of his own blood.
^SKropotkin, Ethics
, p. 60.
^%uxley, "The Struggle for Existence," p. 333*
^^Kropotkin, The State; Its Historic Hole , p. 13.
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He saw a high respect for life amongst primitives and
little evidence to support the contention that they are
instinctively bloodthirsty. Recalling his journies as
a youth, Kropotkin vzrote about the "savages'* he had
observed.
... in Siberia I often noticed the care with which
my Tungus or Mongol guide would take not tb kill
any animal uselessly. The fact is that every life
is respected by a savage, or rather wis, before he
came in contact with Europeans. If he kills an
animal it is for food or clothing, but he does not
destroy life for mere amusement or out of a passion
for destruction.
Early human history, then, was not a saga of ravenous
slaughter, nor were early humans Bakunin's "omnivorous,
intelligent and ferocious beasts" prior to the development
of reason.
Unfortunately
,
primitive humans, thouc:h not
ferocious, were (unlike the idyllic "noble savage")
nevertheless capable of being quite contentious,
. . .
when tribes of different origin, colour and
language met in the course o_^ their migrations, it
often ended in vrar . .
.
jbutj even then men were
seeking to make these encounters more pacific.
Tradition, as Maine, Post, and E, Nys have so vjell
demonstrated, was already developinp: the cerms of
what in due course became International Law. For
instance, a village could not be attacked vjlthout
warning the inhabitants. Never would anyone dare to
kill on the path used by women to reach the spring.
And often to make peace it was necessary to balance
the numbers of men killed on both sides.
^^Kropotkin, Ethics
, p. 59*
^^Kropotkin. The State; Its Historic Role , pp. 13-14.
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Regrettably, mutual aid among primitives existed only
within given tribes. Kropotkin felt that present
*^l^Hlzed humanity has to widen this bond of mutual
aid to fully realize human potential.
For Kropotkin, then, the ancestors of modern
humanity, although somewhat quarrelsome, had inherited
not only a social struc.ture "anterior'’ to their own
existence, but also the ability to create new forms
of social (or anti-social) life, according to their
particular needs. They could expand or decrease the
degree of mutual aid generally offered within the human
community. Kropotkin explained the dual tendencies of
cooperation and domination operative in human society
throughout history in this way;
From all times two currents of thought and action
have been in conflict in the midst of human societies.
On the one hand, the masses of the people worked
out, by their way of life, a number of necessary
institutions in order to make social existence
possible, to maintain peace, to settle ouarrels,
and to practice mutual aid in all circumstances
that required combined effort. Tribal customs among
savages, the village communities, later on industrial
guilds in the cities of the Middle Ages, the first
elements of international law that these cities
elaborated to settle their mutual relations; these
and many other institutions were developed and worked
out not by legislation, but by the creative spirit
of the masses. must refer to Mutual Aid to see
all the evidence Kropotkin collected to prove his
point about communal social organization.]]
On the other hand, there have always flourished
among men shamans, wizarns, rainmakers, oracles, and
priests, who were the founders and the keepers of
rudimentary knowledge of Nature, and the first
elements of worship. . . . Knowledge and superstition
went then hand in hand--the first rudiments of
science and the beginnings of all arts and crafts
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beln«5 thoroughly Interwoven with magic, the formula
an(^ rites of which were carefully concealed from the
uninitiated, 3y the side of these earliest
representatives of religion and science, there were
also the experts in ancient customs
. . . who kept
in their memories the precedents of law. And there
were also the chiefs of the military bands who were
supposed to possess the magic secrets of success in
warfare
.
These three groups of men formed among themselves
secret societies for the keeping and transmission
(after a long and painful initiation) of their
knowledge and crafts; and if at times they opposed
each other, they generally agreed in the long run;
they leagued together and upheld one another in
different ways, in order to be able to command the
rsasses, to reduce then to obedience, to govern them,
t'md to make them work for thera.^*^
Exclusively held knowledge insured at least partial material
secuirlty for a few and had the effect of dividing humanity
into different classes. The group monopolizing the
comm.andlng positions in a class-divided society—be it
a priest class or an organization of bureaucrats—held
pow’er through the possession of some secret craft or
knowledge. This argument so far is rather similar to
Bakunin’s—i.e., that abstractions are used to generate
and uphold the state structure, a society of subjugated
humans, 5l Bakunin had cautioned that ruling savants.
•^^Peter Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism
(London; Freedom Press, 1912) , pp"] 1-2
.
5^To posit the state as the sine oua non of human
existence is to ignore the history of statist society,
which goes back, at best, only ten thous^'nd years, while
humans as we '-now them have existed for at least two
million years, most of them without any form of state
organization. See Mutual Aid and The State; Its Historic
Role for further discussion of the origin of domination
and exploitation in human social life, culminating in
the rise of the modem state in the sixteenth century.
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even in the age of reason and science, would use their
knowledge to exploit the people and to keep them In
Ignorance, Furthermore, he saw a generalized reason as
enabling the masses to break the "chains” of abstractions
which bound them to the productive process as slaves
rather than as freely willing producers. Humans, because
of their animal origins- and nature (unconscious of their
own real existence and acting on Instinct)
,
were condemned
to suffer throughout a history determined by Ignorance
until they developed the consciousness necessary for
controlling their own fates. Kropotkin, because of his
"new" anarchist social scientific view, denied that history
had been a "continual sacrifice of the masses," for there
had been some bright moments In the past when humans had
attempted to live harmoniously
,
both Instinctively and by
a partially reasoned structuring of society. However,
these social structures failed not only because of
Ignorance on the part of the people, but also for lack
of sufficient material reward In life, which necessarily
limited the benefits of living socially and hindered
individual development. Under such conditions, the only
way to attain a partially secure material existence was
to plunder the wealth of others—one’s happiness had to
be another’s pain. Kropotkin stated that the modern
belief that only a few c'n live comfortably In any given
i
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society is
... a survival from those times when the powers of
production of food stuffs and of all industrial
commodities had not yet reached the perfection they
have attained now. In those ti-^es comraunism was
considered as ecuivalent to gieneral poverty
and misery, and well-being was looked at as something
which is access! ole to a very small number only.52
In the past, communism had existed as generalized material
want in a society in vfnich all survived but none lived
in comfort or with individual sensual gratification.
Poverty and the negation of pleasure—toil—had again
and again generated the predomination of egotistical and
brutish concerns in the communist brotherhoods and
communal forms of the past so as to destroy them or to
severely limit their development. Kropotkin, though
(like Bakunin)
,
saw the development of the new industrial
technology as the means of anchoring socialism in
material reality. For Kropotkin, need, once a
. . .
real and extremely important obstacle to
communism, exists no more. Owing to the immense
productivity of human labour which has been reached
nowadays in all directions—agricultural and industrial
it is quite certain . . . that a very high degree
of well-being can easily be obtained in a few years
by communist work. 53
In a libertarian socialist society, necessity would be
met collectively for the benefit of all in a voluntary
and spontaneous fashion. No managerial elite's plans
^^Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism (London;
Freedom Press, 1912), p^
^^Kropotkln, Modern Science anh Anarchism (London;
n.p., 1903; reprint ed. London ; Simian , n.d. ) , p. 2?,
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would be Imposed, as decisloa-making would be localized
and communal. Kropotkin described the essence of
anarchism in this passage from Modern Science and Anarchism
.
The anarchists conceive a society in which all the
mutual relations of its members are regulated, not
by laws, not bv authorities, whether self-imposed
or elected, but by mutual agreements betv:een the
members of that society and by a sum of social customs
and habits--not petrified by law, routine, or
superstition, but continually developing and continually
readjusted in accordance with the ever-growing
requirements of a free life stimulated by the progress
of science, invention, and the steady grovrth of higher
ideals
,
No ruling authorities, then. No govern-^ent by
man, no crystallization and immobility, but a continual
evolution--such as we see in nature. Free play of the
individual, for the full development of his individual
gifts--for his individualization . In other words,
no actions are imposed upon the individual by a fear
of punishment; none is required from him by society
Tout those which receive his. free acceptance. ^ a
society of ecuals this would be quite sufficient for
preventing those unsociable actions that might be
harmful to other individuals and society itself, and
for favouring the steady moral grov^th of that society.
Kropotkin believed that communallty rested in human nature
but that in the past, material scarcity had blocked the
social drive in humans from fully flowering. However,
with the development of modern technology, this basic
social nature could surface to create a communal realm
of plenty, providing +-he present order of social life—
class divided society—was destroyed (most likely by
means of a social revolution) . Freed from the fetters
of material want and the state which divides persons.
S^Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism , 1903
edition, p. 12.
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creates poverty by Its inequitable distribution and
otherwise controls life, humans would be able to turn
their energies to their own creative needs and desires.
This, in turn, would bring about further improvement of
the material aspects of society.
The most important economy, the only reasonable one,
is to make life pleasant for all, because the man
who is satisfied with his life produces more than
the man who curses his surroundings. 55
Unlike Proudhon, Kropotkin did not feel that humans
would have to bury themselves in work in order to meet
necessity or that sociality is derived from socialist
economics; he, as Fourier, saw a liberatory potential in
machinery and also a need for greater sensual fulfillment
of individuals through communal forms.
Man is not a being X'fhose exclusive purpose in life is
eating, drinking, and providing a shelter for himself.
As soon as his material wants are satisfied, other
needs, which generally speaking may be described as
of an artistic character will thrust themselves
forward. These needs are of the greatest variety;
they vary with each and every individual; and the
more society is civilized, the more will Individuality
be developed, and the more will desires be varied. 5®
The new technology, once privilege is abolished, could
be utilized by the self -organizing people to create a new
commune, 57 a higher form of social life for both mind and
55peter Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (London:
n.p., 1913; reprint ed. New York: Benjamin Blom, 1968),
p. i6o.
56ibid.
,
p. 133.
57iviedleval free village community or city. See
Mutual Aid for further explanation.
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body than had ever been attained or even hoped for in
the medieval commune that Kropotkin so admired.
Once anarchist thought had reassessed Itself In
light of these new findings on the origins of social
life, it was impossible for it to accept a ’’law of the
Jungle” as valid for any stage of human development.
Where Proudhon and Bakunin accepted the idea of pre-conscious
and pre-social humans, Kropotkin, Elle and Ellsee Reclus,
and most other late nineteenth century anarchists
conceived of humans as basically social animals. They
rejected the view that our natural roots were evil,
Kropotkin wrote,
. , . If a scientist maintains that ’the only lesson
Nature gives to man is one of evil* then he
necessarily has to admit the existence of some other,
extra-natural influence which inspires man vjlth
conceptions of 'supreme good* and guided human
development towards a higher goal. And in this way
he nullifies his o^^ attempt at explaining evolution
by the action of natural forces only. 3°
The Social Darwinist position, whereby the strong survive
and the best command, entails an asocial conception of
animal ontology; Civilization requires that humans be
socialized by a hierarchically ordered restraining force
applying an externally derived measure of good. Since
the human beast has to be forced to be free, social life
becomes a rule of reasoned abstract and inflexible law.
^^Kropotkin, Ethics , p. 13
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in direct opposition to humnn biological essence. In
this paradigm, liberty Is created by an external state
order and not order by natural liberty.
The authoritarian socialists of Kropotkin’s time
ignored the social aspects of evolution prior to the
rise of socialism (excepting primitive communism for
some)
,
for history in their conception was the ascendence
from asoclallty to sociability due to the development
of modes of production in society rather than to a social
drive in human nature itself. It was thought that once
human social nature became tainted by oriental -despotic
,
feudal, and capitalist forms of production and the social
relations bom. of these productive relations, it v:ould
take a resocializing process to make the new man/woman
of the socialist future possible. One modern writer
explains
,
. , . the implications of mutual aid are also ignored
by socialists, ... In defending their conceptions
of the State against the critical attacks of the
anarchists, these people declare that authority and
power to enforce it are necessary to protect society
from the anti-social inclinations of the individual.
And they add that ’you must have authority vjhere a
division of labour exists, otherx-iise everyone would
do as they liked. ' The assumption behind all these
arguments is that ’doing i-^hat one likes’ is of
necessity anti-social, and that social behaviour must
be imposed on men by an authority outside themselves,
to wit, the State. Such a premise makes the erection
of a central coercive authority a logical necessity.
But to assume that 'doing what one likes* is
necessarily to engage in anti-social behaviour is to
Ignore the whole evidence on which the conception of
mutual aid is based, and to deny its universality in
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human society and throuc:hout the societies of
animals. In effect, such an assumption destroys
the whole basis of socialism itself. 59
Positing an inherently anti -social human nature transforms
any conception of socialism into a granting of privileges
material rewards--denies the libertarian C’utoplan*')
content of socialism, the freeing of the individual from
the external tyrannies' that have fragmented and subsequently
dominated social life. Building socialism takes on the
requirement that social relations must be subordinated
to the demands of a rationalized and socialized division
of labor. This authoritarian stance became the practical
non-utopian image of socialism, especially after the
October Revolution in the Soviet Union.
Anarchists replied that the full flowering of the
social and creative qualities could not be equated with
such projects as the "electrification'* of society,
Creative life must never be subordinated to the demands
of an abstract socialism. The moral that Kropotkin and
others had drax^m by studying social qualities in the
59newetson, "Mutual Aid and Social Evolution,"
pp. 267 -268 . The authoritarian socialist view of human
nature, as well as the assumptions derived from it, has
remained virtually unchanged in the past century,
^®Lenin*s formula for communism was, "Soviet power
plus the electrification of the whole country," V.I. Lenin,
"A Single Economic Flan" (February 1921), Lenin Reader,
ed. Stefan T. Possony (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1966),
p. 101 .
13^
natural world was that once humans were freed from
external restralnts--both those arising from the
Indignities of material want and those due to social
relationships based on privilege—humans would
spontaneously organize themselves. Socialism would
generate Itself; the leaders and planners would retire,
leaving the conduct of. people's lives to the people
themselves
.
... we are not afraid to forego Judges and their
sentences. We forego sanctions of all kinds, even
obligations to morality. We are not afrai(^ to say
'*.Do what yoiS will; act as you. will; because we are
persu.aded thsat the gireat majority of mankind, in
proportion, to their degree of enlightenment and the
'C^ompletenes.s with vih'ich they free themselves from
•existing fe:feter.s wlLl behave and act alv;ays in a
direction u.s;eful to society jiast as we are persuaded
beforehand that a child will cine day walk on Its two
feet and not on all fours, simply because It Is bom
of parents belonging to the genus Homo
Kropotkin tried to come to grips with the creative
powers lying within our evolutionary legacy and with the
^^"Glve the people a free hand, and In ten days the
food service will be conducted with admirable regularity.
Only those who have never seen the people hard at work,
only those who have passed their lives buried among
documents can doubt it. Speak of the organizing genius
of the 'Great Misunderstood,' the people, to those who
have seen It In Paris in the days of the barricades, or
In London during the great dockers' strike, when half a
million of starving folk had to be fed, and they will
tell you how superior it is to the official ineptness of
Bumbledom.” Kropotkin, The Conquest of Bread (London,
n.p., 1913: reprint ed.. New York: Benjamin Blom, 1968),
P. 79.
^^Peter Kropotkin, "Anarchist Morality," Kropotkin * s
Revolutionary Pamphlets , ed. Roger N. Baldwin (New YorK:
Vanguard Press, 1927; reprint ed. New York; Dover
Publications, Inc., 1970), pp. 102-103.
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possibilities of a reasoned development of society, which
would allow for the absolute freedom of individuals.^^
Only new social institutions, he concluded, built from
the bottom up "by means of the
. .
.
popular creative
power and constructive activity based upon modern science
and technique"^^ would liberate humanity from the forces
of ignorance, want, avarice, greed, and other such
divisive traits perpetuated by hierarchical organization.
Drawing from Kropotkin’s work, Hewetson writes that
although ”
. . • competition between individual members
of society is not a *l^w of nature,* it is certainly a
law of . , . any class divided society. Therefore,
the creation of socialism reouires that the entire
content of class divided society be abolished. In
Kropotkin’s words.
To give full scope to socialism entails rebuilding
from top to bottom a society dominated by the narrow
Individualism of the shopkeeper. It is not . . . Just
a question of completely reshaping all relationships.
... In every street, in every hamlet, in every
group of men gathered around a factory, an organizational
spirit m.ust be awakened in order to rebuild life—in
the factory, in the village, in the store, in production
and in distribution of supplies. All relations between
^^However, he explicitly excluded egotistic
individualism; "Each individual understands that he will
be really free in proportion only as all the others round
him become free." Kropotkin, Modern Science and Ancerchism ,
Simian edition, p. 21.
^^Ibid.
, p. 2.
^5Hewetson, "Mutual Aid and Social Evolution," p. 260.
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Individuals and great centres of population have to
be made all over again, from the very day, from the
very moment one alters the existing commercial or
administrative organization.^^
To build a free society, the turn of the century libertarian,
as his/her contemporary counterpart, sought more than
nationalization of industrial concerns, for socialism
would be much more than a simple surfeit of goods or a
rationalization of the economy. Similarly, the political
structure would require a transformation, for as Gustav
Landauer, a contemporary of Kropotkin’s, said, ’’The State
is a condition, a certain relationship between human
beings, a model of humasi behavior; we destroy it by
cont-iractlng other relationships, by behaving dlf ferently
.
Socialism in -content as Kfell as in rhetoric would entail
a reintegration of mind and body and a new unity between
people to replace the relations of class divided society,
which are basically incompatible with humans* social
nature. Only a complete and holistic approach to freedom
would bring about concrete social change consistent with
individual need.
As we have seen, Kropotkin, being in the socialist
tradition, believed that the development of material
production in society would put an end to the economic
^^Kropotkin, The State: Its Historic Kole_ , pp. 5^“55-
^^Gustav Landauer, quoted in Buber, Paths in Utopia,
p. 47.
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exploitation which has given rise to asocial forms and
structures. He viewed socialism as the stage in the
evolution of society which would transcend the previously
inevitable hierarchical structures generated by material
want and class privilege. Furthermore, he saw the
technologically advanced countries as on the brink of
this monumental transition.
. . , modern humanity developed a youthful, daring
spirit of inx’’ention, stimulated by the recent
discoveries of science; and the • inventions that
followed in rapid succession have to such an extent
increased the productive capacity of human labour as
to make at last possible for modern civilized peoples
s-uch a general well-being as could not be dreamt of
antiquity, or in the Kiddle Ages, or even in the
esiTlier portion of the nineteenth century. For the
first time in the history of civilization mankind
hais reached a point where the means of satisfying
Its needs are in excess of the needs themselves.
To Impose, therefore . . . the curse of misery and
degradation upon vast divisions of mankind, in order
to secure vrell-being and further mental development
for the few, is needed no more; well-being can be
secured for all, without placing on anyone the burden
of oppression, degrading toil, and humanity can at
last rebuild its entire social life on the basis of
justice.
The prerogatives and pleasures of power and privilege
which were inherent in class divided society now rested
more on what Bakunin called the ’’cult of authority” --a
belief in the heroic leader and organizer—than on any
basis in necessity.
^%ropotkin. Ethics , p. 2. Material needs should
not be confused with desire. Non-socialist thought and
even many varieties of socialist thought usually disregard
the difference betv;een need and desires. They are
equated so as to allow commodities to take the place of
a new way of life.
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Socialism would arise as the potential for a new
social
-life bec'^me more apparent within the technology
of capitalism and as the masses acted on their own behalf
to actualize this possibility, Rudolf Rocker, the early
twentieth century anarchist, wrote that Kropotkin, like
Elisee Reclus and several others,
. . . saw in revelation only a special phase of
the evolutionary process, which appears when new
social aspirations are so restricted in their
natural development by authority that they have to
shatter the old shell by violence before they can
function as new factors in human life. ^9
To anarchists, the composition of socialist propaganda
and the promotion of communal forms (e.g., unions,
agricultural communes, direct democracy, etc.) were the
necessary evolutionary "steps” prior to the social
revolution (as opposed to simply a political revolution).
Thus, evolution leads to revolution. As Elisee Reclus
stated
,
The word Evolution, synonomous v;ith gradual and
continuous development in morals and ideas, is brought
forward in certain circles as though it were the
antithesis of that fearful word, Revolution, which
implies changes more or less sudden in their action,
and entailing some sort of catastrophe. And yet is
it possible that a transformation can take place in
ideas without bringing about some abrupt displacements
in the equilibrium of life? Must not revolution
necessarily follow evolution, as action follows the
desire to act? They are fundam.entally one and the
same thing, differing only according to the time of
^^Rudolf Rocker, Anarchism and Anarcho-Syndicalism
(London; Freedom Press"! 1973 ) t F! 22
.
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their appear-ince. If. on the one hand, we believeIn. the normal procrress of Ideas, and, on the other,
expect opposition, then, of necessity, we believein external shocks which change the form of society.
Thus, the new society would not come into being solely
as the result of the "moral progress of ideas," of the
material development of society, or even as a socialist
led coun ^ main . Material progress is a prerequisite
to socialism but it is not the substance of socialism;
restructuring social life demands a new social consciousness.
Only a well-rounded social being is capable of creating
a realm of freedom; that is, reason or bodily fulfillment
by themselves do not suffice to build a social environment,
Kropotkin said,
. . .mental fertility destitute of well-developed
sensibility will bring forth such barren fruits as
literary and scientific pedants who only hinder the
advance of knowledge
. ,
.
^^rhil^ sensibility unguided
by large intelligence will produce such persons as
the woman ready to sacrifice everything for some
brute of a man, upon whom she cours forth all her
love. 71
The mind could no longer be separated from the passions
If humans vrere to be truly free. With a bodily-based
reason, people would no longer need abstractions, the
external "vampires of history," and their human
perpetuators to rationalize the earthly situation so as
7®Elisee Reclus, Evolution and Revolution
,
The
Bellamy Library (London: W. Reeves
,
n. d
. )
,
p. 3
•
7lKropotkin, "Anarchist Morality," p. 110.
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to live "socially” or to live "well."
-People would be
able to go about the business of their own dally
existences without having to wrench things from or do
violence to the persons of others.
Anarchist thinkers of this time saw the mission
of science as aiding in the reconstruction of consciousness
along anti -elitist
,
material lines, beginning with
evolutionary theory and its implications.
You lovers of pure science, if you are imbued with
principles of socialism, if you have understood the
real meaning of the revolution Imocking at the door,
do you not see that all science has to be recast in
harmony with the new prlncinles: that it is for you
to accomclish in this field a scientific revolution
far p-reater than that of the eighteenth century ? Do
you not understand that history today 'lies agreed •
upon* about great kings, great statesmen and parliaments
that history Itself has to be written from the point
of viev; of the accomplishments of the masses in human
evolution?72 \Jtalics min^
This view was in opposition to the Social Darviinlsts*
conception of history in terms of the survival of the
fittest, an elitist phenomenon in which social life arises
by arresting natural impulses, Furthermore, if went
72peter Kropotkin, "An Appeal to the Young,"
trans. H.N. Hyndman (New York: The Resistance Press,
1948), p. l4. See especially Kropotkin's The Great
French Revolution , trans. M.F. Dryhurst, Forward by George
Woodcock and Ivan Avokumovi^ (London and New York: William
Heinemann and G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1909; reprint ed. New
York: Schocken Books, 1971) Oor an example of this type
of history.
73The liberal social science of Social Darwinism
was formulated on a conceptual dilemma. As a si^atus quo
conception, it v:as based on evolution. If the elites in
society were the most fit, it would always be so. In that
l4l
beyond the authoritarian socialists* evolutionary
consciousness, which was based on the history of society’s
productive development. Herbert Head, a twentieth
century anarchist philosopher, stated that authoritarian
Marxism and anarchism have differed basically in that
Marxism ^ot all variants is based on economics;
sinarchism on biology. Marxism still clings to an
antiquated Darwinism and sees history and politics
as illustrations of a struggle for existence between
social classes. Anarchism does not deny the
Importance of such economic forces, but it insists
that there is something still more Important, the,
consciousness of an overriding human solidarity
Anarchists viewed evolution in terms of social relations
which have been stunted by material lack and the parasitic
elites it has spawned. A secure material existence for
all had to be insured if socialism was to succeed as
more than a self -abnegating asceticism or as a limited
case, evolution was a moot point. If not, the status
quo could not be preserved, since evolution means
continual change. Several ways were devised to escape
this conceptual bind, the successful solution being a
reversion to the liberal concept of balance of interests
as developed by John Locke and other "free market”
economist-philosophers. The law of the jungle was held
In check by the balance of enlightened self-interests.
Society as a whole developed with a functional elite on
top, and evolution become material progress -with the
surfeit of goods to satiate the animal rapaciousness in
humans and to thus hold society together. Standardized
elites could thus safely occupy the slots in the top of
the corporate state.
^^Herbert Read, Anarchy and Order . Introduction by
Howard Zlnn (Boston: Beacon Jrress, 1971)# PP« 154-155*
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struggle for survival; science would be the means of the
transformation from scarcity to freedom ih its broadest
sense. There is a profound optimism evident in the
anarchist social science of this era, as is clear in
this statement from Kropotkin’s Ethics
.
When we cast a glance upon the immense progress
realized by the natural sciences in the course of the
nineteenth century, and when we perceive the promises
they contain for the future, we cannot but feel deeply
Impressed by the idea th?.t mankind is entering upon
a new era of progress. ... We must turn back 2000
years, to the glorious tim.es of the philosophical
revival in Ancient Greece, in order to find another
such period of the awakening of the human intellect.
And yet, even this comparison would not be correct,
because at that early period of human history, man
did not enter into possession of all those x-^onders
of Industrial technioue which have lately arrayed in
our service. The development of this technique at
last gives man the opportunity to free himself from
slavish toil,'^®
Ironically, the essence of the turn of the century
anarchist perspective on social evolution stood in stark
contrast to its own professed philosophy of science.
While Kropotkin and others believed that nature was
diverse and free forming and that socialism must reflect
this, they nevertheless tried to fit anarchism into a
Nex«^tonian paradigm—a universallstic formula of science.
They seem to have believed that the best x^ay to ’’legitimize”
\
75see especially Kropotkin’s The Connuest of Bread
and Fields. Factories and Workshops (London, .1899; reprint
ed . New York: Benjamin Blom, 19^9 )
•
"^^Kropotkin
,
Ethics
,
p. 1.
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anarchist thought In th© dcvGloping age of science was
to garb it In the language of the "hardest" scientific
paradigm, that of physics. Kropotkin, in a typical
Newtonian-flavored statement from his Modern Science and
Anarchism stated.
Anarchism is a world-concept based upon a
mechanical explanation of all phenomena, embracing
the whole of nature—that is, including in it the
life of human societies and their economic, political,
and moral problems. Its method of investigation is
that of the exact natural sciences, and, if it pretends
to be scientific, every conclusion it comes to must
be verified by the method by which every scientific
conclusion must be verified. Its aim is to construct
a synthetic philosophy comprehending in one generalization
all the phenomena of nature—and therefore also the
life of societies.
It is therefore natural that to most of the questions
of modern life anarchism should give new answers, and
hold with regard to them a position differing from
those of all political and to a certain extent
socialistic parties which have not yet freed themselves
from the metaphysical fictions of old, "^7
Kropotkin saw false social "sciences" existing grounded
in "metaphysical" conceptions rather than simply sciences
erroneously applied (as Bakunin thought) so that the
authoritarian socialist and bourgeois social sciences were
based on factors incongruent with the rules of natural
order. He posited anarchism as the correct formulation
of social science in social matters (although in embryonic
form)
,
Just as the laws of physics were in physical
matters. The difference between an anarchist social
77Kropotkln, Modern Science and Anarchism , Simian
edition, p, 5«
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science and natural science was not so much one of kind
for Kropotkin (as Bakunin insisted, for he feared humans
could be treated as objects by science)
.
but simply one
of content and Quantity of accurate formulations.
... the elaboration of a complete mechanical
world conception has hardly been beprun in its
sociological part--in that part, that is, which deals
with the life and evolution of societies. 78
Thus, anarchist social science was at best a nascent
science of the social, for it lacked a unlversalistic
social formula to reconstitute life according to the
"mechanical world conception" of the "evolution of
societies." Anarchism had to conform to the "mechanical
world conception" to be "practical," that is, scientific
—
at least on the philosophic level. Although in reality
anarchism's conception of social life conflicted with
this unlversalist paradigm, anarchists of the late
nineteenth and-early twentieth centuries who desired a
scientific basis for anarchism had to accept it, as it
was the sole acceptable definition of science at this
time. Thus, Kropotkin stated that the "miraculous"
success of the inductive scientific method was entirely
compatible with anarchism.
The inductive method has proved its merits so
well, that the nineteenth century, v;hich has applied
it, has caused science to advance more in a hundred
78Kropotkln, Modern Science and Anarchism , Simian
edition, p. 6,
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years than It had advanced during the two thousand
years that went before. And when in the second half
of the century this method bep:an to be applied to the
investigation of human society, no point was ever
reached where it was found necessary to abandon it
and a.gain adopt medieval scholasticism. Besides, when
philistine naturalists, seemingly basing their
arguments on '’Darwinism,” beran to teach, "Crush
whoever is weaker than yourself, such is the law of
nature,” it was easy for us to prove first, that was
not Darwin's conclusion, and by the same scientific
method to show that these scientists vjere on the
wrong path; that no such law exists; that the life of
animals teaches us something entirely different, and
that their conclusions vjere absolutely unscientific.
They v:ere just as unscientific as for instance the
assertion that the inequality of wealth is a law of
rstature
, or that capitalism is the most advantageous
Tarra of social life calculated to promote progress.
Precisely this natural scientific method applied to
ecvonom.lc facts, enables us to prove that the so-called
* laws'' of middle -class sociology, including also their
political economy, are not lax*:s at all, but simply
g^aesses, or mere assertions v^hich have never been
verified at all. 7
9
Since the Newtonian conception of science was successful
in certain areas of natural explanation, it was felt that
it must be applicable in the same sense to the social
aspects of life.
Science in the Newtonian model demanded the rejection
of the dialectical method; however, a dialectical conception
of reality—the dynamic of sociality and asociality, of
freedom and slavery—never was forsaken by anarchism.
Yet the turn of the century anarchist philosophy of
79xropotkin, Nodern Science and Anarchism , Simian
edition, pp. 7-8.
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scl0nc6 d.6 f6Tids th© Inductive method and condemns the
dialectic method as inconsistent vrith reason and science.
We have heard much of late about *ohe dialectic
method* which was recommended for formulating the
socialist idea. Such a method we do not recognize,
neither would the modern natural scienoes have anything
to do with it. *The dialectic method* reminds the
modern naturalist of something long since passed—of
something out lived and now happily forgotten by
science. The discoveries of the nineteenth century , . .
were made not by the dialectic method, cut by the
natural scientific method, the method of induction
and deduction. And since man is part of nature, and
since the life of his ‘spirit,* personal as well as
social, is just as much a phenomenon cf nature as is
the growth of a flower or the evolution of social life
amongst the ants and the bees, there is no cause for
suddenly changing our method of invesmiaation vj.hen
we pass from the flov:er to man, or from a settlement
of beavers to a human tovm.^O
The inductive method was supposedly valid in
application to all aspects of scientific inouiry, including
social science. Thus, the mechanical law of the evolution
of society was identical in nature to the law that
explicated the fall of a rock. The philosophic dilemma
in which anarchism placed itself by accepting this paradigm
is seen by its trying to gauge its own relevance by
criteria hostile to its assumptions. The pra.cticality
of anarchism was tied to a science that rejected anarchism*
s
observations on social life and did not fully accept
biological evolutionary theory (despite Social Darwinism)
^%ropotkin. Modern Science and Anarchism , Simian
edition, p. ?.
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as compatible with the mechanical and immutable laws of
matter. Kropotkin wrote,
Whether or not anarchism is right in its conclusions
will be sho;m by a scientific criticism of its bases
and by the practical life of the future.®!
However, the answer to this question was negatively
predetermined by anarchism’s embracing of a paradigm
contradictory to itself.' How could ’’practical life," the
meeting of necessity, be regulated by one set social law?
Furthermore, if the **scientific” criticism of anarchism
proved the latter to be Inconsistent with ’’scientific
law,” must anarchists abandon their struggle for a
harmonious and equitable social life? Such critical
questions were never raised by Kropotkin and his
contemporaries, who, for all their methodical research
and humanistic efforts, were consistently unable to
critically evaluate the idea of science.
Nevertheless, in a vein similar to Bakunin,
Kropotkin regarded the laws of science as conditional,
for they dealt on an abstract level with concrete reality.
The law of gravity did not make a rock fall; so too, the
law of anarchy does not make people social. These laws
were simply explanatory devices. In Kropotkin’s view,
the social scientific opponents of anarchism had too
^^Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism , Simian
edition, p. 48.
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absolute a conception of scientific law.
The scientific method (the inductive method of natural
science) beinc; utterly unknovm to them, they fail togive themselves any definite account of what constitutes
a law of nature,* although they delight in using the
term. They do not know—or if they know they continuallyforget—that every law of nature has a conditional
character. In fact every natural law always means
this: *If certain conditions in nature are at work,
certain things will happen. *82
Therefore, science is abstracted from observable experience.
Yet Kropotkin failed to realize that the model of Newtonian
physics generated its own mythic reality of science--that
is, scientific law came to circumscribe observation.
The anarchist social science of Kropotkin's time
tried to employ the inductive scientific method, developed
and accepted by bourgeois society, to study human evolution
and to explain the •'scientific” basis of anarchy, just as
the telescope v:as used to study planetary movement.
However, the science of ”intellectual optics,” as Elie
Reclus called it, did not in reality fatally limit
anarchist thought, for few anarchists were able to see
and study society in this way, their claims to the contrary
notwithstanding. Furthermore, some anarchist thinkers,
preferring a dialectical, mystical, or a pure syndicalist
approach to reality, took issue with scientific anarchism,
so that a lively controversy developed within the
8^Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism , Simian
edition, p. ?4.
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movement. For example, the prominent Italian anarchist.
Errico Kalatesta, questioned the violence his fellow
anarchists were doing to the cause by accepting the
mechanistic mode of science they expounded in their
intellectualizations of anarchism. He felt that this
orientation largely overlooked the voluntary, spontaneous
and moral quality of anarchism—what he believed vras best
in human life and anarchist thought. Evaluating
Kropotkin’s life and work shortly after the latter’s death,
Malatesta wrote:
Kropotkin adhered to the materialist philosophy
that prevailed among scientisrs in the second half of
the nineteenth century
. . . ; and consecuently his
concept of the Universe was vigourously mechanistic.
According to his sytem. Will (a creative povjer
whose source and nature we cannot comnrenend, just as,
likewise, we do not understand the nature and source
of ’matter’ or any of the other ’first principles')
. ; . vjhich contributes much or little in determining
the conduct of individuals and of society, does not
exist and is a mere illusion. All that nas been,
that is and will be, from the path of the stars to the
birth and decline of a civilization, from the perfume
of a rose to the smile on a mother’s lips, from an
earthquake to the thoughts of a Newton, from a tyrant’s
cruelty to a saint's goodness, everything had to, must
and x\t111 occur as a result of an inevitable seouence
of causes and effects of mechanical origin, which
leaves no possibility of variety. The illusion of
Will is itself a mechanical fact.
Naturally if Will has no power, if everything is
necessary a.nd cannot be other wise, then ideas of
freedom, justice and resnonsibili ty have no meaning,
and have no bearing on reality.
Thus logically all v:e can do is to contemplate
what is happening in the world vjith indifference
,
pleasure, or pain . . . v7ithout hope and without the
possibility of changing anything. . . •
So Kropotkin, vjho was very critic'll of the
fatalism of Marxists, was himself the victim of
mechanistic fatalism which is far more inhibiting. But
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philosophy could not kill the powerful Will that was
In Kropotkin. He was too stronjrly convinced of the
of his system to abandon it or stand by passively
while others C'^st douot on it; he was too passionate
and too desirous of liberty and justice to be halted
by the difficulty of a logical contradiction, and give
up the struggle. He got round the dilemma by
introducing anarchism into his system and making it
into scientific truth. °3
Malatesta*s belief was that anarchism was a great deal
more than the application of the inductive method to
social life. He denied the possibility of there being a
social scientific anarchist perspective. Yet it seems
that Kalatesta overstated his case; a social science of
anarchism was neither impossible, indifferent, nor
fatalistic. Rather, it was the attempt to apply a
mechanistic philosophy of science (x^hich had been developed
to meet the needs of an expanding and centralizing
industrial capitalist structure) to anarchism that harmed
the concept of an anarchist social science. If ''anarchism
Oh
originated , . . from the practical dem.ands of life,"
as Kropotkin himself stated, then a social science of
anarchism could be better derived from the structure of
ethnological, biological and ecological conceptions of
social science than from the immutable laws of physics.
Bakunin x-jisely questioned the application of a universal
®^Srrico Malatesta, "Pietro Kropotkin—Ricordi e
Criteche di un Vecchio Amico," Appendix IV, Errico
I-lalatesta: His Life and Ideas , ed. Vernon Richards
(London; Freedom Fress^ 19^^, PP« 262-263.
^^Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism . Simian
edition, p. 9.
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social physics to life, but had missed the essence of a
social science in his belief in Its Newtonian character.
Kropotkin and others went beyond the Newtonian content
of science and into the realm of social science rooted In
biology
,
but they were ultimately limited by a conceptualization
of science that negated much of their thought, even if
they largely ignored the contradictions. If anarchist
social thought was to stand on its own, it had to break
away from a paradigm with a monolithic orlenation and
construct a uniquely anarchist framework of understanding.
In the early and middle decades of this century, the
foundation v:as laid for contemporary anarchist social
science, whose perspective is better able to explicate
the possibilities of a society embodying a unity of life
in diversity and social harmony, as well as to serve as
a critique of the existing order. Present anarchist
thought has abandonned the Newtonian paradigm as a model
for social science as hampering, harmful, and irrelevant
to the anarchist explanation of human existence.
If many of the anarchists of Kropotkin's time were
guilty of any major fault in regard to science, it vras
placing excessive faith in the ability of science to
liberate humanity from injustice, a result of the
Enlightenment tradition, as well as their partial acceptance
of the Newtonian paradigm. They could not see that science
was just as much a prisoner of the prejudices of the
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society in which it developed; rather than Treeing humans
to create a new social existence consistent with ultimate
scientific reality, science has become more Integrated
with the existing social structures, even further
narrowing areas of human autonomy and spontaneity. The
contemporary anarchist Kurray Bookchln states.
In our time, we have seen the assimilation of
these once liberatory sciences by the established
social order. Indeed, we have begun to regard
science itself as an instrument of control over the
thought processes and physical being of man. This
distrust of science and of the scientific method is
not without justification.
. . . What is perhaps
equally important, modern science has lost its
critical edge. Largely functional or instrumental
in intent, the branches of science that once tore at
the chains of man are nov; used to perpetuate and gild
them.
When the early anarchists accepted social science as a
social physics, they little realized that the ends of a
social science were inseparable from its methods. That
an anarchist social science could ground Itself only in
anarchism’s own values became increasingly clear as the
West moved into a post-industrial age, heightening the
contradictions inherent in hierarchical modes of social
organization. The development of anarchist social
science in recent years will be the subject of Chapter IV.
®5Kurray Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , pp. 57-58
•
CHAPTER IV
CONTEMPORARY ANARCHIST SOCIAL SCIENCE
The Collapse of Critical
Bourg;eols Social Science
It has been shox'm -in this work that both anarchism
and the assumptions of the social science it adopted had
their groundings in the Enlightenment tradition of
critical reconstructive science. Natural science in the
Enlightenment tradition led almost teleoloscically to the
creation of a social science, for science in the late
eighteenth century was regarded as the real force capable
of rectifying social abuses and ushering in an “Age of
Reason.'* Social science was viewed by Corate, the
bourgeois political economists, and the early socialists
as the outgrowth and adjunct of the practical application
of the critical redemptive message inherent in the
sciences. It must thus be remembered, in face of our
contemporary notions, that the reconstructive and
critical ideals of social science did not arise vacuo .
Max Horkheimer, a libertarian socialist of the Frankfort
School, wrote:
The task of describing facts without respect for
non-scientif ic consideration and of establishing the
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patterns of relations between them was originally
formulated as a par'tial goal of bourgeois emancipation
in its critical struxrgle against Scholastic restrictions
upon research. But by the second half of the
nineteenth century this definition had already lost
its progressive character and shov;ed itself to be, on
the contrary, a limiting of scientific activity to
the description, classification, and generalization
of phenomena, with no care to distinguish the
unimportant from the essential. In the measure that
concern for a better society, which still dominated
the Enlightenment
,
gave way to the attempt to prove
that present-day society should be permanent
,
a
deadening and disorganizing factor entered science.!
As the industrial nation-state and its modes of social
and productive organization were widely established in
the nineteenth century, science lost its role as a force
external to and often critical of the structures and
norms of society. It was metamorphosed into "modern
science,** an integral part of the rationalized economic
system characteristic of modern society. This change,
brought about by industrialization and the developing
process of nation-building (expansion of the state and
statist organizational patterns both within and outside
the individual state) , eventually circumscribed scientific
thought so that if functioned largely within the existing
social structures. Paul Goodman, a modern anarchist,
described the result of this as being that
. . .
the system of knowledge has become
interlocked with the other great institutions of
society and the dominant style takes over. But this
^Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory , trans. Matthew
J. O’Connell et al. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), p. 5-
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style was not devised for open dialogue with surprise;
it was devised for cash accounting, tax collection,
military discipline, logistics, and mass manufacture.
Yet bureaucratic methods must somehow be appropriate
to science too. ... To be servicable, excellent
scientists become administrators. Grant-getters who
are clever about the forms become scientists.
Corporations become impresarios for scientists.^
Thus, natural science in its modern role has accepted
uncritically the status quo. The major function of
science in the modem world is to produce innovations
according to the dictates of a capitalist (or in the case
of the U.S.S.R., of a state socialist) economic system.
Simultaneous with the collapse of science oua
social critic was the conventionalization of the social
sciences, which had originated as. a radical critique of
the socio-economic systems of industrialism. The
twentieth century’s '•practlcallzation" --governmental
and institutional adoption of the methods, perspective,
and most significantly, the myth of social science in
order to further legitimize the economic and political
order--has served to advance the decline of its role as
a critical force. Thus, we see the development of
bourgeois social science from a revolutionary d^class^
stance in early political economy, to an intermediate
stage characterized by stasis oriented theories built on
2paul Goodman, Like A Conouered Province (New York;
Vintage Books, 1968) , p. 306.
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evolutionary change—expounded by Malthus, Kanchesterlte
economists, William Graham Sumner, Huxley, and others and
finally
,
to the structural-functionalist schools of thought
of recent years, conceptually resting on a mechanistic
equilibrium, with stasis as their goal. Theories of
qualitative change no longer have a place when the present
order is defined as essentially consistent with scientific
rationality: It is simply unnecessary for the liberal
social scientist to formulate a broad critique of existing
social relations and structures of society. A ’’practical'*
applied science (tied to the productive system) —natural
or social--is cultivated by the economic and political
institutions x^xhich it ’’sanctifies.’’ Social science in
its modern setting has to be "value free" ("neutral")
—
primarily a technical aid, renouncing what "ought to be"
and operating cautiously in limited areas of "what is" so
as to conouer the remaining social and environmental
obstacles to the good life. 3 Partial status-quo
conceptions of social science, by virtue of their elements
of risk, threatened the new ideal of stasis. The pure
concepts of the free market of political economists, and
3"Di sregarding the obligation to help people in the
shaping of their most important concerns, the accumulation
of knox-xledge has deccenerated into an end in itself, a fetish."
The Frankfort Institute for Social Research, Aspects of
Sociolonrv, Preface by Max Korkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1Q?2), p. 8. It is easy to see how
this suits the needs of a system concerned x>jith quantitative
measures of progress and with preventing radical change.
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the Social Darwinists* concept of '•positive checks” and
the battle for survival were disruptive to a rationalized
system of social relationships. These concepts gradually
lost their prominence as the new social science adopted
the perspective that what is is real in the sense of
philosophical good.
The collapse of social science as a radically
reconstructive phenomenon in industrial society was
increasingly evident as it became more established as the
legitimate explication of scientific—rational consciousness
in modern life. Social science in its nev; framework
began to seek theory construction and refinement of
methodology. However, as Paul Goodman stated, means
A
become ends in this paradigm, to the detriment of the
society as a whole.
. . . social scientists devote inordinate attention to
Methodology, as if sharpening their tools for some use
that is not yet. Needless to say, this theoretical
methodology is Irrelevant to our ongoing society whose
needs, rather, are glaring and hardly recuire.so much
subtle documentation and analysis before getting to
work. And as always, the avoidance is more influential
than the attention. Also, the social scientists
themselves become safe spectators.^
Mainstream (liberal) social science has involved itself
in the "practical** concerns of maintaining the power
structure, which in turn supports its scientific claims
^Paul Goodman, The Community of Scholars (New York;
Vintage Books, 1964), p. 251.
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and research. Thus, liberal social science has an
important latent function in maintaining the prevailing
ideology of order
. Its proclaimed purpose, the discovery
of the social laws that determine behavior, routlnlzes
science so that prediction (of social trends, election
results, economic conditions, etc.) becomes the short-run
goal. At the same time, scientific activity is removed
from everyday life so that it becomes an entirely
specialized function--one that is deemed necessary for
evaluating and •’guiding’* social planning. The resulting
form of science is a rationalized elitist one; this is
well suited to the needs of the powerful segments of
modern society.
The dominant ideal of science as an unchanging
standard beyond the realm of ordinary activity is expressed
in the following statement by a "mainstream" social science
methodologist, Alan Isaak.
While science begins with common sense (everyone who
looks sees the same chairs or analyzes the same
attitude questionnaires)
,
scientific knowledge is not
the same as commonsensical knowledge. It is at this
point that the systematic nature of science becomes
relevant. For the scientist takes his observations
and attempts to classify and analyze them. His first
objective is to formulate useful empirical concepts
that organize the phenomena which interest him. Then,
starting with the assumption of determinism, he
attempts to find relationships betiveen these concepts.
If successful, he discovers a scientific law or
generalization. Further systematization of empirical
knowledge is achieved by the construction of theories
which are collections of logically related
generalizations . Finally, the scientist uses his
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laws and theories to exrlaln events and situations
which have occurred or exist and to predict future
happenings. It can, thus, be said that the scientist's
attempts to systematize are all leading up to this
ultimate objective, to explain and T)redict--to show
why things were, are, or will be.
5
It is clear that Newtonianism, vxhich vras temporarily
eclipsed by evolutionary thought, has reasserted its
hegemony in social science's interpretations of modern
science and in social science itself. Basic social
relations are no longer questioned in the theories of
the new "social physics"; rather, they are simply
assumed to be immutable. A rigid predictivist science
has been constructed on the ontology of an essentially
static social order which nevertheless prides itself on
its "progress"—that is, industrial productivity. As
the economic and state structures "rationalized" modern
life and thought, social science was bound to align
Itself with social reality. Science, regarded in our age
as an unqualified blessing, has therefore been interpreted
in the society's own terms in order to respond to the
needs of the system, which has turned for philosophical
support and justification to social science.^
Supported by the economic and governmental structures
of modern societies, "Science acquires the aura that the
^Alan Isaak, Scope and Methods of Political Science
(Homewood, Illinoisl Dorsey Press, 1969) . P^ 28
i
^Thls process, of course, is a dynamic one and is
not deliberate in the conspiratorial sense.
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archaic world once reserved for magic," so that the
handling of social problems "tends to be biased toward
technical expertise. "7 "Experts" In the modern world,
who are seen to possess the most vital knowledge of
social processes, exercise a formidable power® In the
regulation of our rationalized social system, In a
manner somewhat analogous to that of the shaman of old
who used secret knowledge to obtain the meagre surplus
and the obedience of the many (see pp. 125-126 above).
However, science today Is used not so much as a cudgel,
but rather as a buttress of the norms of both post-industrial
welfare and authoritarian socialist regimes. Science,
which In this age Is so necessary a force, has been
enshrined In one particular form In the social systems
that already exist.
Science, as Noam Chomsky has stated, has always
existed as a natural part of society, but In a formally
hierarchical society, science facilitates subservience
and dependence on those In power. As William 0, Reichert
observes, anarchists hold that "all social science must
remain a hopeless confusion so long as men persist in
accommodating social science to the facts of power.
7Bookchin, The Limits of the City , p. 9^.
®The exercise of such power may be open, covert,
and/or even unconscious.
^William 0. Reichert. "Anarchism. Freedom and Power,"
Ethics 79 (January 19^9) J 1^2.
I6i
Modern anarchist scholarship stresses the view that
science arose in much the same fashion as sociality,
ethics, morality, and so forth, and that as a natural
factor in human life, it is thus an essential ingredient
of consciousness. Science is intimately bound with the
basic fabric of human life;^^ when primitive people,
for example, discovered which plan to use for a particular
purpose—vjhlch fibers make the best nets, and such—they
were engaged in a process which was science in its
earliest stage. Thus, humans do not have to "transcend
themselves" to engage in scientific thinking. Chomsky
writes
:
We might say
. . .
that our mental constitution
permits us to arrive at kjiowledge of the world insofar
as innate capacity to create theories happens to
match some aspect of the structure of the world. By
exploring various faculties of the mind, we might in
principle come to understand what theories are more
readily accessible to us than others, or what potential
theories are accessible to us at all, what forms of
scientific knowledge can be attained if the world is
kind enough to have the required properties. Where
it is not, we may be able to develop a kind of
•intellectual technology ' --say a technique of
prediction that will, for some reason, work within
limits but not to attain what might properly be called
scientific understanding or commonsense knowledge.
Another organism, following different principles,
might develop other sciences, or lack some of ours.^^
^^See Chapter III above; Hewetson, "Mutual Aid and
Social Evolution"; Kropotkin, Ethics
, pp. ^0-6l; and
Comfort, The Nature of Human Nature (New York: Harper
and Row, 19^6)
.
^^Noam Chomsky, Problems of Knov:ledge and Freedom
(New York; Pantheon Books , 1971 ) . 21 .
~
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For "primitive” hiimanity, science was Inherent in
life, but a sense of mystery and fear surrounded natural
processes. The first crafts and sciences were tied to
mystery and magic. Early humanity, part of nature, knew
perhaps instinctively—that the balance of the natural
world could not be disrupted without a harmful effect upon
Itself. The early organic commune, structured along
lines of sexual division of labor, considered the
environment to be part of a living order--bird tribes,
ape clans, sentient trees, sacred rocks, etc. Humans
were only one part of the vast network of interaction
among the living and the earth. However, in the process
of social evolution, the environment has been so altered
by human action that much of the damage that has been
done is irreparable. In the West, ”modern” times began
when Boniface chopped down the sacred trees of the
Teutons, thereby removing spiritual barriers to altering
nature and thus making agricultural life a possibility
throughout all of Europe. The Impact of this change over
time has been cataclysmic. Murray Bookchin explains:
The sun, the wind and the earth are experimental
realities to which men have responded consciously
and reverently from time immemorial. Out of these
primal elements man developed his sense of dependence
on--and respect for--the natural environment, a
dependence that kept his destructive activities in
check. The Industrial Revolution and the urbanized
world that followed obscured nature's role in human
experience~-hiding the sun with a pall of smoke,
blocking the winds with massive buildings, desecrating
the earth with sprav;llng cities. Man's dependence on
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the natural world became invisible:, it became
theoretical and intellectual in character, the subject
matter of text books, monographs and lectures. True,this theoretical dependence supplied us with insights(partial ones at best) into the natural world, butits onesidedness robbed us of all sensuous dependence
on and all visible contact and unity with nature.
In losing these, we lost a part of ourselves as
feeling beings. V/e became alienated from nature.
Our technology and environment became totally
inanimate, totally synthetic--a purely inorganic
physical milieu that promoted the deanimization of
man and his thought.
One result of the estrangement from nature, the latter
being a corollary of the ever more successful drive to
dominate the environment to fulfill insatiable "needs,”
was the mind’s ascendence over the body. Consequently
,
the way was open to the eventual development of the
mechanistic form of science with which we are familiar.
Where the primitive stood in awe of the environment as
part of it, modern humans stand in contempt of it, if
not always in theory, certainly in fact; we direct huge
amounts of energy toward remaking the environment into a
more gratifying commodity. As we shall see later in this
chapter, this phenomenon has become a critical problem,
for our time.
The routinization of natural science also affected
socialism, for any shift in one perspective of scientific
thought is bound to have repercussions on others.
^^Bookchin, Post -Scarcity Anarchism , p. 129 .
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Historically
, socialists usually assumed science and
technology to be rational and Independent elements pushing
toward good '‘in the womb of" the Irrational existing order.
There was a demand by opponents of capitalist society to
create scientific socialism in this sense. Most twentieth
century socialists, however (especially authoritarian
socialists)
,
came to share the perspective of bourgeois
social scientists— that liberty, equality and fraternity
were no longer central to a political or social solution,
but were instead solely technical and/or administrative
problems—although their rhetoric was strongly anti-capitalist
and sometimes even "utopian." The distinctions between
"pure" science and technology were increasingly blurred
as industrial society developed, a phenomenon which
greatly affected social and political thought in this
century.
The collapse of socialism as a movement allied
with anarchism occurred progressively in the twentieth
century. The break with the socialist movement was
complete. German Social Democrats voted for war credits.
Other socialists (and even certain anarchists) supported
the cause of the Entente. The proletariat of France
—
the repository of libertarian socialist hopes in the
nineteenth century-*-slaughtered and were slaughtered by
the German proletariat. A social democratic government
in Germany after World War I crushed the v7orkers* council
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(rate) movement and its revolution. Anarchists were
suppressed and deported en masse in the United States
Government * s attempt to destroy the movement in this
country. The Russian Revolution soured for the anarchists
who had taken part in it and for the movement as a whole.
The authoritarian socialists, under the leadership of
Lenin and acting in the name of scientific socialism,
proceeded to slay the popular revolution and to destroy
ruthlessly the anarchist and other leftist movements so
as to permit a rational socialist nation-building process.
Anarchists claimed, though some after the fact, that all
of this was the inevitable result of the triumph of
authoritarian socialism, as they had predicted for years
that socialists who sought power or who worked with it
would create only a new barbarism (see Chapter II above).
The socialist movements were rife with the toxins of the
"successful” authoritarian socialist victory--the
proletarian revolution and vxorkers* state with vanguards,
dictatorship of the proletariat, commissars, Chekas,
democratic centralism, purges, centralized production,
prisons, forced-labor camps, etc. Anarchism was branded
as quaintly impractical in this new age of "scientific
socialism" and of "socialist realism"; if the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been the
era of socialism inclined at least partially toward
anarchism and militant syndicalism, the twentieth century
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was that of practical technical Leninism and/or social
democracy. Nevertheless, the anarchist movement survived,
so that when the Revolution broke out in Spain, the
movement appeared to be headed for a resurgence as a
“third way“ which opposed authoritarianism in all forms—
both of the left and of .the right. ^3 However, with the
outcome of the war in Spain, and in the aftermath of the
Second World War, anarchism as a movement barely
survived. Thus, it was easy enough for post-war scholars
In most nation-states to ignore anarchism as an alternative
or even as a legitimate conceptual concern,. It was
categorized under the label of history’s “lost causes";
its value, if any, was chiefly as an historian’s curiosity,
although anarchists themselves (unlike Diggers, Luddites,
and other “losers") were still very much in evidence,
with many— still perceived by the authorities in both
the West and the Communist countries as real threats to
their respective power structures
—
gracing numerous states’
corrective insti tutions
.
It must be kept in mind that contemporary anarchism
and anarchist thought developed from the paradoxes,
l3Three fascinating accounts detailing the growth and
activities of the Spanish anarchist movement in the thirties
are Vernon Richards’ Lessons of the Sranish Revolution
(London: Freedom Press
,
1972 ) ; Sam Dolgoff’s The Anarchist
Collectives: V/orkers ’ Self -Management in the Spanish
Revolution, 1936-1 Q39 (Mew York: Free Life Editions, 197^)
J
and Murray Bookchin's The Spanish Anarchists , vol. 1
(New York: Harper and Row, forthcoming)
.
16?
» snd. rBstraints tlis.'fc held, bound, tlio an&rchlst
movement in the pq.st. Modern anarchist thought is a
continuation and yet a greater development of the older
body of anarchist thought and of anarchist history.
However, when it is found to exist in this **realist” era
of the post-industrial nation state, it is considered by
most non-anarchists throughout the world to be an
anachronism, a remnant of the romantic aspirations of a
bygone era. Bookchin puts it this vjay:
Until recently, attempts to resolve the contradictions
created by urbanization, centralization, bureaucratic
growth and statification were viewed as a vain
co'interdrif t to • progress ’ --a counterdrift that could
be dismissed as chimerical and reactionary. The
anarchist was regarded as a forlorn visionary, a
social outcast, filled with nostalgia for the peasant
village or the medieval commune. His yearnings for
a decentralized society and for a humanistic
community at one with nature and the needs of the
individual—the spontaneous individual, unfettered by
authority—were viewed as the reactions of a romantic,
of a declassed craftsman or an intellectual 'misfit.
'
His protest against centralization and statif ication
seemed all the less persuasive because it was
supported primarily by ethical considerations--by
utopian, ostensibly 'unrealistic' notions of what man
could be, not by v/hat he vjas. In response to this
protest, opponents of anarchist thou,rht--liberals
,
rightists and authoritarian 'leftists' —argued that
they were the voices of historic reality, that their
statist and centralist notions were rooted in the
objective, practical world.
In short, anarchism has been generally regarded as
^^Bookchin, Post -Scarcity Anarchism , pp. 68-69.
It is Bookchin' s opinion that attitudes toward anarchism
have changed somewhat since the late 1960's.
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unrealistic, at best as a vision of befuddled but
kind-hearted moralists. This impression is quite
erroneous, for it fails to take into account the
significant historical examples of anarchism in practice
and the social scientific perspective it has generated
for more than a century Whether or not the scholar is
sympathetic to anarchist ideals, he/she has at least to
recognize anarchism as a serious and developed world view.
The final section of this paper will further examine
modern anarchism’s critique of contemporary society in
terms of its social science.
Modern Social Science end the Anarchist
Critioue of It
What has united authoritarian socialist social
science and liberal social science is their scientific
methods' orientation to being rather than becoming, and
their view of society as a mechanism running in an
unvarying fashion. Socially created facts have been
transformed into physical and organic laws of nature.
For example, Goodman pointed out that
... in the official bulletin of the Office of Civil
Defense, ... it says, 'Fallout is merely a physical
15Horkheimer
,
Critical Theory
, p. 9.
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fact of this nuclear ap:e. It can be faced like any
other fact.* Here vje have the full-blo-.cn hallucinatlon--
droppins the bombs Is thou;^ht of as a physical fact
rather than a social fact. And so this outrapreous
and mor-onic proposition is swallowed like eve^ythinr
else.lo
The contemporary modus onerandi becomes an unquestionable
physical fact in the context of an order constantly
regenerating itself. In established social science
(specifically, in the V/est)
,
. . . there is a political pathology in the essence
of contemporary social theory that makes revolutionary
alternatives inconceivable to social scientists.
. . .
Contemporary social theory consists in analyzing the
arrangement and possible rearrangement of units that
are defined as entirely socialized to the system of
society, or as deviant. The theory omits animal
nature, which cannot be entirely socialized; it omits
history which tells us that men have been very different
from those they are dealing with; it omits political
philosophy, which tells us vjhat men ought to be if
life is to be w-^rth living; it omits poetic literature,
which imagines other ways of being men. But if we
omit these approaches and deal only with *men as they
are,* we are soon left with the world of the front
page and of TV, as if this were the real world. In
that world, there is no other povrer than the established
power of force, publicity, status, vested holding,
protocol, and the market.
The social structure must remain unchanged in essence if
the existing complex Industrial system is to survive, and
social science has committed itself to preserving that
structure. Goodman further criticized this accomodation
l^Paul Goodman, Drawln,? the Line (New York: Vintage
Books, 1962), pp. 82-83.
^7lbid.
, pp. 103-104.
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because- of the extremely selective perception it has come
to entail.
Unlike the majority of their predecessors for a century
and a half, most of our contemporary social scientists
are not Interested in fundamental social change. To
them, we have apparently reached the summit of
Institutional progress, and it only remains for the
sociologists and applied anthropolorcists to mop up
the corners and iron out the kinks. Social scientists
are not attracted to the conflict core of Freud*
s
theory of human nature; a more optimistic theory, like
Reich* s, is paid no attention at all. But they have
hit on the theory
. . .
that you can adapt people to
anything if you use the right techniaues
.
That humans are basically non-social—a legacy of
the Malthusianism and Social Darwinism of the past—is
assumed by both authoritarian socialist social science and
liberal social science. Humans must be ''socialized” so
as to fit into society and must be kept social by the
threat of sanctions. Order and productive activity depend
not on the development of the animal roots in human life
but upon their repression by the social roles that modern
society has formulated to fulfill the demands of extremely
rationalized structures. ”A-social” or "anomic” humans
must be orc:anized in such a v:ay as to make the rational
division of labor possible and create a well-functioning
social and economic machine. The concept of role, then,
becomes important as an analytical device for constructing
social classifications. Everyone in the functional society
^^Paul Goodman, Growing Up Absurd (New York: Vintage
Books, i960), p. 10 .
171
has a rationalized set of roles. Juxtaposing the imposed
concept of role with the idea of identity, Goodman said,
We must contrast the concept Role, meeting expectations
by playing it cool and knowing the technioue for a
token performance, with the concept of Identity.
. . .
One discovers, fights for, appoints oneself to one*s
Identity. Identity is defined by its task, mission,
product; role depends on the interpersonal expectations
of the others. 19
The created *'fact" of asociality that both bourgeois and
authoritarian socialist social sciences accept as
objectively true requires that humans be organized to
meet their social responsibilities in the various strata
of the industrial order. In their visions, of social
science, the individual aspires to fit some ideal role
—
be it the rational enlightened citizen of the welfare
state or the "Communist Kan" of the future. Both liberal
and authoritarian socialist social science defend social
relations and conditions as they basically are as physical
(natural) facts, for what exists is interpreted within
their paradigms as consistent X'Xith the lav:s of the
social scientific universe. Phenomena and the individual
are classified according to roles that already exist in
society so that humans are either players of roles or
deviants from them.
The language of conformlty-nonconformity is evident
in nascent form in Hobbes' Newtonian view of human
19Goodman, Growinp: Up Absurd , p. Ql.
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relationships. The language of social science, used by
both applied liberal and authoritarian socialist social
sciences, is derived not from a communion with the laws
of nature, but from a law of order common to both
capitalist and socialist forms of industrial state
structure. In liberal and authoritarian socialist social
science, because power is viewed as the necessary physical
force behind the mechanism of social life, synthetic
facts such as centralized domination and hierarchical
control have been accepted as real physical needs for the
society. The consequences
,
as Goodman saw, are disastrous
in terms of satisfactory social living.
There is a certain amount of normal function surviving
or reviving—bread is baked, arts and sciences are
pursued by a few, etc. ; mostly we see the abortions
of lively social functioning saddled, exploited,
prevented, perverted, drained dry, paternalized by
an imposed system of power and management: that preempts
the means and makes decisions ab extra . And the
damnable thing is that, of course, everybody believes
that except in this p-^ttern nothing could be
accomplished: if there were no marriage license and
no tax, none could properly mate and no children be
born and raised; if there were no tolls there vjould be
bridges; if there were no university charters, there
would be no higher learning; if there were no usuary
and no Iron Law of Wages, there would be no capital;
if there vjere no markup of drug prices, there would be
no scientific research. Once society has this style
of thought, that every activity requires licensing,
underwri ting
,
deciding by abstract p>ower, it becom.es
inevitably desirable for an ambitious man to seek
power and for a vigorous nation to try to be a Great
Power. The more some have the power drive, the more
it seems to be necessary to the others to compete, or
submit, just in order to survive. (And im.portantly
they are right.) Many are ruthless and most live in fear.
^^Paul Goodman, "Getting Into Power," appendix 1,
People or Personnel (New York: Vintage Books, 19oo) , pp. 183”!'“^
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Society has come to center around the forceful cement of
power relationships, with all important decisions emanating
from authoritative centers of decision-making.
Many influential contemporary thinkers feel that
the problems of industrial society can be Ironed out by
greater authoritative centralization and Imposed
socialization. These advocates of hierarchical modes of
organization and thought conceive of the relations
between humans in society as unchanging, as pre-determined
by universal law. If social problems exist, remedies are
to be found in a greater alignment of society to the
rationalized laws of social physics. As the relationships
in society do not change in content, humans have to
conform to existing roles in order for society to function
properly. Anti-social conduct is viewed as the natural
and inevitable result of unrestrained liberty, for V7hen
humans are left without external controls, they V7ill
clash like Hobbes* asocial atoms of humanity, or become
"capitalist cutthroats," as Engels held, in the context
of "anarchy in social production. "21 Furthermore, modern
society’s obsession with "role" and "practicality"
demands that activities be organized; more than small
2lFreidrich Engels, Socialism; From Utooia to
Science
,
trans. Edward Aveling (Brooklyn, N.I.: New York
Labor News, 1968 ), p. 64 .
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amounts of unorganized leisure, nothing prescribed to do.
tend to invite anomic boredom, disinterest, apathy toward
the political and economic institutions of society, and
finally, criminality, sabotage, or rebellion.
Chomsky is one modern anarchist especially concerned
with leisure in modern society. V/riting in response to
the common social scientific definition of leisure as
the condition of having nothing to do, and as a
dysfunctional element in large amounts, he has noted;
Evidently, a distinction must be made between
having nothing to do and being able to do as one
pleases. Both states presuppose lack of compulsion,
but being able to do as one pleases requires the
availability of opportunities as well. Under Skinnerian
assumptions ^kinner is chosen here as a representative
of a school of thought rather than as a thinker who
is uniquely significant^
,
it is difficult to distinguish
properly between having nothing to do and being able
to do as one pleases, since there is no reason to
expect anyone to take the opportunity to work without
deprivation and reinforcement. Thus, it is not
surprising that Skinner slips easily from the definition
of ‘leisure* as the state in vjhich one appears to be
able to do as one pleases, to the assertion that
leisure (that is, having nothing to do) is a dangerous
condition. . . .
Beinr able to do as one pleases is a natural goal
of the libertarian, but having nothing to do is not.
V/hile it may be correct to say that the human species
is badly prepared for having nothing to do, it is
quite a different matter to say that it is badly
prepared for the freedom to do as one pleases, 22
Release from the regimentation of work would be disruptive
and dysfunctional to the fabric of the society vfhich
^^Noam Chomsky, For Reasons of State (Nev7 York:
Pantheon Books, 1973)
t
P* 346
.
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channels people Into occupations to fill the roles
demanded by Its complex social reality, created by the
Industrial system. There Is much talk of greater leisure
In addition to more and "better” commodities—leisure
being free time from the more strictly prescribed
roles In both welfare state and authoritarian socialist
systems, but the question of work Itself remains unasked.
Much of the labor that Is done In modern society
continues to be done not because It Is essential to human
survival or well-being, but because It would be
"economically unfeasible" and politically dangerous to
automate completely, abolish, or make It meaningful; the
staus quo maintains Itself by an Institutional momentum
of meaningless activity vjhlch keeps people busy reacting
to acceptable realities so that collective action to
create new realities Is precluded,
Goodman pointed out that we have come to fear our
technology’s ability to put people out of work, thereby
dooming them to a "non-productive" life of trivial leisure
activity. 23 Contemporary anarchism poses the question
whether the solution to "the problem of leisure," as it
Is called, indeed lies in terras of "labor" and "leisure"
time; the anarchist’s statement of the problem Is
^^Goodman, People or Personnel, p. 165.
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usually beyond these concepts, for "being able to do as
one pleases" at all times implies self-motivated creati''’’e
activity. Assuming that the lack of socially enforced
toll renders life meaningless degrades human nature and
wrongly instills fear of further automation. If, however,
one assumes the complete freedom to act according to one’s
inclinations—or, put differently, presupposing a
permanent and universal condition of "leisure"—in a
society with a highly advanced technological base, the
anarchist holds that the necessary goods would nevertheless
be produced voluntarily (activity motivated by feelings
of mutual aid) with minimal effort and that' creative
productivity would become a diversified and universal
phenomenon. In short, an open technology, reoriented in
humanistic directions, would allow the concept of desire
to replace that of need as the object of our productive
efforts. (This will be discussed in greater detail below.)
As we shall see later in this chapter, the modern
post-industrial state, as it is called, has generated
its ovm negation, for it is built on factors which in
the long run are antithetical to the survival of human
life. Much of the revival and spread of anarchist thought
2^Post-industrial in the sense that the state is
beyond the particulcar dysfunct ional occurrences that
ruptured the earlier stages of industrialization.
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since the 1960*s must be seen In light of the predominance
In the West of the welfare state and the "successes” of
the authoritarian socialist regimes in creating "socialisn."
Modern anarchist thought has been assessed by its
scholarly critics and others as a return to past forms
of social, political, and economic organization. It is
true that it remains anchored in the Enlightenment
tradition. However, moderm society has created a milieu
in which anarchism has been able to re\’’ive itself and
further develop its critique of statist society in
accordance with "post-industrial" conditions. It seems
that the flowering of anarchism in the postwar years is
to a large degree a reflection of the deficiencies of the
"realist" regimes of the modern world which have failed
to achieve "The Great Society"—the "heavenly city" on
earth. William 0. Reichert comments.
It is no exaggeration to say that we stand in awe
and fear of Leviathan today, for the creature we
have brought into being and nurtured over the past
several hundred years now appears to be out of
control, threatening our very existence as a free
society. It is to this problem, largely ignored by
contemporary political scientists, th^’t the
philosophy of anarchism is basically directed.
Tracing the development of contemporary anarchist
thought requires that we recall Kropotkin* s theory of
25Reichert, "Anarchism, Freedom and Povjer," p. 139.
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sociality as a fact of human nature. As' has already been
mentioned in Chapter III, liberal and authoritarian
socialist social sciences in the late nineteenth century
were built upon at least a partial acceptance of a natural
asociality and the necessity of restraining nature to
allow an organized life. There is in these bodies of
thought a strong distrust-~indeed
,
almost a pathological
fear—of nature unrestrained. Furthermore, there is a
general belief that socialness is built upon the rejection
of the animal in humans and the acceptance of an
over-riding rule of law, anchored in scientific rationality;
one can not simply leave things to function in their own
way. Modern anarchist thought, like its nineteenth
century counterpart, rejects the conception of liberty
as deriving from imposed order, even if the latter idea
is couched in pseudo-scientific jargon (e.g., ”reinforcement
,
"resocialization," "stimulus-response," "socialist
reconstruction," etc.). Anarchist thought has been
developed in regard to earlier conceptions of mutual aid,
spontaneity, a reasoning bodily-based science, etc., but
to this has been added new dimensions that have gained
importance in modern scientific contemplation of the
human condition. For example, developments in psychology,
linguistics, urban history, and ecology (both outside the
anarchist movement and within it) have all had an
important impact on anarchist social science in recent
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decades.
In Chapter III
,
we saw that Kropotkin and other
nineteenth century communitarian anarchists felt that
soclall ty--human societal organization and relationships
of mutual aid—arose "anterior” to humanity Itself,
Anarchist thought since -then has usually tended tovrard
the notion of a natural sociality so that there Is no
alienation of humans from their natural selves. Yet the
tradition of Western thought and culture characterizes
modern science as the rational force which can overcome
the asocial heritage of humanity and the Intransigence
of nature. Contemporary anarchism, as anarchist thought
In general, posits no such mlnd/body split, for with
sociality a biological given, the mind need not transcend
physical being.
Concerning the animal roots of sociality In human
evolutionary history, a contemporary anarchist writer,
Alexander Comfort, who is concerned especially with the
psychology of pov/er and freedom, with sexual repression
in modern society and with the basic character of animal
nature, states that
At some point in primate evolution, the f'^male became
receptive all the year round and even throughout
pregnancy. This apparently trifling change in
behavior was probably the trigger or one of the
triggers vjhich set off the evolution of Man. . . . Sex
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ceases to be purely reproductive in function and
acouires psycholo.f^ical and recre^' tional functions
apart from fertility. 25
Because of the import^’nce of sex as a medium of pleasure,
unicue social ties developed amoni^st early humanity.
These sexual relationships added a new dimension to human
social forms. Where there had been simply instinctive
social ties, new kinds of social relationships based
on sexual differentiation became possible. Rationality,
In Comfort’s conception, seems to have developed in the
context of sexually based sociality.
The Oedipal resronses may carry an inherent risk of
interference with eventual reproduction, but their
persistence su^^gests a new adaptive function in their
new situation. It seems reasonable to sugj^est that'
this function is morphogenetic, and that they have
been positively selected because of their effects on
human mental and social development. It is not
impossible that by necessitating repression and a mind
divided actively into conscious and unconscious levels
they produced the most significant adaption in
mammalian history, the emergence of conceptual thought. ^7
Thought, then, is seen to have derived from a natural
process--a conclusion that contrasts v^ith most social
scientists* assumption that thought -and social forms
arose with the repression of the animal roots of human
behavior.
The assumption of asociality as the basic fact of
humanness is embodied in both liberal and authoritarian
^^Alexander Comfort, The Nature of Human Nature
(New York: Harper and Rov? , 19^6 ) , p^ 1 3
•
^’^Ibid„ p. 29.
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socialist conceptions of the origin of language. Language,
the most uniaue of human attributes, is assumed by these
schools of social science to derive from external reality’s
being imprinted upon the tabula rasa minds of humans.
A common language is developed when common symbols become
habitual; thus the study of grammar becomes the bulk of
the conventional (behavioristic) schools of linguistics.
When the causal laws—external stimuli--are discovered
at some time in the future, a universal scientific
language—the linguistic equivalent of social science’s
"Grand Theory" of behavior—able to generate scientifically
precise communication, will become feasible. Language,
then, is an artificiality--a structure embodying reinforced
superstitions, "common wisdom," primitive passions, and
so on--in short, a product of pre-scientific consciousness.
Ideally, it should be entirely the "rational" construction
of behavioral scientists.
An anarchist thinker better knovm for his work in
? fllinguistics than for his anarchism, Chomsky addresses
himself to the problem of the origin of language and its
implications. Conceptually related to Kropotkin and
nineteenth century libertarian socialist thought in many
^®This is somewhat ironic, since Chomsky came to
linguistics via libertarian socialism. See Noam Chomsky,
"A Discussion with Noam Chomsky," ed. Doug Richardson
and John Hess, Black Rose 1 (197“^) 63-64.
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respects, he states the problem of languarre In classical
anarchist form. Most schools of social scientific
thought hold that language is *‘a system of organization
of behavior’’^^ created and controllable from external
sources of reinforcement. Thus, the "socializi
Influences of authority can ’’correct” language (as
behavior) according to scientific, hierarchically
determined and ordered principles. Chomsky holds instead
that language reflects something much deeper—that it is
endemic to hiunan experience. Language is a basic and
natural fact of our social existence.
. . .
there apparently are deep-seated and rather
abstract principles of very general nature that
determine the form and interpretation of sentences.
It is reasonable to formulate the empirical hypothesis
that such principles are language universals. 30
Language, then, in its basic characteristics and its
usage, provides
. . .
the basic criterion for determining that
another organism is a being v;ith a human mind and
the human capacity for free thought and self -expression
,
and with the essential human need for freedom from
the external constraints of repressive authority. 31
Language, then, as an expression of humanness, presents
an infinite variety of possibilities.
^^Chomsky, ’’Language and Freedom,” For Reasons of
State
, p . hoS-
^^Chomsky, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom , p. 43.
3lChomsky, ’’Language and Freedom,” p. 394.
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Given the spontaneous nature of behavior in the
early pre-hierarchical
,
pre-statist tribal conununity
,
lan^^af^e must have developed in much the same way as
Kropotkin showed human social structures developing.
Once the proper evolutionary stage was reached, language
did not have to be imposed, but rather, simply utilized.
Although it is a universal human property, it is
nevertheless a diversified one. Furthermore, its
appearance is completely spontaneous--contemporaneous
with consciousness. Functional explanations, says
Chomsky, are inadequate, for
When properties of language can be explained on such
•functional* grounds, they provide no revealing
insight into, the nature of mind. Precisely because
the explanations proposed here are 'formal
explanations,' precisely because the proposed
principles are not essential or even natural properties
of any iraacrinable lan.auage
,
they provide a revealing
mirror of mind (if correct). Such nrinciples, I'le
speculate, are crlori for the scecies --they provide
the framework for the interpretation of experience and
the construction of specific forms of knowledge on the
basis of experience--but are not necessary or even
natural properties of all imaginable systems that
might serve the junctions of human language. 32
Qtalics mine)
By an evolutionary happenstance, humanity acquired a form
of socially creative communication--a giant step beyond
the sexual ties which first differentiated humans from
other animals. The utilization of this human attribute
^^chomsky. Problems of Knowledge and Freedom , pp. '-'4-45.
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made possible the exchane:e of ideas, emotions, feeling
abstract conceptions. Because "free creation" underpins
language, the tabula rasa conception of humans, which does
not take this into account, shows itself to be lacking in
explicative clarity. In contrast, Chomsky’s anarchist
theory of human development depicts people as capable of
creativity within and because of their nature.
... it is not denial of man’s capacity for infinite
’self-perfection’ to hold that there are intrinsic
properties of mind that constrain his development
. . .
in a sense the opposit-^ is true, that without a
system of formal constraints there are no creative
acts; specifically, in the absence of intrinsic and
restrictive properties of mind, there can be only
•shaping of behavior’ but no creative acts of
self -perfection . 33
Humans consciously create their ovm social or
asocial forms. Comfort writes that natural selection—on
the physical, organic, and cultural levels—brought about
the capability for social behavior, abstract thought, and
the communication of experience, all of vJhich increased
the pace of human evolutionary development.
Once it had come, we find another vast acceleration
in the speed of change ; living things change faster
than mere inorganic accumulations, because selection
reduces the random component in their behavior.
Thinking animals capable of purposive behavior change
faster still, or change their environment to suit
themselves, because by thinking and transmitting the
results of their thought in custom, literature and
33chomsky, For Reasons of State , p. 395
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social practice, they perform in their heads what
organisms undergoing selection have to live out at
random over millenia. Moreover this l^ind of
information, unlike chromosomal information, does
permit the transmission of acouired characteristics
—
which vje call experience. 3^
The multidimensional nature of consciousness allows humans
to attempt to mold a purposive environment by transforming
their material relationships into social relationships
vjhich provide more satisfactory group life than had
previously existed. Yet even the natural developments of
social consciousness
,
deliberate thought, and social
forms did not guarantee any specific pattern or triumphant
history, for humans are limited in their knowledge and
scope of purposes. “Natural selection responds; it does
not plan . . . so that even when humans had developed
the capability of purposive action, they did not have
the knowledge to do all that they could do, nor was such
action necessarily advantageous in a divided society in
which one's pleasure rested on another's pain. Cultural,
political, and historical development, then, although
humanly determined, are not quite as “neat" as they often
are depicted—i.e., as smooth and inevltoble transitions
from ape to antiquity, from Home to the Holy Roman Empire,
from the chaotic “Dark Ages" to the citizenly wisdom of
3^Comfort, The Nature of Human Nature , p. 7.
35ibid.
,
p. 29.
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of the modern nation state. Comfort explains further
that proj?ressive development is at times haphazard,
uneven, and even abortive,
Man is not obliged by his nature to evolve at the
social level, any more than the old fossil Lingula at
the biological. There are peoples today making stone
Implements exactly like those of neo-llthic Man; and
food gatherers living much as Pekin Man must have
done. The great breakthroughs are characteristically
local and once-for-all it x^ras the agriculturists of
the Eastern Meditteranean who broke through to cities
and to further civilization which spread East and
V/est; it was the city technological society of Europe
that broke through to science—equally cultured
societies in the past, and in China, India and South
America had failed to make this precise breakthrough.^
There is, then, no fatalistic order to social development
as it has occurred; the course of humanity could have
been different. Many events of great importance have
occurred randomly. However, to rule out deliberate action
is to undermine the role of consciousness in history, as
well as of material limits on human activity. With
consciousness and language , it became possible for humans
to intentionally change their natural surroundings and
to structure the form of the group in response to the
individual's needs (and vice versa). All of this occurred
in a scarce environment V7ith a highly limited technology;
hence, class society, exploitation, domination, etc, 37
36comfort, The Nature of Human Nature , p._52. See
Bookchin, The Limits of the City , for a discussion of the
rise of the modern v.'estern nation-state , ending in the
modern social form of megalopolitanism.
^"^Kropotkin detailed this development in Mutual Aid
and Modern Science and Anarchism.
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Of all the contemporary anarchist theorists, Murray
Bookchin deals most extensively with the development and
effect of material want and hierarchical privilege.
According to his historical analysis, lacking the large
scale technological capability which could liberate
humanity from the toll that necessity imposed, humans were
unable to provide material security for everyone: There
was an equality of struggle. At a certain point, however,
a few successfully established themselves above the others
due to knowledge, strength, luck, or any combination of
these (see Chapter III above), creating privilege for
some and slavery for the many. The transition from the
earlier organic communal forms of mutual aid to privilege
and the natural environment first occurred vjith the
subjection of women, as Bookchin explains in the
following passage.
Even before the emergence of bourgeois society,
Hellenistic rationalism validates the status of vromen
as virtual chattels and Hebrew morality places in
Abraham’s hands the power to kill Isaac. The reduction
of humans to objects, whether as slaves, women, or
children, finds its precise parallel in Noah's/Jicj
power to name the beasts and dominate them, to place
the world of life in the servitude of man. Thus from
the two mainstreams of Western civilization, Hellenism
and Judaism, the Promethean powers of the male are
collected into an ideology of repressive rationality
and hierarchical morality. 38
3®Murray Bookchin, "Toward an Ecological Society,"
Roots 3 (197^) : 6-7.
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Bookchln observes further that, as Horkhelmer and Theodor
Adorno noted, the subjugration of women was symbolic of
the conouest of nature, ;'7oman beins the embodiment of
nature by virtue of her biological function. Woman,
smaller and more physically vulnerable than man,
represented the fulfillment of man*s ancient dream of
mastering nature; her biological function, viewed by the
male-dominated society as a stigma of inferiority, became
the focal point of her relations with man and the
determining factor in the establishment of the hierarchy
that solidly established the "male*' principle, reason,
above biological being. This process provides insight
not only into the nature of modern man’s relationship
with woman, but into the character of his relationship
with the natural environment as well.
Yet the above process has occurred among some
so-called ’’primitive” peoples as well, in similar forms:
Scarcity of needs seems to be the significant common
factor where it is evident. We may put forth the
hypothesis that within tribes and/or clans experiencing
an inadequacy of material needs, the physically stronger
^^Bookchin, ’’Toward an Ecological Society,” p. 7.
^®Thus, ’’matriarchy” never existed in substance, as
a form of rule. The real "colarities” of history are not
"patriarchy vs. matriarchy" but "hierarchy vs. anarchy.’
See Kurray Bookchin, "On Hierarchy and Domination,"
Black Hose 1 {197^): 6.
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males have dominated women and children, who have been
the only ''technolog;y'* available and who were relatively
easy to subdue. This provided a certain degree of Insured
privilege for the strong individuals. Similarly, tribes
dominated weaker tribes, as the bonds of mutual aid did
not usually extend beyond the tribe. Thus, the first
“machinery" was human "machinery" enslaved by hierarchical
social relationships; thus, the first "class struggle" is
evident in the early stages of social development.
The communal forms of social life in the past—such
as the tribe, village community, medieval commune,
religious commune—usually failed to meet the needs of
all their members and to free them from hard labor with
the benefits of communal life, for technology in the past
^ISee Kropotkin* s Kutual Aid and The State; Its
Historic Role .
^‘^This analysis corresponds to that of most Marxian
socialists insofar as the origin of domination and
exploitation is concerned. See Friedrich Engels, Oriain
of the Family, Private Property and the State (New York:
International Fubllshers, 1971). However, communitarian
anarchists differ v;ith Marxist thinkers in their critical
assessment of class struggle: Where Marxian thought
generally views it as constructive, as good in the broad
historical sense, the anarchist view toward it is quite
negative. For examcle, Bookchln writes:
"The history of the class struggle is the history of
disease, of the wounds opened by . . . man’s one-sided
development in trying to gain control over nature by
dominating fellow man. If the by-product of this
disease has been technological advance, the main products
have been repression, a horrible shedding of human blood
and a terrifying distortion of the human psyche,"
(Bookchin, Post -Scarcity Anarchism, p. 18?)
.
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was too undeveloped to substantially ease the toll.
Hence, even the relatively recent political attempts at
reform—e.g., the French Revolution, the Paris Commune,
etc. —were ultimately futile in terms of structural social
change. Bookchin explains:
However glowing and lofty were the revolutionary Ideals
of the past, the vast majority of people, burdened by
material want, had to leave the stage of history after
the revolution, return to work, and deliver the
management of society to a new leisured class of
exploiters. Indeed any attempt to equalize the vrealth
of society at a low level of technological development
would not have eliminated v:ant, but would have merely
made it into a general feature of society as a whole,
thereby recreating all the conditions for a new
struggle over material things of life, for new forms
of property, and eventually for a new system of class
domination. ^3
The highest ideals of humans, from primitive Christianity
—
**A11 things in common”— to the French Revolutlon--”Llberty
,
Equality, Fraternity” --have been repeatedly smashed by
UU
the difficulties of obtaining the basic needs of survival.
Escape from toil has always been a privilege in a world of
^3Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , p. 89 .
^^One can thus see the importance of work in early
socialist thought as the means of overcoming the division
of society into orders of privilege. Proudhon in particular
felt that if all people were busy working to meet their
own needs, the needs of everyone vxould be adequately filled.
Also, the "brotherhood” of socialist work would unite all
people in a solidarity of need to replace the divisions of
privilege. The cuestlon ’whether early socialist attempts
could have X'^orked in spite of the restrictions imposed by
scarcity is an ooen one. The Russian Revolution, for
example, xv’as a dismal failure--for libertarian socialists,
at least --xvhich cannot be blamed entirely on the treachery
of the Bolsheviks. Anarchists diverge on this difficult
question.
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scarcity
,
with the relative freedom of some (in a very
narrow sense) built upon the slavery of others. By means
of redirecting the progress of technology, contemporary
anarchism sees the possibility of achieving freedom
without generalized want and the abnegation of the individual
in opposition to the community. Much of the potential for
freedom in the technology of our times has been overlooked
by modern worldviews that remain anchored in the technical
realities of the nineteenth century. Engels, for example,
based his argument for economic and political centralization
upon the technological reality of his time; early Industrial
technology relied heavily upon steam power, which is
provided from central sources. In many respects, the
decentralization of the means of production was an
impossibility in the early stages of the Industrial
Revolution; anarchists today, like many other critics of
the status quo, believe that a greater degree of
decentralization in most aspects of life is warranted by
the conditions of post-industrialism. It is a truism
that times change, but the enormous changes that the
industrial nations have made in the economic sphere during
the last century (especially in the last thirty years)
have hardly affected their socio-political realities in
at least one important respect, the predominance of the
hierarchical centralist style. Says Bookchin, “A century
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ago, scarcity had to be endured; today it has to be
enforced—hence, the importance of the state in the
present era. **^5 The continued existence of hierarchical
forms of social relationships, as manifested in economics,
politics, psychology, sexuality, and social thought in
general, in face of the .existing possibilities of a new-
life style through a different development and utilization
of our technological capabilities is a major concern of
contemporary anarchist thought.
Statist thinking, which is a legacy of scarcity and
a highly limited technology and which is not exclusive to
either capitalist or socialist ideologies, views
hierarchical organization as the only means of effectively
insuring that people meet their daily needs and rationally
use natural resources. However, hierarchical forms of
social organization have generated their o-wn negation,
as domination has become the disaster course for the
contemporary v7orld. Modern society is built on a
heightened domination; the city dominates the surrounding
countryside, the modern urban-centered nation-state
dominates rural peoples of the world and dictates the use
and abuse of the world's resources—all in the name of
greater economic, social, and political efficienoy. The
^^Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , pp. 37-38.
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The result, according to Bookchln,
... Is a crisis in social ecology. Modern
society ... is being organized around inLTiense urban
belts, a highly industrialized agriculture and capping
both, a swollen, bureaucratized, anonymous state
apparatus. If we put all moral considerations aside
for a moment and examine the physical structure of
this society, what must necessarily impress us is the
incredible logistical problems it is obliged to solve
—
the problems of transportation, of density, of supply
(of raw material, manufactured commodities and
foodstuffs), of economic and political organization,
of industrial location, and so forth. The burden , . .
urbanized and centralized society places on any
continental area is enormous.
Yet more urbanization and centralization are precisely the
solutions proposed by liberals, social democrats, and most
authoritarian socialists. Consequently
,
our social problems
are acerbated by a concurrent decline in our norms of
human relations. It is hardly surprising that a highly
centralized politico-economic structure has given rise
to a mass conception of sociality which tends to replace
the more individuated approaches that remain.
Bureaucratic techniques of social management tend to
replace humanistic approaches. All that is spontaneous,
creative and individuated is circumscribed by the
standardized, the regulated and the massifled. The
space of the individual is steadily narrowed by
restrictions imposed upon him by a faceless impersonal
social apparatus. Any recognition of unique personal
qualities is increasingly surrendered to the manipulation
of the lowest common denominator of the mass. A
quantitative, statistical approach, a beehive manner
of dealing with man, tends to triumph. . . . '
^^Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , p. 62.
^7 lbid.
,
p. 65 .
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The hierarchical consciousness continually regenerates
itself and the conditions of scarcity in articulated
thought and in social forms, thereby reinforcing the idea
of its ovm inevitability. However, its great ''success'*
in modern society is literally reversing the course of
organic evolution.
By creating vast urban agglomerations of concrete,
metal and glass, by overriding and undermining the
complex, subtly organized ecosystems that constitute
local differences in the natural world—in short, by
replacing a highly complex, organic environment with
a simplified inorganic one, nian is disassembling the
biotic pyramid that supported humanity for countless
millennia. In the course of replacing the Comdex
ecological relationships on which all advanced living
things depend, for more elementary relationships, man
is steadily restoring the biosphere to a stage which
will be able to support only ' simder forms of life.
If this great reversal of the evolutionary process
continues, it is by no means fanciful to suppose the
precondi tions for higher forms of life will be
irreparably destroyed and the earth will become
incapable of supporting man himself, 48
Thus, the history of hierarchical society could well end
with ecocide.
Anarchism differs from the prevalent modes of
thought and social organization in that it declines to
accept nature, which includes humans, as an object, ^9
^^Bookchin, Post -Scare! ty Anarchism , pp. 6?-68.
49”The notion that man must dominate nature emerges
directly from the domination of man by man. The
patriarchal family planted the seeds of domination in the
nuclear relations of hu'~’anity; the classic<al split in the
ancient world betw’een spirit and reality— indeed, betvreen
mind and labor--nourished it; the anti-naturalist bias of
Christianity tended to its growth. But it was not until
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Anarchis't thoue:ht has accepted as axiomatic that
There are no hierarchies in nature, other than thoseimposed by hierarchical modes of human thou.^ht, but
rather differences merely in function between and
within living things
.
50
Just as there is no "king of beasts,*' there are no natural
kings of humans, technical experts notwithstanding.
However, hierarchy has generally been imputed as the
essential drive in history toward overcoming the bestiality
of the human animal. Put somewhat differently, the idea
of Inherent anti-soclalness has created and in turn
reinforced its own social reality. Anarchist thought,
however, rejecting the idea of hierarchy, concurrently
rejects domination not only of huinans by other humans but
also of the natural world by human society.
In modern society, nature, both organic and inorganic,
is view^ed as a vast pool of resources existing for
productive and consumptive use. Where people of the
ancient, medieval, and Renaissance worlds regarded the
organic community relations
,
feudal or peasant in form,
dissolved into market relationships that the planet itself
was reduced to a resource for exploitation. This
centurles-long tendency finds its most exacerbating
development in modern capitalism. Owing to its inherently
competitive nature, bourgeois society not only pits humans
against each other, but also pits the mass of humanity
against the natural x\rorld. Just as men are converted into
commodities, so every aspect of nature is converted into a
commodity, a resource to be manufactured and merchandised
wantonly." 3ookchin, Post -Scarcity Anarchism , p. 63.
^Qlbid.
,
p. 285.
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cosmos as alive in the sense of being able to move itself
and of being capable of self -activity
,
the '•scientific”
of our times is based on the concent of inertia.
Nature reacts to external forces; change must be imposed.
Quite simply, nature, wnich consists of matter and motion,
is a passive entity holding no claim to an existence of
Its ovm. In an inanimate universe, humans are destined
to become masters of the lush garden of Eden. The
ecosystem is a fit object to be manipulated in the same
manner as humans control their fellows.
As the social and ecoloirical crises of society
become increasingly insoluble, the old solutions
nevertheless remain basic to most social thought. (Today,
however, they emanate from the centers of technical
expertise.) In lieu of critical self -examination
,
mainstream social science seeks to streamline its
explanations and the operations of existing power structures.
The ecocrlsis, for example, is explicated not in terms of
structural tendencies toward manipulating nature but
rather, in terms of overpopulation; The spectre of
Nalthus has returned to haunt Western society, with many
^^David Kubrin, "How Sir Isaac Newton Helped Restore
*Law *n Order* to the West," Liberation l6 (Karch 1972): 37.
Bookchln comments, "Just as medieval theology structured
the Christian heaven on feudal lines, so people of all
acces have projected their social structure onto the natural
world." Murray Hookchin, "Tovjard an Ecological Society,"
p. 5.
I
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major social problems attributed to the excessive growth
of population In recent years. 52 This phenomenon may be
alleviated by Imposed controls, as can other environmental
problems such as ’’pollution’* and ’’conservation,” The
prevalent Idea Is that the crisis of the environment and
society must be handled by rational, scientific thlnklng--
”envlronmentallsm. ” That Is, the solution to the problem
must be Instrumental In nature when society Itself Is
viewed as an lnstrumentallty--a vast mechanism of raw
Inputs and refined outputs,
’Environmentalism’ tends Increasingly to reflect an
instrumentalist sensibility in which nature is viewed
merely as a passive habitat, an agglomeration of
external objects and forces that must be made more
serviceable for human use irrespective of what these
^ Bookchin comments that expressing population increases
simply as the ratio between birth rates and death rates fails
to explain the complex factors behind such statistics,
”A rising or declining birth rate is not a simple
biological datum, any more than is a rising or declining
death rate. Both are subject to the influences of
economic status of the individual, the nature of family
structure, the values of society, the status of women,
the attitude toward children, the culture of the
community, and so forth. A change in any single factor
interacts with the remainder to produce the statistical
data ’birth rate’ and ’death rate.’ Culled from such
abstract ratios, population growth rates can easily be
used to foster authoritarian controls and finally a
totalitarian society, especially if Malthusian propaganda
and the failure of voluntary birth control are used as an
excuse. In arguing that the forcible measure of birth
control and a calculated policy of indifference to hunger
will eventually be necessary to stabilize world
populations, the neo-Malthusians are already creating a
climate of opinion that will make genocidal policies and
authoritarian institutions socially acceptable."
(Bookchin, "Toward an Ecological Solution," Ramparts 8
[May I970l: 10.)
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uses may be. 'Environmentalism, * in effect, deals
with 'natural resources,' 'urban resources,* even
human resources'.
. .
,
[It^does not bring into question
the underlying notion of the present society that man
must dominate nature; rather, it seeks to facilitate
that domination by developing techniques for diminishing
the hazards caused by domination. 53
The greater rationalization and command of the "resources"
at the disposal of modern society is to be achieved
according to scientific social laws so that at best, a
balance may be struck between economic advantage and
environmental integrity—a solution which in the long run
will solve nothing. There is no long-term compromise
with the earth's own delicate balance.
Socialist thought and the socialist tradition are
in no way free from the idea of manipulating the earth.
Socialism arose in the belief that the needs of humanity
could best be met in a rational fashion if the potential
of the new technology could be tapped for the benefit
of all. The early socialists and present day authoritarian
socialists viewed the cosmos as a vast resource to be
utilized in a rational fashion. For example, the early
authoritarian socialist, Etienne Cabet, in his utopian
novel Voyage to Icaria , dealt with the environment as an
abstraction. Cabet drew Icaria as "arranged with the most
scrupulous regard for symmetry" ; its capital, Icara, for
53Bookchin, "Toward an Ecological Society," p. 4.
^^Berneri
,
Journey Through Utopia , p. 224.
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example,- is perfectly round and Is divided by a straight
river which branches at the center of the city to form a
round island. The perfected environment is no less
manipulative and authoritarian than his views of the
communist life of Icaria, where the wearing of the same
styles, regulation of daily life by the use of bells, and
such, resembled the ideal factory of modern rationalist
authoritarian communism a la U.S.S.R. (see Chapter I
above). Yet even more sophisticated socialists, notably
Marx, assumed that human subjects create, fashion, and
move the inert object nature. Bookchin analyzes the
socialist idea of dominating the environment in this way:
Marx does not advance beyond the moment of the master/slave
relationship. The moment is transfixed and deepened
into the Marxian theory of class struggle--in my view
a grave shortcoming that denies consciousness the
history of an emergent dialectic--and the split between
subject and object is never wholly reconciled. All
interpretations of the young Marx's ' Peuerbachian
naturalism* notwithstanding, humanity, in Marx's view,
transcends domination ambivalently by dominating nature.
Nature is reduced to the 'slave,' as it were, of a
harmonized society, and the self does not annul its
Promethean content. Thus, the theme of domination is
still latent in Marx's interpretation of commanlsm;
nature is still the object of hum.an domination. So
conceived, the Marxian concept of nature--ouite aside
from the young Marx's more ambivalent notions--vitiates
the reconciliation of subject and object that is to be
achieved by a harmonized society. 55
Early anarchist thought, too, posited the desirability
of a subjection of nature to meet the material needs of the
55Murray Bookchin, "On Spontaneity and Organization
,
"
Liberation l6 (March 1972)
:
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people. Harmony between persons, a solidarity of interests
and creativity, has been basic to anarchist thou.Tht starting
with Proudhon, but harmony did not originally extend to
the natural world; the common task of all Individuals was
"taming nature" for the "equal sharing of well-being.
Socialism in Proudhon's view—the negation of privilege
and the creation of an economic order based on liberty
and community resulting from the transformation of the
raw material of nature into created goods--v7as the triumph
of reason, the male mind embodied in the subordination of
Instinctual disorganized nature by labor and science.
Bakunin, basing his theory of sociality on the negation
of the "struggle for life, "57 viewed reason as the means
to a just economic and social structure in a natural world
that was cruel, anti -social and indifferent to human
needs and freedom. The environment, the adversary of an
ignorant humanity in the past, would be developed
"rationally" once the proper material -based consciousness
developed. Thus, the cultivation of reason would enable
society to maximize the yield of the bountiful earth.
All vjould thereby escape Darwinian struggle.
The first conceptual shift with regard to anarchism
and nature is found in the work of the Reclus brothers and
5?Bakunin, Bakunin
,
p. 169 .
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Kropotkin, all three of whom asserted that the lesson of
unrestrained nature is not one of evil and that human
animality does not have to be repressed when people live
together. Hence, animal nature is a positive force.
However, they still assumed the environment itself to be
an asset an aggregation of rocks, minerals, chemicals,
etc, to be "developed" in "a few years by cornmunlst
work, "58 Only in this manner could humans be freed to
live well. Nineteenth century anarchist thought rarely
considered harmony as extending beyond men and sometimes
women; it almost never considered human harmony with
nature. Socialism was draim as the triumph of the mind
over the natural surroundings. It is true that for
Bakunin and Kropotkin, the mind did not have to be
transcended by work or sexual renunciation
,
but they did
vievj the conquest of the environment as the key to freedom
from drudgery. After Kropotkin* s brief period of
communist labor, as depicted in his Fields, Factories and
59Workshops
,
humans would no longer have to concern
themselves exclusively with surviving. They v7ould go
about fulfilling their creative needs and would begin to
feel a greater camaraderie with nature, as did the
primitives he described in his Ethics , who rarely killed
5^Kropotkin, Modern Science and Anarchism , Freedom
Press (1912) editiorTi p. 69 .
59peter Kropotkin, Fields, Factories and Workshops
(New York; Benjamin Blom"! 1969) .
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except for need, and who were In '’awe'* of the beauty and
majesty of the natural surroundings of which they were
Integrally part.
Present day anarchist thought differs most from
earlier anarchist thought in its conception of humans in
nature. Most communitarian anarchists today place a
greater emphasis on humanity as a conscious part of a
diversified structure of organic life and inorganic
matter subsumed under the rubric, ’•ecology
.
Contemporary Anarchist Social Science:
Tovjard the Creation of Sco -Community
Like socialist thought in general, anarchism vievrs
technology as misused, but its vision of technology’s
humanistic potential is considerably broader. Most
communi tarian anarchists hold that if the direction of
Its use and development were reversed, technology would
become the means of eliminating not only privilege and
thus domination from human society, but also of allov/ing
for the first time since the rise of hierarchical society
the fulfillment of physical needs with little ’’work” as
^^Not all anarchists hold this view. There are
still many classical "Bakuninists” grounded in the worldview
of nineteenth century anarchism. Furthermore, there are
some ’’class-struggle” anarcho-syndicalists , as well as
individualist anarchists, whose primary interests lie
outside ecology.
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we know it. Where socialism in the past had to assume a
closed technology, which could (at best) generate only
an equality of need with a highly limited meeting of
desires, anarchism today is engaged in the conceptual
^^^rification of socialism as it could be in a post—scarcity
settlng^^--that is, as a netvrork of relationships transformed
by an open, humanistic technology. The old socialist
tradition has been bypassed in this important aspect by
the achievability of a revolutionized material basis of
communal life which was virtually inconceivable in
Fourier’s, Marx’s, Engels’, Proudhon’s, Bakunin’s, and
William Morris’ lifetimes. Today, the concept of desire
has become essential to the anarchist reconstructive
ideal.
Early anarchists thought that a generalized
knowledge of science and socialized technology could
liberate humans from exploitation by other humans.
Participation in the various aspects of scientific work,
to some degree, in Bakunin's and Proudhon’s visions of
toil-less economic system. The use of the term
here is not In the same sense as Daniel Bell’s critique
of it; in the latter’s view, "post-scarcity" implies an
infinite supply of commodities. Anarchism’s conception
of freedom does not derive from a plethora of things, but
rather from the existence of satisfying social relations.
"Post-scarcity" implies the universal fulfillment of basic
material needs, but it is a precondition of freedom rather
than a freedom in itself. It characterizes a society
free from meaningless work and meaningless commodities.
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socialism would no longer be a privileged occupation, but
rather, an Integral facet of socialist life and a universal
activitv*. 3akunin felt that true socialism—a society
based on liberty
,
equality and solidarity—
-could come into
being and survive if its members were well acquainted
with scientific method and reason. His image of science
was quite Newtonian and thus mechanistic and anti-animistic,
with the conquest of nature being the precondition of
securing an adequate material base for the termination
of exploitation. In present anarchist thought, hovjever,
a new social relationship between individuals depends
upon the renunciation of hierarchy, which began vjlth the
domination of women and ended with the domination of
the environment. In contrast to the *' environmentalist"
ideal of a managed economy and a moderated use of
"resources," contemporary anarchism seeks new relationships
between humans, but with the natural world as well.
Ecology . . . advances a broader conception of
nature and of humanity’s relationship with the natural
world. . .
.^3^ sees the balance and intensity of the
biosphere as an end in itself. Natural diversity is
to be cultivated not only because the more diversified
the components that make up the ecosystem, the more
stable the ecosystem, but diversity is desirable for
its ox-m sake, a value to be cherished as part of a
spiritualized notion of the living universe. . . .
Ecology, furthermore, advances the view that humanity
must show a conscious respect for the spontaneity of
the natural world, a world that is much too complex
and variegated to be reduced to Galilean physlcs--
mechanical properties. Some systems ecologists
notwi thstanding , I would hold with Charles Elton’s
view that ’The world’s future has to be managed, but
this management would not be like a game of chess . . .
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more like steerin,?: a boat.* The natural world
must be allowed the considerable leeway of a spontaneous
development informed, to be sure, by human consciousness
and manapcement as nature rendered self-conscious and
self-active--to unfold and actualize its wealth of
potentialities
.
An ecolof^ically sound society is possible in the
modern world, but it is directly dependent upon the
development of a "liberated technology" (Bookchin*s term),
for "technology must be viewed as the basic structural
support of a society; it is literally the framework of
an economy and of many institutions . "^3 Technological
sophistication is extremely Important to contemporary
communitarian anarchist thought, but there are two crucial
criteria in the anarchist evaluation of technological
progress: First, that it be concordant with the
requirements of the ecosystem, and second, that it
concretely promote the end of human freedom. The
material base for a transformed technology already exists,
at least in the developed countries; however, the various
modern ideologies of scarcity--all entailing power
^^Bookchin, "Toward an Ecological Society," p. 4.
^^Bookchln, Post -Scarcity Anarchism , p. 8?.
^^Goodman wrote:
"Technology is a branch of moral philosophy, with the
criterion of prudence, efficiency, concern for remote
effects, safety, amenity, perspecuity and repalrability
of machines, caution about interlocking priorites
determined by broad social needs." (Paul Goodman,
( The New Reformation: Motes of a Neolithic Conservative
[New York: Random House , 19701} » ^^0
~~
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structures and elites and embodyins the values of hard
work, guilt, discipline, and Imposed order—still prevail.
Ironically, the same values and structures created and
sustained a productive system so successful that it has
undermined scarcity, its nourishing condition. Scarcity
is maintained by a myth preserving the Illusion of a
struggle against nature' and against other humans.
Inequitable distribution preserves this idea of scarcity
so well that there is almost universal acceptance of the
Social Darwinist assumption that one*s needs are filled
at the expense of the needs of others. Therefore,
anarchists seek to transform the modern consciousness. .
The question of the means of such a transformation
may be raised at this point. While few anarchist thinkers
deny the necessity of a ^social revolution," the form of
such a revolution is disputed, especially vjith regard to
questions of violence. However, all are in agreement
that consciousness is not changed in a cataclysmic moment
of revolution. Reichert explains:
The social revolution, all now generally agree, will
not be something sudden and complete in itself, but a
long evolutionary process arising in the will of
individual persons and spreading to others through the
techniques of education and example. Basic to the
social revolution is the transformation in attitude
which V7ill have to take place in the minds of
individuals repcardinsr the phenomenon of power. Where
men tend today' to think of power in terms of organized
force and compulsion, they must come to think of it
as an act of voluntary co-operation aimed toward social
creativity. . . . Qnarchism, since it does not depend
upon the seizure of pov/er , as other revolutionary
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theories do, can lon;ically advocate- a program of social
rebellion aimed toward the gradual but cersistent
transformat ion of the social conditions within society
by genuine non-violent means. ^5
Anarchist social science, rejecting the concept of
academic objectivity, is firmly committed to the abolition
of domination and hierarchy and to the promotion of
Individual autonomy, It perceives these goals, which
imply a harmonious community , direct democracy, a
humanized technology, and a decentralized system as not
only better than existing social forms, but also as the
necessary preconditions for the survival of the human
species and of most other forms of life as well. Social
^^Heichert, ’’Anarchism, Freedom and Power,” pp, l47-l48.
This is not to say, hov^ever, that all anarchists are
committed to the concept of pacifism in the face of state
violence
,
^^The anarchist critique of objectivity would accept
the various criticisms that have been advanced against
this concept by antl-behavioralists of many persuasions.
However, anarchists emphasize not the impossibility of an
objective stance, but rather, the undesirability of
"objectivity.” Humans and the various forms of life and
inorganic matter are subjects in the sense that they are
involved in a vast web of interrelationships as the fact
of their very being.
^"i^This does not mean that there can be an absence
of discord in human society. Reichert explains:
"Anarchists do not suppose for a minute that all
men would ever live in harmony v^ithout the dirupting
conflicts which from time to time set one man or group
against another. They do maintain, however, that the
settlement of conflict must arise spontaneously from
the individuals involved themselves and. not be imposed
upon them by an external force such as government.”
("Anarchism, Freedom and Power, p. l43)
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development in the so-called advanced countries has
carried these libertarian concepts beyond the realm of
morality, for the extreme precariousness of life on a
planet that Is now faced with nuclear war and ecocide (to
say nothin /5 of the threats to physical and/or spiritual
survival posed by •’minor” national antagonisms, pollution,
urban decay, alienation, technological dehumanization,
etc.) seems to bestow a concrete dimension upon the radical
reconstructive ideal. Hierarchical forms of consciousness
and hierarchical social structures have brought about the
global crises with which we are confronted: The anarchist
social scientist holds that attempts to extricate
ourselves from them by further hierarchical solutions are
impossible and often tend, in fact, to further aggravate
the problems. As Bookchln expresses it, ”V/hat was once
regarded as practical and objective has become eminently
impractical and irrelevant in terms of man’s development
towards a fuller, unfettered existence."^® The anarchist
thinker conceives of the solutions in terms of reconciling
what are generally recognized in this society as
dichotomies. This requires a vast expansion of the range
of social experience and consciousness, with no hindrances
^^Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , pp. 69-70.
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upon the development of new forms.
Anarchism is not only a stateless society but also aharmonized society which exposes man to the stimuli
provided by both agrarian and urban life, to physical
activity and mental activity, to unrepressed
sensuality and self -directed spirituality, to communal
solidarity and individual development, to regional
uniqueness and worldwide brotherhood, to spontaneity
and self-discipline, to the elimination of toil and
the promotion of craftsmanship.
Regarded as mutually antagonistic within a highly
fragmented society characterized by the atomization and
Isolation of the individual, the extremely high degree
of the division of labor, consumerism, and the polarization
of rural and urban areas, the reconciliation and realization
of the above elements are posited by anarchist social
science as both possible and necessary. The product of
such a transformation would be bo'th a new stage in the
dialectic of social development (due to the advanced
material base)
,
and yet a return to past forms of social
relations and of interaction with the natural environment.
The unity with the past lies in the existence of a sense
of community and of a sensitivity to the natural
surroundings . At both ’’poles” of the historical process--
at the most primitive stage and at the most highly
developed--we find the phenomenon of communistic society.
. .
. la'Q the first, a technologically primitive
society that still lived in awe and fear of nature;
\a^ the second, a technologically sophisticated
^^Bookchin, Post -Scarcity Anarchism , p. ?8.
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utopia, that could live in reverence
' for nature andbrings its consciousness to the service of life.
Moreover
,
the first lived in a social network of
rigidly defined reciprocities based on custom and
compelling need; the second could live in a free
constellation of complementary relations based on
reason and desire. 3oth are separated by the enormous
development of technology, a development that opens
the possibility of a transcendence of the domain of
necessity, 70
The element central to the anarchist modes of social
organization is spontaneity—that is, behavior, feeling
and thought that is not externally restricted but that is
Instead internally controlled. This concept suggests
the capability of the Individual to regulate his/her own
actions and to shape actively the community’s realities.
Thus, it is antithetical to the ascribed image of anarchist
activity, which is one of undelib$rated and impulsive
behavior. Rather than thwarting social organization and
structure, spontaneity
, . . ordinaril.y yields non-hierarchical forms of
organization
,
forms that are truly organic ,. self -created
,
and based on voluntarism. The only serious question
that is raised in connection with spontaneity is
whether it is informed or not. 71
That spontaneity must be ’’informed” necessitates
the existence of social science and ’’pure” science
(natural) in addition to the scientific activity connected
"^^Bookchin, ”0n Spontaneity and Organization , ” p. 15*
71 lbid.
, p. 9.
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with the development of technology. Science, In the
anarchist perspective, should be quite different from
the forms of science with which we are familiar; the
sciences, both natural and social, should be reintegrated
and directed toward the achievement of ecocommunity
.
a
general harmony and sense of purpose on the part of humans
to'ward each other and the natural world. According to
Goodman, scientific activity should be more akin to
natural philosophy than to the environmental and behavioral
engineering to v:hich it is presently oriented. In
Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals
,
he wrote,
. .
.[Natural philosopher^ conceive themselves as
devoted to a kind of personified Nature from whom they
get primary satisfactions. They would not say that
•nature is neutral,' though of course 'she' is beyond
men's petty concerns. They love nature, or are
curious, or surprised, or awe-struck at finding Cosmos
in Chaos. . . . Correspondingly , nature provides
principles, and often goals, of ethics. This is
different from the excitement of a 'modern scientist'
in his confrontation of nature, which is rather that
of solving a hard puzzle and getting on with, the work
of the self-centered system of science. 72
Science, in the view of the anarchist thinker, must be
de-mythologized and transformed--like technology--into a
phenomenon completely beneficial to humanity. Rather than
a "morally neutral" abstraction subject to manipulation by
power elites, science should be a universal concern;
must be creative and supportive of community .
72paul Goodman, Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals
(Nev7 York; Random House , 19^2 ) , p^^ ^5
•
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W© lifivs s©6n thrit all anarchist thought is SGVsrBly
critical of the centralist mode of social organization.
The common theme of anarchist objections to centralization
is that the latter is invariably fatal to community
(meaningful sociation on an everyday basis)
,
geographical
and otherwise. Of the contemporary writers, Bookchin*s
and Goodman’s works are especially important as explications
of decentralism. Contending that centralization is a
system designed for control—convenience of administration"^^—
modern anarchists envision diverse ecocommunities^^ loosely
federated with one another so as to maximize the individual’s
73*'ln a centralized enterprise, the function to be
performed is a goal of the organization rather than of
persons (except as they Identify with the organization).
The persons are personnel. Authority is top-down. Information
is gathered from below in the field and is processed to be
usable by those above; decisions are made in headquarters;
and policy, schedule, and standard procedure are transmitted
downward by chain of command. The enterprise as a whole
is divided into departments of operation to which are
assigned personnel with distinct roles, to give standard
performance. . . . The system was devised to discipline
armies; to keep records, collect taxes, and perform
bureaucratic functions; and for certain kinds of mass
production. It has now become pervasive.” (Goodman,
Peoole or Personnel
, pp . 3 -^-^ • )
7^Anarchists do not advocate imposing a single
organizational form on society. Indeed, 7jrote Goodman,
”
. . .
it is improbable that there could be a single
appropriate style of organization or economy to fit
all the functions of society, any more than there could
—
or ought to be--a single mode of education, 'going
to school,' that suits almost everybody; or any more
than there is a 'normal' psychology that is healthy
for almost everybody,” ( Ibid
.
,
p. 27.)
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autonomy and that of the basic social unit. 75 in
functional terms, decentralization would be economically
efficient, for with a minimum of central intervention,
individual units would be able to regulate themselves.
Goodman wrote.
The real obstacles in the way of decentralization
and local liberty are not those that are usually
mentioned, namely trie size of populations, the
complexity of society and technology, the necessary
economies of scale, the national econom’’’. Free
citizens could cope with such difficulties, subdivide
administration
,
simplify where complexity has too
many disadvantages, federate where it is worthvjhile,
control necessary bureaucracies from below. In many
of the functions we are hers concerned with, there
are substantial gains in efficiency and savings in
cost just by operating on a smaller scale. . . .76
He observed that "a central clearing house of information”
about the whole federation would be advantageous, but
planning and decision-making are best done locally. 77
However, as important as it is, efficiency is not the
rai son d * etre of decentralized organization. Rather,
the main arguments for the dissolution of megalopolitan
organization center around the improvement in the quality
of life that such a change would generate.
75Goodman described decentralization as ”a kind of
social organization ; it does not involve geographical
isolation, but a particular sociological use of geography.”
( Peonle or Personnel , p. 15-)
7^Goodman, New Reformation , p. l83.
77ibid
. ,
p. 13.
2l4
Anarchist writers, inspired by the historical
examples of the Greek poli
s
and the medieval commune,
have sought to recapture certain features of the above
forms of community as essential to **the good life” of a
free society. At their heights, both nodes of organization
were characterized by a large degree of local autonomy,
which allowed functional ecocommunities in incomplete
forms. Given the technological advances of the modern
age, it is now possible to “resurrect” regionalism, as
well as the authentic ecological consciousness of the
distant (that is, “primitive”) past, but to transcend
simultaneously the strict limits that scarcity had always
Imposed upon human relationships and to construct a social
system whose values v;ould be primarily aesthetic. That
is, all creative activity could be described loosely in
terms of art when people are free of external sources of
compulsion and the heavy burden of need. The “liberatory
technology,” which would eliminate drudgery and thus
alienation, would simultaneously allow everyone to become
an artist and all work to become art. As the British
anarchist Herbert Read put it, art should be “a quality
inherent in all work well done. ”78 All activity in a
free society would be determined by the creative i-rill of
7%erbert Head, To Hell V/ith Culture (New York:
Schocken Books, 1963). P* 93*
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individuals who are united by their essentially affective
ties to others.
Modern anarchism, while it draws heavily upon the
theories of human nature and society propounded by Its
intellectual ancestors, Is nevertheless definitely based
In the realities of the twentieth century, in both its
critical analysis and its constructive speculation. If
we consider the visions of the early .nineteenth
,
mid-nineteenth
,
and late nineteenth-early twentieth
century anarchists, described in the chapters above, the
ideal mode of social organization sketched below by
Bookchin is illustrative of the above point.
. . . a free community will regard agriculture as
husbandry, an activit.y as expressive and enjoyable as
crafts. Relieved of toil by agricultural machines,
communitarians Il'communitarians" does not connote a
single ideal, as "Communist man," but rather is a
polymorphous concept which implies the existence of
many types of free peopl^wlll approach food cultivation
with the same playful and creative attitude that men
so often bring to gardening. Agriculture will become
a living part of human society, a course of pleasant
physical activity and, by virtue of its ecological
demands, an intellectual, scientific and artistic
challenge. Communitarians will blend with the world
of life around them as organically as the community
blends with the region. They will regain the sense
of oneness with nature that existed in humans from
primordial times. Nature and the organic modes of
thought it always fosters will become an integral part
of human culture; it will reappear vjith a fresh spirit
in man’s paintings, literature, philosophy, dances,
architecture, d.omestic furnishings, and in his very
gestures and day-to-day activities. Culture and the
human psyche will be thoroughly suffused by a new
animism.. The region will never be exploited, but it
will be used as fully as possible. Every attempt will
be made by the com.munity to satisfy its requirements
2l6
locally--to use the region’s energy resources,
irlnerals, timber, soil, water, animals, and plants
as rationally and humanistically as possible and
without violating ecological principles . 79
Bookchln expressed an ideal in the above passage,
but a critical examination of this ideal reveals no fixed
plan for organizing and Implementing the changes that are
required. One finds this neglect to delineate in detail
•’post-revolutionary” anarchist structures in the work of
almost all anarchist thinkers, with the possible exception
of Paul Goodman.^® This may be viewed as either a
weakness or a strength of anarchist social science.
Liberal and authoritarian socialist social scientists,
who emphasize prediction and rationalized social planning,
tend to be extremely critical of 'a body of theory which
contains no prescribed answers to many particular
problems that could arise in the course of a social
transformatlon
,
nor the exhortation to utilize existing
structures in a somex'ihat changed setting. Yet anarchist
social science is, by its openness, able to approach a
situation of social reconstruction—hypothetical or
real--with a more undograatic disposition than other
"^^Bookchin, Post-Scarcity Anarchism , pp. 118-119.
®^Goodman*s numerous sociological works abound in
'•practical proDosals," some of which are incompatiole with
his ultimate anarchist vision. That is, his "blueprints
appear to be somewhat reformist, on a level different from
his anarchism.
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existing paradigms (though certainly not "objective”
see p. 207 above) ; it is hardly limited by projections
of present social structures and relations upon the forms
of the future. Furthermore, the anarchist social
scientist perceives his/her function not as a vanguard
agent of social engineering, but as primarily a
"consciousness raiser”®^ of the potential for freedom
in the human animal. There is no necessity, then, for
anarchist social science to apply Itself chiefly to
examining the minute operations of the present’s various
hierarchical organizations nor to enumerating the fine
points of the future's structures. It is a common
assumption that the form.er is irrelevant to anarchist
social science's goal, and the latter v;ould take care of
Itself under conditions of freedom. Furthermore, as
Reichert observes, the open-ended, anti-doctrinaire
nature of anarchist thought is an advantage with regard
to its overriding concern for the freedom of the individual.
Many poorly informed observers condemn anarchism as
a political theory because it fails to set forth a
detailed plan for the implementation of the utopia
it supposedly holds out to us. . . . .Anarchism ... is
oriented toward the future and is wholly in accord with
the notion that contemporary life is inadecuate and
unsati sfactory from the point of view of the individual.
Yet anarchism as a social theory is valid in the eyes
of the anarchist v:hether or not it ever produces any
practical results. For anarchism directs itself at
^^Perhaps this explains the persistent anarchist
preoccupation with education.
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the
. individual and not at the mass. ' It is a *way of
life* which makes it possible for the individual to
transcend the physical restrictions and limitations
he finds himself surrounded by.°2
There is another feature of anarchist social science
that is perhaps simultaneously a weakness and a strength:
Because twentieth century anarchism has not been widely
recognized as a serious -alternative worldview, it has
had virtually no dialogue with the more ’’established’*
schools of social science. Therefore, its recent
development has been somewhat ’’closed” in the sense that
there has been a lack of two-way communication with most
social scientists. Unfortunately
,
because the anarchist
critique as well as its ideal has been largely ignored
in academic circles, there has been little constructive
"feedback” to anarchism from outside the anarchist
movement which would force anarchists to further revise
and strengthen their critioue. Likevrise, mainstream
social science is the less for its failure to address
itself to the issues anarchist social science has raised.
Anarchist thinkers, excluded from the mainstream(s)
of social scientific activity, have not been limited by
the ’’boundaries” of the more ’’successful” paradigms.
Furthermore, anarchism's relative isolation has prompted a
^^Reichert, ’’Anarchism, Freedom and Power,” p. l46.
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more introspective social science in that the tendency
to be theoretically self-conscious is greater when one
is faced with delineating one's own conceptual system
and explicating it from an insurgent position. It may
be true that its isolation makes it easier for anarchist
theory to develop and to retain a certain pristine
quality, but at the same time, it also tends to stifle
the vitality which any body of thought requires for its
continued development as a relevant and effective theory.
Of course, the most basic values and assumptions of the
anarchist thinker have necessitated the independent
development of anarchist social science, but it is the
opinion of this writer that the mutual contact of the
latter with antithetical and partially sympathetic
schools of social science would be fruitful for all
involved.
We have seen that there is an anarchist paradigm
of social science which is distinct from the better
knoim models of social science. However, the impact of
the anarchist paradigm and the many specific works it
has generated has yet to be felt in political science,
political sociology, criminology, social psychology,
social ecology, psychology, etc. Whether or not it is
accepted as a valid perspective by non-anarchists and
whether or not it ultimately succeeds as a social science
will be determined by anarchists* ability to reveal new
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possibilities for everyday living—that is. new dimensions
of freedom for each of us. 3akunin*s and Kalatesta's
admonition against allowing science and even anarchism
itself to become abstractions seems to have been heeded
in most anarchist theory construction to date; anarchist
social science does not posit a single utopian form as
a finite solution to all problems of human life.
Panaceas are necessarily abstractions. If it is to
enhance freedom, anarchist social science must help to
provide the conceptual tools necessary to further
explicate and create the nevj realities of freedora--or,
put differently, new ways of being human. In practical
terms, anarchist social science hopes to stimulate
widespread interest in further researching alternate
social forms as replacements for structures based upon
hierarchical power. Its present value, however, is that
it represents an entirely different mode of studying
people and their relationships to social structures,
starting as it does with the assumption that order
derives from liberty. V/e may close with William Reichert’s
statement of the value of the anarchist social scientific
endeavor for anarchist and non-anarchist scholars alike:
To be an anarchist, then, is not to overturn the
state by force and violence but to reject the use of
force and violence as a m^^ans of maintaining social
order. Thus conceived, the philosophy of anarchism
221
becomes a rich and fertile area of lma.aiaatlve social
perception X'.'hich colltical science has not yet
discovered to any areet extent. Those political
scientists who dare to take seriously its admonitions
concerning freedom and power may vxell reap a rich
revrard
,
sa.ving us from the cul-de-sac in vjhlch we now
seem to be caumht.^l
^^Reichert, '’Anarchism, Freedom and Power," p. l48
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